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ABSTRACT
The problems of locally-enforced building regulations are discussed.
The regulations include zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations,
building and housing codes, and other local land-use regulatory
measures. The more commonly proposed reforms for building laws are
criticized in terms of their inability to deal with the problems of
building control. Finally, the author proposes that a system of
voluntary controls be substituted for the governmental interventions.
The voluntary system consists of strengthened "nuisance" laws and
implied warranties, private covenant systems, and a series of interim
measures which might make such a system politically feasible. The
voluntary system would avoid many of the problems of coercive govern-
mental controls and it could conceivably accomplish the goals of a
safe, sanitary, and responsive environment for all of our citizens.
-- ---- r..........n.. t...leTees As. oe.ee e e eree.e
Nicholas Negroponte, Thesis Advisor
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1.0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
It is the purpose of this paper to investigate the various problems
associated with locally-imposed building laws, to criticize some of the
proposals for reform which have been advocated recently, and to present
an alternative to the present coercive system of environmental control.
The motivation for the choosing of this topic comes from the author's
anarcho-libertarian orientation: the belief that the use of force,
except perhaps in self-defense, is immoral -- no matter how many good
intentions cloak the issue. However, since it is recognized that few
people share this philosophical position, this paper has relied on a
more commonsense and empirical approach.
The anarcho-libertarian bias has one significant advantage over tradi-
tional left-wing or right-wing thought: the anarcho-libertarian is
class-blind. The author is concerned only with "means," never ends.
The author is neither for nor against the poor, the rich, developers,
environmentalists, or any other group. Briefly, the anarcho-libertarian
believes that every individual regardless of class interests, should be
entitled to pursue whatever goals he or she values so long as the "means"
employed do not entail an infringement on the equal rights of others.
The specific goals are relatively unimportant. If the "means" used in
pursuit of those goals are moral (i.e., non-harmful and noncoercive),
then the "ends" are both moral and acceptable.' At various points in
this paper, it may appear that the author favors the poor or the
developer, but this is merely the result of the author's observation
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1.0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (continued)
that coercive laws have often been used against these groups. If the
laws magically were transformed to disadvantage the rich or the
environmentalists, the author would be no more satisfied. This attitude
is process-oriented and, as such, cannot intentionally promote any
particular set of class interests or values.
Not unexpectedly, the anarcho-libertarian bias leads to moral disapproval
of all government interventions in the building process: property taxes,
eminent domain powers, mandatory registration of professionals and
craftsmen, rent control, government-sponsored urban renewal, etc. Since
these topics range too widely, the present work confines itself to the
rather narrow scope of local land-use and amenity controls: zoning
ordinances, building codes, subdivision controls, historical commission
requirements, conservation commission requirements, and the like. These
are all locally-enforced victimless crime laws.
Zoning laws control building bulk, floor area, height, setbacks, lot
size, frontage length, and land use. Historical commission regulations
cover many of the same items and, in addition, cover aesthetic controls
(but usually only apply to strictly limited areas which some people
consider to have historic or architectural significance). Conservation
commission regulations allow or disallow development (but usually only
apply to strictly limited areas which some people consider to have
ecological significance). Subdivision controls cover the lot sizes,
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1.0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (continued)
streets, and various common amenities which must be provided when large
tracts of land are subdivided into smaller parcels for development into
residential neighborhoods. Building codes cover plumbing, electrical,
structural, fire-preventative, and various general construction features.
Together these laws effectively dictate the what, where, when, and how
of construction.
This particular set of laws was chosen because it forms a cohesive,
well-defined group of interventions and because the effects of any one
set of regulations tend to reinforce the others. Each of these regula-
tions seeks some (frequently high) level of amenity; each increases
costs; each mandates middle-class, middle-of-the-road standards; each
decreases user options.
It is the author's belief that most of the problems caused by building
laws are inherent in the system of government intervention. The
mechanisms that operated when our first clumsy attempts at building
control were enacted are identical to the mechanisms that we see
operating today. The personalities change, but motivations and processes
seem to be immutable. For this reason, historical anecdotes are
sprinkled liberally throughout this work. Through the use of historical
examples, it is hoped that the reader will be able to gain a sense of
the basic, essential futility of trying to control the lives of fellow
human beings.
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1.0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (continued)
Chapter 2.0 A Taxonomy of Laws, using a priori reasoning, proves that
building laws per se can have no beneficial results. For the reader
who understands and believes the contents of this chapter, Chapters 3.0
through 9.0 will prove redundant. Chapter 3.0 Enactment discusses the
motivations behind enactment of building laws and outlines some of the
problems involved in the enactment process. Chapter 4.0 Nonenforcement
shows how the intent of the law may be thwarted through substantial
non-compliance. Chapter 5.0 Enforcement shows how the intent of the law
may be thwarted through errors in the original enactment. Chapter 6.0
Mechanisms of Exclusion discusses several of the more important ways in
which those who frame the laws acquire and maintain favored positions.
The problems outlined in Chapters 3.0 through 6.0, as serious as they
are, are not theoretically unsolvable. For instance, a corps of well-
programmed robots might solve all nonenforcement problems. They could
evict inhabitants of non-standard housing and demolish the offending
buildings; they could administrate zoning and subdivision ordinances
without allowing exceptions; they would be unlikely to become tempted by
graft; and they would have no choice but to be objective in their duties.
This solution would not be satisfactory, but it is possible. Chapter 7.0
Values, however, outlines the basic, necessary problems inherent in
any coercive system of building laws. This chapter is at the heart of
the thesis. Chapter 8.0 Reforms suggests some criteria for reform and
criticizes some recent suggestions for reform in terms of those criteria.
Chapter 9.0 Toward a Solution advances the skeleton of a voluntary system
-9-
1.0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (continued)
of building control and considers the political factors that might lead
us to such a system. Appendix A -- Chapter 10.0 Myths treats some
specific issues in building law that may worry the average reader.
Appendix B -- Chapter 11.0 "Have Nots" and Building Law and Appendix C --
Chapter 12.0 "Haves" and Building Law enumerate the various groups of
individuals who have been unjustly harmed or enriched by building
legislation. These final three chapters are not necessary to the overall
development of the thesis, but may prove helpful to other proponents of
a voluntary approach.
(1) A further discussion of this principle can be found in Robert
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, 1974), pp. 30 ff.
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2.0 A TAXONOMY OF LAWS
Very often the conditions to which enactors and reformers of building laws
have responded have been deplorable indeed. The first major push for
housing code and zoning code enactment in this country followed a
disastrous fire on March 26, 1911 at the Triangle Shirt Waist Company in
New York City. 146 workers, mostly young girls, were killed because of
provision of inadequate fire escape routes.1 But this sort of catastrophe
is merely a result of human ignorance and carelessness. Accidents of
this sort will occur with or without government decrees. Even if we
grant that the owner had little regard for human life, simple self-interest
would have guaranteed that he would take all the precautions that he could
afford against the threat of fire -- the fire destroyed his property too.
The same logic applies to his workers. All other things being equal,
an aware worker will choose to work in a safe environment rather than in
a fire trap. But, the lawmaker argues, people are not aware and all
things are not equal. This sadly, is often true, but the enactment of
laws cannot improve the situation and may actually cause a deterioration
in the ability of the market to respond to the wants and needs of users.
Let us now investigate the possible permutations of the conditions cited
above. In the following analysis, the word "lawmaker" refers to the
framer of the law. This person may be an architect or an engineer or a
city planner or a legislator or an interested layperson. This is the
person with the power to force others to do his will, the regulator. The
"user" is the regulatee, the one who is forced to obey the law. This
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2.0 A TAXONOMY OF LAWS (continued)
person may be a builder or a landlord or an architect or an engineer or a
self-helper or a tenant. He is the one without the power.
Condition A:
(1) The lawmaker doesn't recognize that a building problem exists.
(2) The user doesn't recognize that a building problem exists.
In this situation, no improvement can be made except by accident. No law
could help because there is no one with enough knowledge to frame the law.
This situation has certainly been the cause of many modern difficulties
such as Ronan Point2 or the John Hancock Tower's structural inadequacies. 3
Both buildings met state-of-the-art building codes, but both were
structurally inadequate because the state-of-the-art provided insufficient
information about the structural capabilities of these buildings.
Condition B:
(1) The lawmaker doesn't recognize that a building problem exists.
(2) The user does recognize that a building problem exists.
As in Condition A, no law could help because there is no one with enough
knowledge to frame the law. But this situation is different in that
improvements can be made. Every architect or designer has been in the
embarrassing position of having a contractor or owner spot a foolish error.
Then, amidst rationalizations and red faces, the error is corrected and a
possible problem is averted.
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2.0 A TAXONOMY OF LAWS (continued)
Condition C:
(1) The lawmaker does recognize that a building problem exists.
(2) The user does recognize that a building problem exists.
This situation has two subpermutations which must be discussed separately.
Condition CI:
The user is willing to correct the problem.
In this case no law is necessary because the user recognizes and
voluntarily corrects the problem. An example of this situation would be
found in a law requiring all housing to have a roof. This would be a
silly law and would have no benefits. This sort of law is enacted
frequently however and serves to make the code books thicker and more
unwieldy (see Section 5.1 Underkill).
Condition CII:
The user is unwilling to correct the building problem.
This condition has two variations also.
Condition CIIa:
The law remains unenforced.
This situation is extremely common. It happened in medieval London, turn-
of-the-century New York City, and modern Texas; it is the predominant
pattern in emerging nations. Needless to say, such a law carries no
benefits, but may be subject to much abuse (see Chapter 4.0 Nonenforcement).
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2.0 A TAXONOMY OF LAWS (continued)
Condition CIIb:
The law is enforced.
Such a law is almost always a victimless crime law. Aside from such a
law being paternalistic, it will, of necessity, entail side effects that
will damage people more than the original problem would have. Consider,
for example, a law requiring all housing to have an automatic dishwasher
to promote the health and convenience of the people. For some people,
primarily the rich, this law would have no substantive effect since they
would have owned an automatic dishwasher with or without a law
(as in Condition CI cited above). For others, the middle class, the
side effects would be moderate: because of the cost of the dishwasher,
they may have to forgo a weekend trip to the mountains or the purchase
of an encyclopedia. But note that their condition is worsened (at least
in their own judgment) by such a law -- if that were not the case, they
would have owned a dishwasher and would hot have to be forced to buy one
(in other words, they would have been in the category of the rich above).
For the poorest people in our society, such a law is catastrophic -- they
may not even be able to afford any kind of housing because of it, or they
may have to forgo another necessity such as food.
Condition D:
(1) The lawmaker does recognize that a building problem exists.
(2) The user doesn't recognize that a building problem exists.
In these circumstances, it might be thought that a law would be most
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2.0 A TAXONOMY OF LAWS (continued)
beneficial. This is the situation that lawmakers most frequently
perceive (though often they are mistaking Condition C for this one)
and this is where information really can be useful. But the question
arises, "Do we need a law?" and the answer emerges, "No." All that is
needed to transform Condition D into Condition C is information and
education. No force of law is necessary. Of course, it is recognized
that the various building laws do provide needed information to
designers, but voluntary standards would serve as well as coercive laws
for this purpose.
From the above analysis, we can see that, at least theoretically, a
building law is never beneficial and is seldom even neutral in its
effects. Of course, the examples cited above are extreme cases, but
the average building law differs only in its lack of exclusivity: most
laws actually fall in several of the categories discussed above and their
effects vary depending on the knowledge and wealth of the people on
whom they are imposed and on the knowledge and conscientiousness of the
people by whom they are imposed.
In the next seven chapters, let us investigate some of these situations
as they have occurred in the real world.
(1) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), p. 26.
(2) Hugh Griffiths, Alfred Pugsley, and Owen Saunders, Report of
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2.0 A TAXONOMY OF LAWS (continued)
the Inquiry into the CoZllapse of Flats at Ronan Point, (vini,;nil
Town (London, 1968), pssim. reports how a relatively small gas
explosion caused the collapse of several bays in a high-rise
residential tower. The affected bays were destroyed from roof
to ground floor. Although the building conformed with the
codes, no one had expected that much pressure would be put on the
exterior walls from the inside of the building. When the
explosion blew out that wall, all of the bays above it came
crashing down and this unexpected weight caused the collapse
of all the bays below the damaged one.
(3) The new John Hancock Tower was designed and built in accordance
with Boston building codes. As the building was nearing
completion, it was discovered that the wind-bracing was
inadequate. The owner thereupon paid for a massive reinforcement
of the deficient members. The problem was that the framers of
the Boston building code had not contemplated that a structure
of that size would ever be built in Boston. In both these
cases the law was not unreasonable; the problems were simply a
result of normal lack of foresight on the part of the framers
of the codes.
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3.0 ENACTMENT
The first set of problems we will investigate concerns the circumstances
that surround the enactment of building laws. Section 3.1 The There-
Oughta-Be-A-Law Syndrome discusses the motivation for enactment of
building laws. Not everyone who advocates such controls is as well-
intentioned as the reformers we discuss here (see Appendix C -- Chapter
12.0 "Haves" and Building Law for an alternate view of this process),
but, for the moment, we will ignore the base motives of some reformers
and concentrate on the "do-gooders." Section 3.2 The Framers' Problems
and Section 3.3 The Political Process show how, even if a "good"
building control could be found, its chances of enactment into law would
be negligible.
3.1 The There Oughta-Be-A-Law Syndrome
People with the advantages of wealth and education have often observed
the "inadequacy of other people's housing. This has always been an easy
observation to make since "adequate" is a relative term. The poorest 1/5
to 1/3 of housing has everywhere and everywhen been defined as "inadequate."1
Seeing that people are killed in fires, in structural failures, or in
plagues, reformers cry, "If only the architect had done such-and-such,
these innocent people would not have died." They see filth and crime
among the poor and they lament, "If only the builder or owner had done
so-and-so, the poor would have comfortable fulfilling lives. And they
-17-
3.1 The There-Oughta-Be-A-Law Syndrome (continued)
start enacting laws to force architects and builders and owners to
correct the inadequacies.
The reformers hopes are about as realistic as the hopes of the teetotalers
before Prohibition. The There-Oughta-Be-A-Law response assumes that the
law will have the desired result and no other; it assumes that the law
will operate in a vacuum. This is not the case.
(1) As pointed out in Edward C. Banfield, The UnheavenZy City
Revisited, A Revision of the UnheavenZy City (Boston and Toronto,
1974), p. 22, the lowest 1/5 to 1/3 of the population has
everywhere and everywhen been defined as "below the poverty
line." This reasoning easily extends to housing problems,
dropout problems, police brutality, and a host of other so-called
problems.
3.2 The Framers' Problems
Feiss has said that "[t]he design and redesign of cities and their
maintenance at the highest possible level of human, economic, and physical
value is a task of such magnitude that the validity of uninformed or
amateur approaches to it is subject to question."1 But leaving such
problems in the hands of the elite few is even more questionable.
"Unfortunately for the community, in lieu.of solid information, [planners]
will tend to rely on their own experience and background, and this
inevitably creates hardships and problems for those of different
perspectives, tastes, and attitudes."2 Obviously, even in a relatively
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3.2 The Framers' Problems (continued)
small commurity, a framer cnriot lave al.l the necess;lry information a]i:
the time: such a claim would imply omniscience about economic, social,
and aesthetic values which no human could possibly possess. Thus, the
framer of the law depends on "soft" information -- his personal values,
the political process, historical trends -- and, of necessity, the
framers' answers will be inappropriate for many people.
First, framers run into problems of conflict of interest. If they want
to keep their jobs, they must respond to what their clients want.
Since the "client" is usually a government, the framers respond to the
wants of the middle-class or upper-class bureaucracy which controls the
government rather than to the wants and needs of the users.3 To a large
extent there is no outright dishonesty involved here: those who think that
"urban" is synonymous with "chaotic and unhealthy" will gravitate towards
suburbs and those who believe that suburban tracts are monotonous and
unstimulating will gravitate towards cities. The problem is that whatever
parochial interests control the appointment of planners and code
designers, these same interests will be reinforced by the framers'
decisions.
Another difficulty springs from termporal changes. Though many building
codes and zoning ordinances provide for periodic (even yearly) updating,
the needed changes are seldom politically or economically possible to
enact. People will not tolerate changes that may rezone adjacent property
-19-
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3.2 The Framers' Problems (continued)
for industry or allow a fire trap to be built next door. People grow
accustomed to a certain level of protection from zoning and building
codes and will not sit by idly when planners suggest any lowering of
standards. And if a raising of standards is promoted (stricter
building codes or rezoning from industrial to single-family residential),
the property owners who are affected will object to a lowering of the
value of their property (non-conforming uses and substandard buildings
are worth less on the market than identical buildings which, because
of less stringent regulations, comply with the law).
A third problem springs from legal difficulties. As will be shown in
Section 4.1 Variances, Appeals, and Other Legal Exceptions, courts will
occasionally interfere in the local processes and framers must adhere
to judicial and constitutional guidelines. Although zoning and regional
planning schemes have sometimes allowed a locality to "take" property
without compensation,4 constitutional guarantees do not normally allow
such thefts. This legal limitation on the power of planners has long
been a source of complaint.5
A fourth problem that the framers of laws have encountered is their own
lack of foresight (see also Section 5.2 Blunders). London planners who
sought open space got slim towers built on one- and two-story podia which
virtually covered lots and eliminated open space.6 Boston's West and
North Ends were long considered to be the second worst slums in the
-20-
3.2 The Framers' Problems (continued)
United States; 7 this erroneous view led to the demolition of one of
Boston's most cohesive and socially-satisfactory neighborhoods. 8 A
prize-winning "dumbbell" apartment plan of 1879 was cursed only twenty
years later as leading to the worst conditions.9 "Model" tenements in
New York City frequently became uninhabitable slums.10 And in case
the reader believes that such elementary mistakes are a thing of the
past, consider the recent statement (by a planner advocating uniform
building codes) that "any" model code would work anywhere!u Anyone
who believes that acceptable standards for warm, sunny Phoenix would
be equally appropriate in Boston's freeze-thaw cycles, Miami's hurricanes,
or Los Angeles' earthquakes is not adequately in touch with reality.
But this list of difficulties only scratches the surface: (5) planners
must base laws on past experience, and this system will necessarily
prove inadequate in anticipating future events12 -- especially in the
fast-paced technological society of today; (6) planners cannot (yet)
force entrepeneurs to develop a parcel -- they can only stop development
-- but such a negative tool cannot hope to effect positive results;
(7) the framers of laws tend to be myopic -- at a time when poor
emigrants were fleeing from conditions in Europe, planners praised
London and other European cities for their healthful, sanitary
conditions;L3 (8) finally, the possibilities for graft should not be
ignored -- bribing a planner to zone one's property in accordance with
one's wishes is easier and less obvious than bribing the local board
-21-
3.2 The Framers' Problems (continued)
of appeals for a variance.
Thus we see that, even if the framers of the law were granted unlimited
freedom to enact whatever provisions they desired, building regulations
would be riddled with parochial exceptions, personal preferences, and
outright blunders.
(1) Carl Feiss, "Planning Absorbs Zoning," Urban Land Use Policy:
The Central City, ed. Richard B. Andrews (New York and London,
1972), p. 125.
(2) Bernard H. Seigan, "The Case Against Land Use Planning,"
Reason Magazine, 7, 9 (January, 1976), p. 10.
(3) Bernard H. Seigan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 4 ff. contains an
excellent discussion of the planning of a zoning ordinance.
Similar pressures and circumstances surround the framing of
building codes, but the process is not often so generally open
to the consuming public.
(4) Ibid., pp. 224 ff. discusses how zoning and planning schemes have
sometimes been used as a cheap surrogate for eminent domain
proceedings.
(5) Bernard H. Seigan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), p. 82.
(6) Dean Hawkes, Building Bulk Legislation: A Description and
Analysis (Cambridge, England, [n.d.]), p. 37.
(7) New York slums won dubious first prizes. Lawrence Veiller,
"Housing Conditions and Tenement Laws in Leading American
Cities," The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W.
DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903), p. 136.
(8) Herbert J. Gans, The Urban ViZZagers (New York and London, 1962),
passim.
(9) Lawrence Veiller, "Tenement House Reform in New York City, 1834-
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3.2 The Framers' Problems (continued)
1900," The Tenement tlouse Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W.
DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
p. 101.
(10) Ibid., p. 86. Veiller himself did not seem to learn from
experience as witnessed by his "model" tenement of 1896, ibid.,
pp. 107 ff.
(11) David Falk, Building Codes and Manufactured Housing (Washington,
D.C., 1973), p. 78.
(12) Edmund Contoski, "Government Controls and Urban Renewal,"
Reason Magazine, 7, 1 (May, 1975), p. 26.
(13) Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller, "The Tenement House
Problem," The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W.
DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
p. 58. At about the same time, British planners praised
American tenements, G. Topham Forrest, The Construction and
Control of Buildings and the Development of Urban Areas in the
United States of America (Westminster, England, 1925), p. 108.
This situation is known as "the grass is always greener on the
other side of the Atlantic."
3.3 The Political Process
The planers' "ideal" solutions, imperfect though they are, are unlikely
to be enacted and enforced in their original form. Before any zoning plan
or building code is enacted, it must run the gauntlet of some political
process.
"Property rights and political rights are devoid of meaning when they are
subject to the variables of the popular moods and caprices." ! The "good"
cannot be ascertained by counting noses.2 Local contractors, unions, D.A.R.
ladies, realtors, Sierra Club members, J.C.C.ers, historical commissions,
-23-
3.3 The Political Process (continued)
Leagues of Women Voters, and other special interest local groups all vie
in the political battle to get zoning and code regulations that reflect
their desires. 3 And whoever yells and fights hardest usually wins
regardless of how parochial or devoid of merit his case may be.4
Admittedly, public pressure is not necessarily a bad thing. Veiller noted
that public scandals regarding the construction of jerry-built tenements
made those tenements unsalable -- a strong market incentive for
maintaining some generally acceptable minimum standards.5 More recently
credit card burnings and boycotts have been used to discourage unwanted
development.6 The major differences between this (acceptable) type of
public pressure and the (unacceptable) legislative variety mentioned above
are twofold.
First, laws are more or less permanent. Once a law has been passed
(especially a law purporting to protect some segment of the population
without any apparent cost), it is extremely difficult to get it repealed
-- witness the current situation with anti-marijuana or anti-gambling
laws. The bureaucracy becomes entrenched and constantly fights to have
its power extended. Thus even when the original supporters of a building
regulation change their minds, the law remains. The non-legislative
equivalent has no such drawback. If the unwanted development becomes
acceptable (through changing economic, social, or aesthetic conditions)
and the threat of public pressure is removed, the developer is free to
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proceed.
Second, laws are coercive. There is little recourse for the losers in
the legislative battle. An example will help here. Let us look at the
increasingly popular case of the Association of Local Nature Lovers v.
Cheapo Tract Homes, Inc. 7 The nature lovers want strict building codes
(this makes development expensive, thereby discouraging it, thereby
leaving more land in its natural state) and zoning ordinances which
mandate extensive wildlife preserves. The management of Cheapo Tract
Homes, Inc. and their potential buyers from the ghetto want few or no
building codes (thereby making the costs of new homes more affordable) and
small-lot zoning. Political pressure in the legislative process will
almost always insure that the nature lovers win and the poor will be
excluded from the community entirely. This cannot be a just result. The
free enterprise situation is very different. If zoning and building codes
are removed from the nature lovers' repertoire, the nature lovers will
compromise; typically they would have to pay the developer to leave
natural spaces in the development. Either extreme -- doing nothing or
bribing the developer not to build -- seems unlikely, but if either
happened, it would not be unjust; it would show either (1) that the nature
lovers do not love nature enough to make even a small sacrifice (i.e.,
they only want open space if they can get it for "free" by stealing it
from someone through the legal system), in which case total development is
the most just result, or (2) that the nature-lovers value nature intensely
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and thus deserve open space and no development. Note that in no case
are the ppor saddled with the bills -- they can only benefit from such a
situation. Thus, an optimum result is obtained. Nature lovers get open
space to the extent that they are willing to pay for it and the poor get
affordable homes.
This example raises a third problem with the political process. There
was a good reason why the Association of Local Nature Lovers won the
battle for restrictive local codes: they already lived in the town and
had greater influence than the poor who might have moved to the town had
the project been built. Local building restrictions are intensely
parochial. 8 Many of the people who are most affected by local laws are
never represented in the political process that leads to enactment of a
law: non-resident businessmen, workers, landlords, and possible future
residents. This situation is patently unjust.
Thus we see that even regulations that were initially perfect, equitable,
and benevolent would suffer amendment and distortion in the local
political arena. As long as building regulations are locally enacted and
locally enforced, the local political process -- in public hearings or
social events or casual conversations -- will insure that the laws protect
the status quo at the expense of those who cannot or will not participate.
(1) Bernard H. Seigan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
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Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 222.
(2) Bernard H. Seigan, "The Case Against Land Use Planning,"
Reason Magazine, 7, 9 (January, 1976), pp. 10 ff. Bernard H.
Seigan, Other People's Property (Lexington, Massachusetts,
Toronto, London, 1976), pp. 3 ff.
(3) Numerous examples of the sort of compromises which result from
the political process are found in S.J. Makielski, Jr., The
Politics of Zoning (New York and London, 1966), passim. The
political maneuvers which accompany building code enactment
have not been so entertainingly documented, but that such a
mechanism exists cannot be in doubt. See, for instance,
Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and Michael A. Fischetti,
Survey of the Administration of Construction Codes in Selected
Metropolitan Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968), passim.
(4) Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game, Municipal Practices and
Policies (Madison, Wisconsin, 1966), p. 91, or "Land Use: Rights
of the Regulated," AREA Bulletin, 2, 3 (May, 1976), p. 2.
(5) Lawrence Veiller, "The Speculative Building of Tenement Houses,"
The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W. DeForest and
Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903), p. 377.
(6) Seigan, Land Use Without Zoning, p. 43.
(7) Although this is a fictitious case, it is based on characteriza-
tions of zoning cases given by numerous authors. Of course, the
issue is not always over ecological considerations. The tax base,
the community character, and a variety of other real and
spurious excuses have been used by suburban, middle-class
pro-zoners to justify exclusionary practices. However, the
analysis stands even when the name of the residential group is
Suburbantown Taxpayers' Association or A-Maple-Tree-On-Every-Lawn
Coalition.
(8) John W. Reps, "Pomeroy Memorial Lecture: Requiem for Zoning,"
Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard B. Andrews
(New York and London, 1972), p. 12.
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The first building regulations in English-speaking countries emerged in
London in 1189: a "building's court" was organized "for the allaying of
the contentions that at times arise betweeen neighbors in the city
touching boundaries made, or to be made, between their lands and other
things...."' This court ruled on boundary disputes and pollution
complaints and, most importantly, they issued decisions that were aimed
at preventing the spread of fires. Numerous fires had periodically done
extensive damage to the city of London and this court attempted to
minimize such damage.2
A number of the decisions from this early court seem justified:
prohibitions on erecting buildings which block sunlight from nearby
buildings (probably the beginnings of "Ancient Lights" legislation in
England) and prohibitions on the pollution of abutting property because
of inadequate plumbing facilities (common nuisance law).3 We say these
laws seem justified because they prohibited a person from doing any
physical damage to his neighbor's property or person.
But other decisions shared the flaws of modern legislation: for instance,
the strict fire codes which required a builder to erect a three-foot-thick
fireproof party wall on the property line4 and which mandated tile roofs
and fire-fighting apparatus.5 These laws, though intended to prevent
damage to the property of others, did not prohibit acts which are harmful
to others. Not building a fireproof wall or not having fire apparatus
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onr }ind cannot be conr;true(i to) I e;a to danmage necessarily (perhapss the
regulated building was so fireproof that there was no danger of it
contributing in any way to a fire on adjacent property).
Another basic problem with these fire laws is that if the owner complied
with the law and later was responsible for a fire on his property that,
in spite of the fire code, caused damage to a neighbor's property, the
owner (the person who was responsible for the damage) would be held
harmless (see Appendix A -- Section 10.6 Land-use Controls Protect the
Environment for a more complete discussion of this point).
But these were not the only problems. A major difficulty that this
legislation shares with modern building laws is that it was and they are
unenforceable. Pre-Elizabethan England had no enforcement agency6
(though builders were sworn to abide by the law7). But even when there
is an enforcement agency, it is often impossible to uphold building
regulations. In the next five sections we describe some common
mechanisms which result in nonenforcement of building laws.
(1) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation in
London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), p. 6.
(2) Ibid., p. 7.
(3) Ibid., p. 6.
(4) Ibid.
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(5) bid., p. 8.
(6) Ibid., p. 7.
(7) Ibid., p. 8.
4.1 Variances, Appeals, and Other Legal Exceptions
One of the most common mechanisms which results in nonenforcement of
building laws is the legal variance procedure. It is perhaps significant
that the first recorded building law case is indicative of the fate of
many later laws -- the first case is the granting of a variance. In
London in 1302, a certain Mr. Bat was allowed to build a thatch (rather
than tile or some other fireproof material) roof in exchange for an
indemnity.l
Modern zoning practice is the worst villain in this regard: in many cases,
so many variances, rezonings, appeals, and special exceptions have been
granted that the zoning law might as well not exist. "The variance
procedure, conceived originally as zoning's 'safety value' [sic] to relax
pressures arising from minor situations involving 'practical difficulty
and unnecessary hardship,' has been much used and abused...."2 "[Large
numbers of patently illegal variances are granted every year." 3 In a
study done on all variances or rezonings granted in the United States,
only about one quarter were rejected.4 But, of course, zoning is not the
only villain: building codes5 and even statewide land-use regulations6
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are routinely by-passed via legal variance, appeal, and special
exception procedures.
The reasons for such a plethora of approved variances are diverse.
Sometimes the authories compromise so as not to run afoul of the courts.7
As noted by Reps, "Zoning is a police power measure -- it follows that
the impact of zoning regulations must be reasonable and that their
effect must not be so burdensome that they amount to a taking of
property instead of a mere restriction in the interests of protecting
or promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 8
Thus in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, a local zoning decision was overruled
by the Supreme Court as an improper infringement of property rights.9
Although the courts have generally upheld land-use planning as a
legitimate application of police powers,10 numerous recent cases have
invalidated local statutes because of their exclusionary effects:
DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No. 1,11 MoZino v. Mayor and
Council of the Borough of Glassboro,l2 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Township of Madison,13 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mt. Laurel,14 National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board
of Adjustment,'5 Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. ,16 Board of County
Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper,'l 7 Buchanan v. Warley,l 8 Crow v.
Brown,'9 Dailey v. City of Lawton, Oklahoma, 2 and Kennedy Park Homes
Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, New York.21 In each of the cases
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listed above the courts have invalidated local zoning ordinances because
of exclusionary provisions. It is therefore not surprising to find that
many local boards prefer to grant a variance instead of having a case
go to court where the entire local ordinance might be overturned.
At other times political or fiscal considerations militate in favor of a
variance being granted. Doebele writes, "...we read daily in the
newspapers of municipal competition for a choice light industry or
shopping center. Fundamental principles of zoning and rational allocation
of urban land on a metropolitan scale have been known to bend very
easily when the local tax base is at stake."22 (See Appendix A -- Section
10.5 Zoning Maintains Low Property Tax Levels for a more complete
discussion of "fiscal" zoning. See Appendix C -- Section 12.7 Some
Politicians for a more complete discussion of "political" zoning and
land-use control.)
A final factor which might enter into the granting of bona fide
variances, and one which has not received wide notice is the problem of
arbitrariness. Mandelker's study of the Seattle area land-use policies
showed conclusively that there was no noticeable relationship between
stated goals regarding apartment location and the actual variances
granted.23 Proximity to a major artery had been a stated condition, and
that did seem to be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition, but
a review of the denials seems to indicate that proximity to a major
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artery was also a necessary condition to a denial. 24 In other words,
developers simply didn't apply for a rezone or variance unless they were
planning to build near a major highway.2 5 Moreover, rezoning decisions
by County Commissioners also bore no relationship to the nature of
surrounding development despite the planners' contentions that they
made fine-grain distinctions on that basis.2 6 If the granting of
variances, rezonings, and other legal exceptions is as whimsical as
Mandelker's study suggests, it is no wonder that building laws are so
frequently ineffectual.
Of course, not all legal exceptions allow the developer to do whatever he
wants. Many variances are compromises or partial exceptions only. But
developers are aware of this propensity of local administrators to allow
partial exceptions and they have learned to deal with the situation
appropriately: they simply ask for much more than they actually want2 7
or they include legal, but undesirable, features in the design which can
be traded off in the bargaining procedure.
Because of the various legal exception procedures, building laws have been
unable to provide the promised protection in a variety of circumstances.
It might be argued at this point that the granting of exceptions merely
allows the free market to influence the construction industry, but this is
not true for two reasons. First, only a select few can afford to apply
for variances -- the granting of variances bestows a favored position on
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some while causing harm to those who are unable to apply and to those few
who are refused. This sort of legal disparity is incompatible with the
free market. Second, under free market conditions (i.e., without building
laws and their guarantees), people would voluntarily enter into covenant
systems which would prevent much of the development that is allowed via
legal exceptions.
This point is important. If the building law system serves any desirable
function, it is to create some sort of certainty, some level of protection,
some semblence of control to the users of buildings. If that certainty is
eroded through the various mechanisms of nonenforcement, it would be better
to avoid making legal guarantees and to allow people to contract with
their neighbors to achieve the level of certainty that they desire.
(1) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation in
London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), p. 9.
(2) C. McKim Norton, "Elimination of Incompatible Uses and
Structures," Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed.
Richard B. Andrews (New York and London, 1972), p. 97.
(3) Building the American City (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 226.
(4) Allen D. Manvel, Local Land and Building Regulation, How Many
Agencies? What Practices? How Much Personnel? (Washington, D.C.,
1968), pp. 32 f.
(5) Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and Michael A. Fischetti,
Survey of the Administration of Construction Codes in Selected
Metropolitan Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 3.
(6) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
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Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), 1). (08.
(7) An enlightening discussion of this point and the resultant
compromises is contained in Bernard H. Siegan, "The Case
Against Land Use Planning," Reason Magazine, 7, 9 (January,
1976), p. 7.
(8) John W. Reps, "Pomeroy Memorial Lecture: Requiem for Zoning,"
Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard B.
Andrews (New York and London, 1972), p. 12.
(9) 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The decision, rendered by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, read in part, "The governmental power to interfere
by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner
by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and
other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if
it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.... That the invasion of the
property of plaintiff in error was serious and highly injurious
is clearly established; and, since a necessary basis for the
support of that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning
authorities comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment
and cannot be sustained."
(10) See R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and
Land Use Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), pp. 180 ff.
(11) 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970). Subsidized housing was allowed
in a residential area as a matter of public policy.
(12) 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971). A zoning ordinance
which mandated luxurious conditions in multiple-family dwellings
was invalidated under the equal protection provision.
(13) 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971). One-acre zoning and
large home sizes, which had been adopted to retard the growth of
the community, rendered the zoning ordinance void in its entirety.
(14) 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972). Using equal protection
reasoning, the courts invalidated a zoning ordinance which
discriminated against the poor.
(15) 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). The courts invalidated a
four-acre minimum lot size provision.
(16) 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). The courts overturned two-
and three-acre zoning, but felt that one-acre zoning was
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permissible under the circumstances.
(17) 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). The courts invalidated a
two-acre minimum lot size provision that had been imposed on
two-thirds of the county because of its exclusionary effects.
(18) 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Racially restrictive zoning was declared
unconstitutional.
(19) 332 F.Supp. 382, 457 F.2d 788 (1972). The courts overruled a
locality which had refused to issue a building permit for a
subsidized multifamily project.
(20) 425 F.2d 1037 (1970). Zoning based on racial bigotry was
overturned.
(21) 436 F.2d 108, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). Zoning based on racial
bigotry was overturned.
(22) William A. Doebele, Jr., "Key Issues in Land Use Controls,"
Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard B.
Andrews (New York and London, 1972), p. 5.
(23) Daniel R. Mandelker, The Zoning Dilemma, A Legal Strategy for
Urban Change (Seattle, 1971), pp. 133 ff., pp. 142 ff.
(24) rbid., p. 144, pp. 133 ff.
(25) Whether this is due to market forces (voluntary choices to build
near convenient transportation routes) or to builders' decisions
not to apply for a variance unless stated policies of the zoning
law were met, is unclear. Perhaps both considerations were
weighed by developers.
(26) Mandelker, p. 170.
(27) Siegan, "The Case Against Land Use Planning," pp. 7 f.
4.2 Graft, the Personal Variety
Building laws and graft seem to be inseparable. Early English surveyors
(a government position roughly equivalent to building inspector) were so
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notoriously corrupt that the Royal Institute of British Architects formed,
in part, in response to the situation and Punch did a vicious and well-
known satire on them.l After a particularly ugly scandal in the late
1800s, this position was no longer filled by appointment, but rather by
election2 -- a reform which has still not been universally implemented in
the United States.
Naturally, the first serious attempts at building law enforcement in this
country were also rife with graft, which was a source of complaint both
from the public 3 and from the honest inspectors.4 Indicative of the extent
of this problem is the curious fact that even Tammany Hall politicians
were among the backers of the early New York City zoning codes. 5
This problem continues to this day with no sign of abatement.6 As long as
an owner or contractor can cut costs by paying a bribe rather than by
obeying the law, our system of building control will foster dishonesty.
This is particularly true when the law mandates the unnecessary, the
redundant, or the impossible, 7as is frequently the case. This will also
be particularly true as long as appointments to building control positions
are given to political supporters or kinsmen (see Appendix C -- Section
12.2 Inspectors).
The form of personal graft discussed above is ubiquitous, but another,
almost unknown variety of individual graft deserves mention here. When a
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developer desires to build in such a way so as to harm a neighbor, he
might consider "bribing" the neighbor to compensate him for the damage.
This seems quite equitable and has actually been proposed as one system
of building law reform. Much to the consternation of government
officials, this form of "equitable bribery" was used extensively in
London with regard to "Ancient Lights" legislation. 8 Unhappily, our
current system of government-enforced laws and codes, which emphasizes
prosecution and complaint by government officials (rather than by aggrieved
neighbors), has discouraged its use in favor of the less equitable (but
more effective in the American context) system of bribing government
officials. The developer will bribe whoever has control of prosecution.
If that person is a government inspector, justice will not result. If
that persori is a damaged neighbor, the outcome will be equitable.
Whatever the form, personal graft is a major contributory mechanism
resulting in nonenforcement of building laws.
(1) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation in
London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), pp. 91 f.
(2) Ibid., pp. 86 f.
(3) For instance, "Tenement Evils as Seen by the Tenants," The
Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W. DeForest and
Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903), p. 385.
(4) For instance, C.A. Mohr, "Tenement Evils as Seen by an Inspector,"
The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W. DeForest
and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903), p. 421.
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(5) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), p. 123.
(6) For instance, ibid., pp. 208 ff., p. 301.
(7) Warren W. Lehman, "Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conserva-
tion of Chicago's Housing Supply," Urban Land Use Policy: The
Central City, ed. Richard B. Andrews (New York and London, 1972),
pp. 168 f.
(8) Dean Hawkes, Building Bulk Legislation: A Description and
Analysis (Cambridge, England, [n.d.]), p. 29.
4.3 Graft the Public Variety
"Technical requirements are frequently used as a lever to attain more
influence over the applicant [for a building permit]. [The administrator]
makes a practice on bargaining on such items as required set-backs to
attain his esthetic objectives, e.g., he permits slight encroachments
over building lines to achieve certain esthetic gains. [Footnote] The
authorities make a practice of establishing setbacks so that the buildable
area is slightly less than what is currently desired. This forces
designers to ask for small encroachments over the building lines in
exchange for certain municipal esthetic objectives."1
The incentive strategy described above has been widely praised and is used
worldwide. It must be noted, however, from the developer's point of
view, that this public strategy is no different from the personal graft
problem described in the previous section -- and the developer has
justification for his point of view. If the purpose of building regulation
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is to provide citizens with a certain level of protection and if we wish
to live up to our guarantees, laws must be clear. Laws, in order to
provide some reasonable degree of certainty and objectivity, must apply
a binary response (either it is legal or it is illegal) to the very
intractable real world. (That this binary response is also just and
workable is shown in Section 9.3 The Problem of Diseconomies.) Either
an action is defined to be harmful and should be forbidden (except by
consent of the "harmed" party) or an act does not harm another and
should be permitted. If a local official "underzones" (the situation
described in the quote above) and bargains down to the point where no
damage is caused, the developer would be harmed unjustly. Either the
developer would reject the incentive and would be forced to build in a
suboptimal fashion (for instance, a small building when a larger building
would do no harm) or he would accept the incentive and would be forced
to pay for (questionable) public goods. On the other hand, if a local
official zones "properly" and bargains down in exchange for public
goods, neighbors would be harmed unjustly and the whole purpose of
building regulation would be undermined. In every case, some private
individual (either the developer or the neighbor) is forced to pay for
some public benefit. Such a policy is necessarily unjust.
This form of "public graft" occurs over a wide range of statutes. The
most simplistic use of this technique has been implemented in building
codes. For instance, overly strict concrete codes have been promulgated
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with the understanding that waivers would be issued for "special cases."2
The most sophisticated use of this technique is normally found in zoning
regulations. For instance, New York City has allowed developers to
increase their built areas by up to ten times the area of plaza, arcade,
or connector-plaza if the developer builds such a public amenity. 3 Aside
from the questionable value of providing often-deserted public spaces,
this policy necessarily leads to less light and increased densities
which harm neighbors.4 It seems incredible that a law designed to
protect neighbors' rights should lead to unavoidable damage to neighbors.
However, as long as control remains in the hands of bureaucrats, such a
situation will persist.
But these are not the only tools that local officials use to blackmail
would-be developers. Delays in the granting of approvals, variances, and
permits; 5 threats of strict enforcement of laws;6 or even rejection of
acceptable projects (if the official doesn't like working with the
developer for one reason or another); 7 have all been used. In fact, our
building regulation system is so fraught with this sort of wheeling and
dealing that it has been suggested that public relations and other
"people skills" are more important to a designer/builder than architectural
or technical competence.8
As long as local bureaucrats are allowed to say, "Do it my way or you
can't do it at all," the building industry will be subject to the sort of
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abus( described above. Nd(,;i. ; lo ay, I:i.s ort o.' i)lise can lead to a
considerable undermining of the goals of building regulation.
(1) Sidney Cohn, Practice of Architectural Control in Northern
Europe, A Report Prepared for HUD (Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
1968), p. 104.
(2) G. Topham Forrest, The Construction and Control of Buildings and
the DeveZopment of Urban Areas in the United States of America
(Westminster, England, 1925), p. 34.
(3) Dean Hawkes, Building Bulk Legislation: A Description and
Analysis (Cambridge, England, [n.d.]), pp. 22 f.
(4) In the United States, we must assume that zoning bulk
regulations are "reasonable," i.e., that if more bulk were to be
built, neighbors would be harmed. "Underzoning" would be
declared unconstitutional.
(5) Cohn, pp. 104 f., p. 129 f. Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game,
Municipal Practices and Policies (Madison, Wisconsin, 1966), p.
53. That such delays entail significant costs is verified in
George Sternlieb and Lynne Sagalyn, "Zoning and Housing Costs,"
Land Use Controls: Present Problems and Future Reform, ed.
David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), p. 135, p. 137.
(6) This author has seen threats of strict enforcement used on a
number of occasions. The folly of ignoring such threats has also
been proved: many regulations that are costly and unnecessary
are generally ignored.
(7) Daniel R. Mandelker, The Zoning Dilemma, A Legal Strategy for
Urban Change (Seattle, 1971), p. 130.
(8) Charles G. Field and Steven R. Rivkin, The Building Code Burden
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1975), p. 95.
4.4 Flexibility
"This point needs to be underscored, for public intervention in the land
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development market carries heavy penalties for the losers and substantial
gains for the winners. If zoning is not to result in arbitrary decision-
making, it must be based on a policy which sensitively discriminates
between cases of refusal and cases of approval on grounds which are
supportable in matters of substance and equity. None of the variables
which were isolated for study -- and which the plan selected -- in the
King County rezoning process had an appreciably high explanatory value....
A zoning process caught in ambiguities such as these cannot succeed."l
The lack of objective criteria on which to base decisions mentioned above
with respect to Seattle zoning apply equally well to other local building
regulations. Considerable personal discretion is vested in local building
inspectors2 and this power is used 3 and abused.
The situation is unsatisfactory now, but many "reforms" which have recently
become popular introduce even more "flexibility" (as it is euphemistically
called). In particular, special permits, floating zones,4 contract
zoning,5 planned unit developments, and performance standards have all come
under fire. Although each of these "reforms" solves some problems, they
are all subject to abuse when enforced by the thousands of local officials
around the country.6
The zoning devices all grant the local officials excessive amounts of
personal power over applicants. They do not give control to people living
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in the neighborhood, people who might or might not be harmed by unusual
developments. They do not give control to the developer, to the person
who has the most to lose under the circumstances. Moreover, they tie
the developer to an inflexible plan which, by law, cannot be changed to
meet unexpected site or market conditions.
Performance standards, though they show promise if standards are set so
as to define damage objectively, are flawed too often. They frequently
actually allow some pollution, thus abrogating the rights of neighbors.
Moreover, they are often so technical that laypeople are incapable of
dealing with them. The most serious problem they present, however, is in
the area of predictability. It is very difficult, and sometimes probably
impossible, to predict the actual characteristics of a large development
before its construction.
Thus we see that we should be very cynical of the optimistic claims of
the reformers who favor these reforms. Flexibility is needed, but this
freedom should be placed in the hands of the people who are most concerned,
the developer and his neighbors. There should be no place for discretion
by administrators and bureaucrats and inspectors.
(1) Daniel R. Mandelker, The Zoning DiZemma, A Legal Strategy for
Urban Change (Seattle, 1971), pp. 167 f.
(2) See, for instance, Charles G. Field and Steven R. Rivkin, The
Building Code Burden (Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London,
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1975), pp. 39 f.
(3) Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and Michael A. Fischetti,
Survey of the Administration of Construction Codes in Selected
Metropolitan Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968), pp. 39 ff., pp. 65 ff.
(4) The floating zones system is one in which a particular zone and
all of its required standards appear on the books, but no
specific land area is set aside for such a zone. If and when a
project is proposed that would be built in such a zone, rezoning
is considered individually and rejected or approved on whatever
arbitrary grounds seem important to the local administrators.
(5) Contract zoning is a system in which a rezoning is granted, but
special conditions are placed on the parcel -- generally by
placing a covenant on the land. For instance, a parcel might be
rezoned for industrial use, but a covenant would be placed on the
land restricting its use for a scientific research facility. As
with floating zones, planned unit developments, and special
permits, this system encourages graft, favoritism, and arbitrari-
ness.
(6) Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game, Municipal Practices and
Policies (Madison, Wisconsin, 1966), pp. 6 ff., p. 91. Edmund
Contoski, "Government Controls and Urban Development," Reason
Magazine, 7, 1 (May, 1975), p. 26. Bernard H. Seigan, Land Use
Without Zoning (Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972)
pp. 64 f.
4.5 Beneficent Nonenforcement
"Norms practiced or legally required by organized public and private
sectors, but impractical for the mass of the people, are simply ignored.
For example, if building land is restricted by private commercial
speculation, it will be taken out of the commercial market through
organized invasion if no other land is available, or if poor people
cannot pressure the political authorities into expropriation on their
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behalf. "'
Turner would find it extremely difficult to find the example he cites
above in a completely free market -- even in the notoriously oligarchic
land market of Hawaii, strict statewide controls have been adopted.
However, he makes an excellent point: whenever enforcement of a
building regulation would cause extreme damage to the majority of
people, it will be (justifiably) ignored.2
Medieval England was plagued with this problem. The "building court"
had promulgated some very sensible fire rules, however, the fire hazard
in London was such that the richer people had already switched to fire-
proof construction so the law had no effect on them, 3 and the poorer
people could not afford stone homes without starving so they ignored the
law and the law had no effect on them.4 By the early 1500s England
still had not learned this lesson. A heavy influx of continental emigres
combined with an expanding economy created an enormous pressure to increase
density in London. Queen Elizabeth I, justifiably worried about the
plague, issued a law forbidding the construction of any new homes in
London and allowing a maximum of one family per residence. 5 In 1589 this
law was reaffirmed and a four-acre minimum lot size was established for
all England.6 The emigres, faced with the choice between starving in their
homeland and disobeying a building regulation in England, sensibly chose
the latter. And, much to their credit, the "surveyors" studiously
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ignored Elizabeth's edicts. Developers prefabricated homes and erected
them at night to avoid being obvious in the flouting of the law. And
Elizabeth angrily castigated both the "surveyors" and the "covetous and
insatiable" businessmen 7 but, happily for the poor, the building laws
remained unenforced. In the reign of King James (1603-1624), another
spate of building regulations was issued. Authorizations f demolitions
were conferred on the seventeenth century British planners which gave
them more authority than modern American planners have; architectural
controls and class-conscious residency controls were established; a
reaffirmation of the "no new housing" law and fireproof construction
code was issued; and most onerously, a law against the habitation of
cellars was enacted. 8 Predictably, these laws were also disobeyed.9
Beneficent nonenforcement also accompanied building laws-in the United
States. The first housing code was issued in New York City in 1867 and
other major cities quickly followed suit but these laws, directed against
deplorable tenement conditions, were disobeyed often enough to be the
rule.1 0 The recent emigrants crowded into downtown Manhattan slums and
erected squatter settlements in the suburban boroughs.11 Incredible
though it seemed to middle-class reformers, these conditions were better
than could be found in Europe (as witnessed by the continuing waves of
starving emigrants), and mercifully the tenement codes were ignored.
Modern building codes have often suffered the same fate for the same
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reasons: most housing in Laredo, Texas would be condemned if minimum
housing standards were to be enforced12 and in 1955 it was estimated that
a million people would be left homeless in New York City if the multiple-
dwelling code were to be enforced strictly.13
Of course, motivations for beneficent nonenforcement are sometimes not
very beneficent. Some localities have noticed that code enforcement can
lead to abandonment of the building by the owner and, since cities
seldom have sufficent demolition funds to cope with the problem, they
have opted for non-enforcement.14 Other localities have found that
homeowners resent the invasion of privacy that accompanies inspections
and have thus found it impossible to enforce the code.15 Finally, in
some areas, the inspectors, recognizing their inability to deal competently
with complicated industrial projects, have given up the pretense of
inspection.16
In all of the instances cited above, nonenforcement of building laws, even
though it undermined the stated goals of the law, was preferable to
enforcement -- the position of the poor was not worsened, urban blight and
additional taxes were avoided, the civil right to privacy was maintained,
and incompetent harassment of developers was avoided. Beneficent
nonenforcement, as laudable as it is, entails at least three real
difficulties however.
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First, beneficent nonenforcement is a perfect breeding ground for graft
and discretionary enforcement. In one case that this writer knows of, a
contractor was forced to pay over $7000 to the municipal authorities on a
$250,000 contract because he had refused to bribe a local inspector. The
inspector hauled out every unused building regulation he could find and
charged the contractor with every legal (but normally unenforced) fine and
fee on the books. This was rank injustice, but the contractor had no
legal recourse. As long as unenforced laws remain on the books, building
regulation will foster dishonesty and corruption.
Second, beneficent nonenforcement, along with all the other nonenforcement
mechanisms, insures that the promises and guarantees that we make about the
environment will be broken. Houses are not always safe, sanitary, and
sound; neighborhoods are not always protected from the invasion of
undesirable projects; our environment is not always free from pollution.
Since we are unable to fulfill our promises, we should not lie to people so
glibly. Better to live with an honest caveat emptor than with a dishonest
government.
Finally, beneficent nonenforcement breeds a general contempt for law. Those
laws which actually do prevent harm may be disobeyed along with the others
making the enforcement of "good" laws much more difficult.
(1) John F.C. Turner, "Housing as a Verb," Freedom to Build, eds. John
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F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter (New York, 1972), p. 171.
(2) Some reformers have denied the validity of this reasoning.
William G. Grigsby, Housing Markets and Public Policy
(Philadelphia, 1963), pp. 305 ff. denies the possibility of
wholesale abandonment and suggests that "[s]imply compelling
cities to do what the law already demands would be a big step
forward." Such an opinion seems naive in light of New York
City's abandonment rate. Grigsby also overestimates the
ability of enforcers to compel obedience to an unpopular law.
(3) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation
in London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), pp. 6 f.
(4) Ibid., p. 7.
(5) Ibid., p. 12.
(6) Ibid., p. 14. Certain rural industries and, of course, the
upper classes were exempted.
(7) Ibid., p. 15.
(8) Ibid., pp. 18 ff.
(9) Thid., p. 71.
(10) Spencer D. Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement
(Washington, D.C., 1970), p. vii. Lawrence Veiller, "Non-
enforcement of the Tenement House Laws in New Buildings," The
Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W. DeForest and
Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903), p. 257.
(11) Kate Holladay Claghorn, "Foreign Immigration and the Tenement
House in New York City," The Tenement House Problem, Volume II,
eds. Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London,
1903), pp. 72 f.
(12) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), pp. 29 ff.
(13) Edward C. Banfield, The UnheavenZy City Revisited, A Revision of
the Unheavenly City (Boston and Toronto, 1974), p. 51.
(14) Parratt, p. 13.
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(15) Ibid., p. 11.
(16) Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and Michael A. Fischetti,
Survey of the Administration of Construction Codes in Selected
Metropolitan Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968), pp. 65 ff.
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At the turn of the century, DeForest claimed that the tenement problem
in New York City was solved, that even prostitution (an "evil" long
associated with tenements) was fast disappearing.1 DeForest was
optimistic because the reformers had managed to enact the housing law
that they had advocated and the reformers themselves were in charge of
enforcement.2 DeForest's claims seem incredible in light of today's
facts: the worst housing for the poorest people in New York City is
no better today than it was 75 years ago and even prostitution in New
York City has not yet been completely eradicated. It is sadly all too
easy to poke fun at DeForest's sanguine expectations.
Zoning laws have fared no better than housing codes. "Like the
assumptions of Prohibition, those of the European planning movement
fell very wide of the American cultural reality. One of the contributions
of the twenties was a mass of urban evidence which showed just how wide
the gap was between the original planning theory of zoning and its
actual applications in the nation's towns and cities." 3
Given the contents of the previous chapter, we may safely lay much of the
blame at the doorstep of nonenforcement. Economic conditions, birthrate,
social values, and a variety of other given circumstances have had more
effect on urban form than any legislation. However, enforcement of
building laws brings with it some different, and perhaps more serious
problems. This chapter discusses two problems which have seriously
-52-
5.0 ENFORCEMENT (continued)
undermined the goals of building law although, superficially at least,
the letter of the law may have been obeyed.
(1) Robert W. DeForest, "Introduction, Tenement Reform in New York
since 1901," The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert
W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
pp. xx f.
(2) Ibid., pp. xiii f.
(3) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), p. 203.
5.1 Underkill
There do seem to be some localities which have been "successful" in
enforcing their regulations. These are areas where there are building
regulations, where the regulations are enforced, and where no apparent
hardship results. This situation is usually the result of one very
special set of circumstances: the regulations are so unexacting that
there exists virtually no constraint on developer behavior.
Perhaps the most well-known case of underkill is Los Angeles' zoning.
Whenever planners gather to discuss the trouble with zoning, someone is
bound to compare Los Angeles (which has had zoning for 50 years) to
Houston (which has never had zoning) and conclude that there is no
appreciable difference between the urban forms of these two cities.l
This draws sighs from planners because this observation seems true. But
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this fact is not surprising since Los Angeles along with many other cities
and towns has indulged in "overzoning." 2 This practice insures that the
zoning codes will have no substantive effect on the form of the city.
The underkill problem is slippery since the exact provisions which
constitute underkill may vary from site to site and from time to time.
For instance, economic conditions in one year may be such that developers
consider obedience of building regulations to be an outrageous luxury.
The following year these same developers may willingly adopt high
standards knowing that this strategy will insure speedy approvals and
amicable inspections and knowing that the buying public will be willing
to afford the additional costs.3 In fact, in light of the modest building
proposals made in New York City in recent years,4 it may be that that
citadel of strict building regulation is moving toward an "underkill"
position.
(1) This example is taken from Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game,
Municipal Practices and Policies (Madison, Wisconsin, 1966),
p. 251. Babcock believes that differences do exist in the fine-
grain structure of the city, but offers us no proof.
(2) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), pp. 204 ff.
"Overzoning" is the practice of allotting too much land area to
a given use. If too much land were to be set aside for commercial
or industrial uses under cumulative-use zoning practices, the
zoning ordinance would have no substantive effect on developer
behavior. This practice was widely indulged in southern
California.
(3) Some apartment developers such as Flatley in the Boston area and
some manufactured home builders make a regular policy of
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overdesigning. These builders aim for a wealthier market than
would normally be expected. It seems that in at least some
instances, this overdesign strategy is calculated to overcome
difficulties with building laws. See, for instance, Charles G.
Field and Steven R. Rivkin, The Building Code Burden (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1975), p. 77.
(4) Dean Hawkes, Building Bulk Legislation: A Description and
Analysis (Cambridge, England, [n.d.]), p. 21.
5.2 Blunders
Throughout the ages catastrophes have been associated with building
problems. Often the disasters occurred because the building laws had
not been enforced. This was undoubtedly the case with the great plagues
in London in the 1300s which killed one-third of the population and
which occurred despite refuse laws,l or the Plague of 1665 which killed
one-quarter of the population (about 100,000 people). 2 It was also
probably true of the Great London Fire of 1666 which was not completely
extinguished for four months,3 and with the numerous smaller fires and
structural collapses of the nineteenth century.4 But as we saw in
Section 4.5 Beneficent Nonenforcement, the laws could not have been
obeyed under the social and economic conditions extant at the time. We
must face up to reality and accept the fact that these horrible,
death-dealing catastrophes were inevitable; no mere law could have
averted them.
In another category, we find laws which have been enforced but which,
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mostly because of lack of foresight or knowledge on the part of the
framers, did not alleviate the problems they were designed to solve.
Thus we find that London's stringent fire codes did not stop the fires
resulting from the Fire Blitz of December 29, 1940.5 This was certainly
not the planners' faults -- no one could reasonably have planned for
bombing. But the fact remains that even the most intelligent plans
cannot foresee all contingencies. Thus we find that the 1916 New York
City zoning laws which were motivated by the merchants' desire to
protect Fifth Avenue and by public uproar against skyscrapers such as
the Equitable Building and the Woolworth Building,6 did not prevent
airlines and banks from taking over the once-fashionable shopping
district7 and did not prevent even more objectionable buildings from
being erected in Manhattan. 8 Nor did the suburban residential zoning
provisions which allowed for small "Mom and Pop" groceries for neighbor-
hood convenience prevent traffic-provoking 24-hour mini-supermarkets
from proliferating in otherwise quiet neighborhoods. 9
The most painful type of building law, however, is the law that actually
mandates a building problem feature. The early New York City building
codes required that each habitable room be open to the outside air.10
This law caused developers to build narrow "air shafts" in order to
conform with the law without pricing the buildings beyond the means of
the poor. Not only did virtually everyone hate these air shafts (tenants
frequently boarded them up) -- they cost money, they collected filth,
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they made privacy impossible, and they transmitted noises and odors --
but they were cited as a major factor in the spread of tenement fires:
26% of the fires studied in Veiller's magnum opus were spread through
these light and air shafts.u
In more recent years, a similar situation has developed with sanitary
waste disposal laws. Although there exist several modern, ecologically
sensible systems which might benefit both owners and neighbors, our
building codes continue to mandate traditional (often pollution-prone)
plumbing systems.
The examples cited above are hardly conclusive evidence of the inability
of legal restrictions to deal with building-related problems, but they
should serve to prove to us that it is possible that some of our laws
actually work to undermine our benevolent goals.
(1) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation
in London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), p. 10.
(2) Ibid., p. 28.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid., pp. 78 ff.
(5) Ibid., pp. 122 ff.
(6) The bulk legislation would have prohibited these two buildings but
would have had little or no effect on most construction. Seymour
I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), pp. 163 f.
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(7) Ibid., p. 290.
(8) Ibid., pp. 291 ff.
(9) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), p. 10.
(10) Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller, "The Tenement House
Problem," The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert
W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
p. 18.
(11) Hugh Bonner and Lawrence Veiller, "Tenement House Fires in
New York," The Tenement House ProbZem, Volume I, eds. Robert
W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
p. 264.
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"In more metropolitan areas than one cares to count, it is virtually
impossible today to build a suburban house on less than a one-half-acre
lot. We are told by the home builders that all Americans prefer the
single-family isolated house. The fact of the matter is ... an American
family building or buying a house today very often has little legal
choice in the matter. The aged, the single, the childless, and most
important, the less affluent of our population, are being systematically
excluded from more and more parts of our metropolitan areas."1
This chapter deals with the single most controversial aspect of building
law, exclusion. When the result of law is to create a preferred
position for some, while ignoring the needs and aspirations of others,
there is basic inequality before the law. Building laws, and to some
lesser extent other municipal strategies, have created just such an
imbalance.
(1) William A. Doebele, Jr., "Key Issues in Land Use Controls,"
Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard B.
Andrews (New York and London, 1972), pp. 4 f.
6.1 Costs
"The fundamental point is that controls and regulation, even where well
intended and apart from the fact that they mainly produce shortages and
increases in price, more importantly diminish freedom.... This
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increase will favor the affluent and disproportionately burden the poor.
The large urban centers have suffered the most, and the deterioration
they have experienced can be traced directly to these controls." l
The fact that compliance with building law increases costs without any
concommitant increase in user desirability is indisputable. The fact
that cost increases caused by building regulation result in a reduction
of housing opportunities for the poor is self-evidently true and has
been mentioned by most critics of such regulation.
There are three ways in which costs are increased via building regulation.
First and most obvious, are the direct costs of mandated features (e.g.,
minimum lot sizes, prohibitions on the use of plastic pipe). These costs
are easily documented in the following subsections. Second, there are
indirect costs which result from decreased supplies. The most obvious
case in zoning law occurs when the locality zones very little land for
apartments; this results in an artificially constricted supply facing a
high demand and prices of such land are necessarily driven higher than they
would be without zoning. The most obvious case in building codes occurs
when the law requires a builder to use a scarce resource, for instance, a
licensed electrician; this type of law increases demand artificially (while
other laws keep supplies in check) thus necessarily increasing building
costs as in the example above on zoning. These indirect costs have never
been documented.
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The third way in which local building laws increase costs is very indirect:
the cost of enactment and enforcement. $300 million is spent annually by
local governments (this figure does not include regional, state, and
federal costs or the massive amounts of voluntary time which are donated
on the local level) on local land and building regulation.2 Although this
cost is only about .6% of the construction costs affected by the
legislation,3 it is questionable whether society should afford even this
small cost for enforcing laws of such dubious value.
In the following two subsections we will discuss the cost issue as it
relates to zoning and building codes respectively.
(1) Norman Karlin speaking at a conference entitled "Land Use:
Rights of the Regulated," as reported in an article of the
same name, AREA Bulletin, 2, 1 (January, 1976), p. 1.
(2) Allen D. Manvel, Local Land and Building Regulation, How Many
Agencies? What Practices? How Much Personnel? (Washington, D.C.,
1968), p. 2.
(3) Ibid.
6.1.1 Zoning and Land-use Controls
Most writers who have been concerned with zoning have noted that zoning
and urban renewal works have both increased costs directly1 and
indirectly through reducing supply2 or encouraging speculation.3
"Acreage zoning, reflected in low population density, is the most
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significant factor (correlation coefficient = .60) in comparing recent
increases in house sales prices in various parts of the country." 4
Obviously, high costs necessarily lead to exclusion of the poor. Justice
Westenhaver of the lower court in the famed Ambler Realty Co. v. Village
of Euclid case was among the first to note the exclusionary effects of
zoning5 and his observation has been eloquently echoed by many others:
"Exclusionary zoning is actually a redundancy. All zoning is exclusionary,
and is expected to be exclusionary; that is its purpose and intent."6
The most widely discussed supply-restricting feature of zoning is the
minimum lot size. 93.8% of all local governments with zoning7 have a
minimum lot size requirement and 23% of them have a minimum of 1/4-acre
or more for any type of building.8 25% of those municipalities inside
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAa) have 1/4-acre minima --
in other words, urban areas are actually slightly more exclusionary than
exurban areas!9 Of those localities with a zoning ordinance, 8.8% had
2-acre zoning in at least some of their area.10 The SMSAs were also
more exclusionary in this respect with 10.8% of those localities zoning
for 2-acres or more on some of the land included in the township.ll Some
SMSAs are notably more exclusionary than the average however.
It is said that 50% of the land within 50 miles of Times Square is zoned
for a one-acre minimum lot size. 12 A study of Westchester County
exclusionary zoning practicesD is particularly enlightening. In 1952 the
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zoned capacity of this county was 3,209,100 people; by 1957 it had been
reduced to 2,274,300 people; and by 1969 it was down to 1,763,600
people -- a 40% reduction in under two decades.14 About 1/3 of Westchester
County is zoned for a density of less than one person per acre -- a
surprising statistic considering that some of the most densely populated
land in the United States is only a few miles distant.15 This same
study proved that exclusion exists in Westchester County: by the early
1970s more people were working in this "bedroom" county than were living
there. An opposite result would not have proved a lack of exclusionary
effect (some suburban communities are quite exclusionary: they outlaw
both the poor and industry too), but when workers must commute to
"bedroom suburbs" to go to ork, one knows that exclusionary practices
are rampant. On the other side of New York City, similar results have
been found. 77.0% of the single-family residential land in a study done
in northeastern New Jersey was zoned for more than one acre. 17
Floor area minima have also added considerably to the burden. 36.9% of
all housing which falls under a statute with minimum floor areas
requires 600 square feet or more.18 The SMSAs were again more exclusionary.
43.9% of the metropolitan housing which falls under minimum floor area
requirements must occupy 600 square feet or more.19 Again, in some areas,
this sort of provision is much more restrictive: in one four-county area
in northern New Jersey, 77.6% of the single-family residential-zoned
land required 1200 square feet or more as the minimum building size. 20
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Of course, other local land-use regulations can have a significant effect
too (one of the reasons why the simple elimination of zoning would
probably not be completely effective in ridding ourselves of exclusionary
practices). Zoning's little sister, subdivision controls, which often
mandate road building, expensive drainage schemes, and various other
improvements, can also prove quite exclusionary.21 Conservation
commissions and their counterparts have also been known to decrease the
supply of buildable land significantly: Orange County, California;
Moulton Ranch; and El Toro have set aside 50% of their land for open
space; South Laguna Beach has declared 75% (17,000 of 26,000 acres) to
be off limits to developers.2 2 The researcher reporting these figures
accurately notes, "What advocates of open space don't tell you is that
the cost of the unused, unproductive land is slapped on the cost of new
homes." Minimum frontage requirements have also been shown to be a
significant provision in the exclusionary codes. In the study in
northeastern New Jersey, 68.4% of the land covered by single-family
residential zoning had a 150 foot minimum frontage requirement.23
Whether the costs are direct in the form of costly requirements or
indirect in the form of decreasing necessary supplies, zoning and other
land-use controls are unavoidably exclusionary.
(1) Allen D. Manvel, Local Land and Building Regulation, How Many
Agencies? What Practices? How Much PersonneZ? (Washington, D.C.,
1968), p. 3. R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The
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States and Land-Use Controt (New York, Washington, London, 1975),
p. 162. Edward M. Bergman, Eliminating Exclusionary Zoning:
Reconciling Workplace and Residence in Suburban Areas
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974), p. 6.
(2) Linowes and Allensworth, p. 162. Bergman, p. 6. Edward C.
Banfield, The UnheavenZy City Revisited, A Revision of the
UnheavenZy City (Boston and Toronto, 1974), p. 16. Gil
Ferguson speaking at a conference entitled "Land Use: Rights
of the Regulated," as reported in an article of the same name,
AREA Bulletin, 2, 1 (January, 1976), p. 1. Or consider the
eloquent example cited in Fred Bosselman, "Can the Town of Ramapo
Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Entire World?" Land Use
Controls: Present Problems and Future Reform, ed. David
Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), p. 254. The only
state to adopt and implement comprehensive state zoning, Hawaii,
had a median value of owner occupied housing of $35,100 in 1970.
This compares with the national median of $17,000 in the same
year. This example provides us with an estimate of what indirect
costs might be if zoning were conscientiously applied everywhere.
(3) Bergman, p. 3.
(4) Chris Kristensen, John Levy, and Tamar Savir, The Suburban
Lock-out Effect (White Plains, New York, 1971), p. 8.
(5) 297 Fed. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), reversed 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Westenhaver's decision was, of course, overturned by the Supreme
Court, but the lower court's findings were surprisingly
prophetic.
(6) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 88.
(7) 90.1% of all governments with 5,000 or more people have zoning
ordinances. Manvel, p. 31. It can be assumed that some
reasonable proportion of the remaining communities are covered
by county zoning codes.
(8) Ibid., p. 32.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
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(12) Siegan, p. 91.
(13) Kristensen, Levy, and Savir.
(14) Ibid., p. 3.
(15) Ibid., p. 7.
(16) Ibid., p. 11.
(17) Norman Williams, Jr. and Thomas Norman, "Exclusionary Land Use
Controls: The Case of North-eastern New Jersey," Land Use
Controls: Present Problems and Future Reform, ed. David
Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), p. 114.
(18) Manvel, p. 32.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Williams and Norman, p. 114.
(21) Kristensen, Levy, and Savir, p. 5, for instance.
(22) Ferguson, p. 1.
(23) Williams and Norman, p. 114. A complete analysis of housing
prices is found in George Sternlieb and Lynne B. Sagalyn,
"Zoning and Housing Costs," Land Use Controls: Present Problems
and Future Reform, ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New
Jersey, 1974), pp. 131 ff.
6.1.2 Building Codes and Amenity Controls
"In 1921 the Senate Committee on Reconstruction and Production issued a
report in which it was pointed out that building-code requirements varied
widely and were one source of unnecessarily high construction costs.
Since that time various writers and speakers have repeated these charges
and have also referred to lack of flexibility in dealing with new materials
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and new methods of construction. Much of this criticism is justified."1
As with zoning, codes have often been used to exclude the poor -- though
this effect appears to be unintentional. As with zoning, many commentators
have noted the direct costs2 and indirect costs: prohibiting of new
(cheaper) means and materials,3 altering manufacturing processes,4
discouraging new constructions or renovation,6 requiring the use of
scarce resources,7 raising rents,8 and even making high-rise development
prohibitively expensive.9
There are actually two sources of this increased cost due to building
codes. The first is the cost associated with the diversity amongst codes
in various localities. This cost, though considerable, applies primarily
to producers and consumers of buildings with wide regional markets such
as manufactured housing and are further discussed in Appendix B -- Section
11.6 Producers and Consumers of Mobile and Manufactured Homes. The
second is the cost associated with a particular code. This sort of cost
increases expenses associated with housing without providing increased
user fitness. Both costs are considered in this subsection.
Studies documenting the actual costs of building codes estimate typical
costs running between 3% and 30% of construction costs. ° 10% of
construction costs seems to be the consensus figure.ll In dollars the
most conservative estimate runs about one billion dollars,l2 but using
the consensus percentage figure, five billion dollars is not an
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unbelievable figure.
How could these costs get so high? A Douglas report13 investigated the
problem. Only 43.9% of all localities having building codes based their
plumbing codes on the National Plumbing Codes (and those towns likely made
various modifications which involved more restrictive provisions). 14 The
remaining towns presumably concocted an ad hoc set of provisions which
were very likely influenced by local plumbers looking for guaranteed work.
Fire regulations were likewise diverse. On the average 24.4% of the
localities prohibited fire-retardant wood in fire-resistive buildings. 15
42.2% of the municipalities required parapets on row housing and 34.6% of
them set the minimum distance to fire exits at 25 feet or under in
multifamily dwellings.16 As was usual with zoning, urban areas were
always more restrictive than the average.
The same study asked about fourteen specific provisions all of which had
been approved by all or most model codes. The results of this section of
the study show so clearly that local codes are unnecessarily restrictive,
that we reprint it here. 17 As we have seen in this section, the monetary
costs of local building regulation are considerable. These codes, when
enforced, place an onerous burden on the poor and even the working and
middle class. Considering the fact that housing conditions are usually
not improved (and may actually be worsened) by such regulations, one must
wonder what we are paying for.
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Table 10. Proportions of Local Building Codes That Entirely Prohibit
Various Features in Residential Construction: 1968 (Based on Data for
municipalities and New England-type Townships of 5,000-plus)
% of gov'ts
with building
codes (1)
% of building code
gov'ts specifically
reporting (2)
Construction Feature All (3) M.C. (4) All (3) M.C. (4)
Plastic pipe in drainage system .... 62.6
2" by 4" studs 24" on center in
non-load-bearing interior
partitions ....... 3........... 4 7.
Preassembled electrical wiring
harness at electrical service
entrance . .................. 45. 7
Preassembled combination drain,
waste, and vent plumbing
system for bathroom
installation .............. 42.2
2" by 3" studs in non-load-bearing
interior partitions ............35.8
Party walls without continuous
airspace ...................26.8
Single top and bottom plates in
rlon-load-bearing interior
partitions ..................... 24.5
Wood frame exterior for multifamily
structures 3 stories or less
(5) . . .......... ... ......... 24.1
1/2" sheathing in lieu of corner
bracing in wood frame
construction . .. 4......20.4
Prefabricated metal chimneys ........19.1
Nonmetallic sheathed electric cable.13.0
Wood roof trusses 24" on center ..... 10.0
Copper pipe in drainage systems..... 8.6
Bathroom ducts in lieu of
operable windows ............... 6.0
61.7
43 5
44.8
39.6
34.7
27.4
23.5
22.0
21.1
16.9
13.0
10.3
9.4
5.3
68.9 67.6
50.6 46.1
51.2 49.1
46.8 43.2
38.3 36.9
30.6 30.7
26.2 24.8
26.7 23.5
22.0
20.5
14.5
10.7
9.3
6.4
22.3
18.0
14.4
11.1
10.0
5.6
(1) Units so reporting as a percent of all building code governments
in each group (including those that did not specifically report "yes"
or "no" for particular construction features).
(2) Units so reporting as a percent of those reporting either "yes"
or "no" (i.e., excluding those not giving this information for particular
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construction features).
(3) These data pertain to the 3,273 municipalities and New England-type
townships of 5,000-plus that have building codes.
(4) These data pertain to the 2,199 units (of the 3,273 total) that have
building codes reportedly based primarily upon one of the four national
or regional model codes.
(5) Calculation excludes governments that entirely prohibit frame
residential construction (77 altogether, including 59 "model code"
governments).
(1) George N. Thompson, "Preparation and Revision of Building
Codes," Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard
B. Andrews (New York and London, 1972), p. 133.
(2) For instance, Charles G. Field and Steven R. Rivkin, The Building
Code Burden (Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1975),
pp. 97 ff.
(3) Tbid., pp. 79 ff. See also George Sternlieb and Lynne B.
Sagalyn, "Zoning and Housing Costs," Land Use Controls:
Present Problems and Future Reform, ed. David Listokin (New
Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), p. 135.
(4) Thompson, p. 136.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Warren W. Lehman, "Building Codes, Housing Codes and the
Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply," Urban Land Use
Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard B. Andrews (New York
and London, 1972), p. 171.
(7) Field and Rivkin, p. 4.
(8) Thompson, p. 136.
(9) Daniel R. Mandelker, The Zoning Dilemma, A Legal Strategy for
Urban Change (Seattle, 1971), p. 123.
(10) Field and Rivkin, p. 76.
(11) Ibid., p. 79. Arnold Kronstadt, "How Code-Enforced Waste Can Make
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a $1,500 Difference in the Sales Price of Two Identical Houses,"
Land Use ControZs: Present Problems and Future Reform, ed. David
Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), pp. 148 f.
(12) Field and Rivkin, p. 5.
(13) Allen D. Manvel, Local Land and Building Regulation, How Many
Agencies? What Practices? How Much Personnel? (Washington,
D.C., 1968).
(14) Ibid., p. 33.
(15) Ibid., p. 35.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid., p. 36.
6.2 Judicial Reinforcement
As was noted earlier, recent court decisions have sometimes overturned
local zoning ordinances when these ordinances were found to be exclusionary
or confiscatory (Section 4.1 Variances, Appeals, and Other Legal
Exceptions). However, the vast majority of court cases have reaffirmed
the localities' rights to enforce land-use regulation. To many readers
of these cases, there is no substantive difference between the facts of
the cases which upheld zoning and the facts of the cases which overturned
zoning.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. is the landmark case in which
the Supreme Court declared zoning to be constitutional. Despite proof
that Ambler's land had been devalued by zoning and despite the lower
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court's opinion that zoning was exlusionary by nature, the Supreme
Court, led by long-time conservative Taft, upheld zoning as a justified
use of police power.2 In explanation of the apparent contradiction,
it must be remembered that zoning was touted to be a protection for
property values. In other words, it was probably upheld precisely
because it was exclusionary.
The courts have usually followed this landmark case, The courts have
also refused to investigate the legislative process or its intent
except in cases of flagrant confiscation, segregation, or exclusion.
They have also refused to consider the rights of potential residents
(i.e., slum dwellers who might move into a suburban community if
developers were allowed to build cheaper housing). If a developer is
willing to build inexpensive housing and to sell it to slum dwellers,
and if such action causes no objective damage to others or their
property, the potential residents have a right to buy the property
and move into town. Zoning (and other building laws), by disallowing
inexpensive housing, clearly interferes with the basic rights of both
developers and potential residents under these circumstances,.
These policies cause the court battle to be one between many suburban
homeowners trying to protect their neighborhoods, their rural or
semi-rural life-style, their pocketbooks, and their open spaces, and
one selfish, money-hungry, capitalist developer. In such a battle the
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outcome is seldom in question. Thus the New Jersey courts have upheld
minimum unit sizes in Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne3 and
prohibitions of trailer parks in Vickers v. Township Committee of
Glouster Township4 and minimum frontages in Bilbar Construction Co. v.
Board of Adjustment.5 And in Village of Belle Terre et a. v. Bruce
Boraas et a. ,6 the Supreme Court (with but a few misgivings) upheld a
provision of that town's zoning code which effectively prohibited
non-kinship-based communes and even multiple-apartmentmate situations.
This decision should strike fear into the hearts of all alternate
life-style proponents and all of us who value personal freedom and privacy.
Judicial reinforcement of restrictive and confiscatory zoning is
certainly deplorable, but sadder still is the situation of some
developers and property owners who do manage to win in the courts, but
who find that judicial relief is not very effective. Such a case is the
Appeal of Girsh.7 The courts agreed with Girsh that the local zoning
provision was exclusionary because it had made no land available for
apartment development. But this was a hollow victory. The town
promptly zoned four different unsuitable sites for apartments, none of
which included Girsh's property. 8
This anecdote is significant because it hints at the strategy that the
exclusionary town might adopt when faced with reform. If the courts were
to change their traditional stand, if zoning and if building codes were
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reformed to correct the most flagrant abuses, the exclusionary town
would merely shift the burden to some other set of local controls,
perhaps property taxes or historical commissions or conservation
commissions or subdivision controls. Even locally-provided services
could be manipulated to keep out the "riffraff."
The fact of the matter is that some people want to exclude others and
no law on earth is likely to change that desire. As long as that
desire exists, people will find a way to circumvent the intent of
legislation. The problem for the reformer who wishes to eliminate
exclusion is then two-fold. First, for the long range, education and
understanding will be the only effective tools against exclusion. A
good reform system would be educational in that people who excluded on
irrational grounds should be forced to pay for exclusion (rather than
have a free or a subsidized exclusionary system as we have now).
Second, for the short range, we should adopt a system which allows for
some exclusion (remember too, that some exclusion may be justified),
but which also allows the poor some opportunities. We should discover
an avenue of escape for the excluders which does a minimum of damage to
the excludees.
(1) 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
(2) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), pp. 245 ff.
(3) 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952) which also upheld a five-acre
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minimum lot size.
(4) 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962).
(5) 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
(6) N. 73-191, April 1, 1974.
(7) 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
(8) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 214.
6.3 Convenience
Pushing up costs, invoking regressive property taxes, or appealing to
the courts has not necessarily kept all the "unwanteds" out of town.
And many towns have (usually inadvertantly) stumbled upon another
strategy: reducing convenience. This strategy can be implemented
with at least three tactics: reduction of public services, prohibition
of convenience features, and enactment of regulations which cause
convenience features to be unfeasible economically.
The reduction of public services tactic can normally only be invoked
in the most exclusive communities, those communities where residents,
because of the availability of servants and/or leisure time, can afford
to forgo some public amenities. Examples of this sort might be lack
of provision of garbage collection or provision of inferior public
schools. This tactic has several advantages. First, it may make the
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town a distasteful place to live for the very poor. Such a town could
conceivably do away with exclusionary zoning and building code practices
without attracting an influx of the less affluent. But even if such an
influx were to occur, the costs of having the poor in town would be
greatly diminished. Second, this tactic results in a low property tax
rate, an advantage which is not unnoticed by the residents of such
communities.
The second tactic, outright prohibition of convenience features, is
most usually a by-product of those building law provisions which assume
a middle-class life-style. For instance, separation of residences from
workplaces and commercial facilities is not much of an inconvenience for
a two-car suburban family. But the poor no-car or even the relatively
poor one-car family often finds that the advantages of use separation
are not worth the trouble.1 Commuting to work, shopping, or visiting
a cinema or friends may be costly in money, in time, and in family
harmony. And if zoning prohibits home industry, commuting becomes
essential, thus depriving many people of a convenient workplace.
Finally a town may reduce convenience by making convenient features
prohibitively expensive. Such happens when zoning limits density to
the point where convenience shops such as shoe repair stores, cleaners,
and variety stores cannot support themselves. Such businesses need
reasonably high densities in the neighborhood to be assured of a market.2
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The ;ame result is obtained more directly if the building code imposes
overly strict requirements for commercial and industrial structures.
In this chapter we have discussed the mechanisms by which some people
manage to exclude other people from their neighborhoods. If the reader
is more interested in the various characters in the drama, he or she is
advised to read Appendix B -- Chapter 11.0 "Have Nots" and Building Law
and Appendix C -- Chapter 12.0 "Haves" and Building Law where these issues
and others relating to the difficulties inherent in building law are
discussed with more specificity.
(1) J:rrrlrr] . Sicrqan, "The New Approach to Planning: Nonzolinq,
/(aon xagazine, 4, 12 (April, 1973), p. 7.
(2) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 125 f. mentions this
point in a slightly different context.
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"We wondered whether the zoning system was as much an innocent regulator
of potentially harmful activity as it seemed, and we have concluded that
any zoning system which seeks real limitation of freedom of choice must
carry well-delineated and value-laden policies with it.... We are
simply not sure of the values we wish to implement in our urban policies.
Until we are, we can continue to expect the planning and zoning process
to be deeply troubled by ambiguity and ambivalence."I
What has been said about zoning above, can also be extended to housing
and building codes. "If governments cannot, or will not, make up the
difference between what housing laws require and what the effective
demand can purchase, then why do they create these problems? Why is the
common sense solution of allowing and encouraging people to make the
best use of what they have treated as subversive nonsense by the
technocratic and bureaucratic authorities? Why do these authorities and
the institutions they control refuse to let people live and move between
the extremes of neglected, dangerous slums and residences suitable for
middle-class Joneses? Why, in other words, are the 'problems' so
universally defined in terms of what people ought to have (in the view
of the problem-staters) instead of in realistic terms of what people
could have?"2
Implicit in each building regulation is some goal, some objective. These
goals are chosen by some "problem stater" who has values and biases of his
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own which do not necessarily correspond to the values of and biases of
the regulatees. As Grenell has so aptly stated it, "In an effort to
achieve targets and to increase production, the nature of housing
needs is assumed a priori by government policies and programs. People
in general, and poor people in particular, become invisible to
officialdom; their needs are reduced to the barren and abstract
specifications of codes and standards, however well-intentioned.
They are either prevented from exercising real control over one of the
basic elements of existence, or are continually harassed by governments
bent on preventing haphazard or substandard development."3
Essentially, there are two prevalent assumptions that have allowed this
situation to exist. The first is the notion that planning is somehow
objective or scientific. In fact, there is no objective way to determine
the "best" use of land, or to choose between pro-growth or no-growth
proposals, or even to decide what is safe, healthy, or moral. 4 And
planners are thus forced to use their own values when formulating
legislation.
The second assumption can best be described by a proponent: "There is
frequently a conflict between the values of a society at large and the
ambitions of individuals, or groups within it. In the context of the
built form, it can be shown that uncontrolled growth of building bulk may
prejudice the functioning of adjacent buildings and constrain the form
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which development might take on adjacent sites. FIurthtnnore, tlhe
performance of transport and other servicing systems may be affected.
The existence of these conflicts establishes the right of society
to control the activities of individuals."5 There are at least three
flaws in this line of reasoning. The first is that "controlled
growth" somehow constrains development any less than "uncontrolled
growth." The second is the notion that "society at large" is something
other than the individuals within it, and therefore has some "rights"
above and beyond those possessed by individuals. This is a philosophically
debatable question, and too complicated to discuss in a treatise on
building regulation, but the fault of this assumption does not rest on
philosophical theorizing only. The third flaw is that this reasoning.
presupposes that the framers of legislation will be able to represent
the values of "society at large." Not only is it impossible for the
framers to shed their own personal values, but it is also impossible for
the framers to adopt the values of "society at large." People have very
diverse tastes and goals, and any attempt to homogenize these values
will result necessarily in mediocrity and in official blindness to the
wants and needs of the least powerful segment of society.
In the remainder of this chapter we will study this problem more closely.
(1) Daniel R. Mandelker, The Zoning Dilemma, A Legal Strategy for
Urban Change (Seattle, 1971), p. 188.
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(2) John F.C. Turner, "Housing as a Verb," Freedom to Build, eds.
John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter (New York, 1972), pp. 149 ff.
(3) Peter Grenell, "Planning for Invisible People," Freedom to
Build, eds. John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter (New York, 1972),
pp. 97 f.
(4) Nice discussions of this point are contained in Mandelker, pp.
14 f.; and in Bernard H. Siegan, "The Case Against Land Use
Planning," Reason Magazine, 7, 9 (January, 1976), p. 10.
7.1 Economics
Local regulations often have both architectural and economic consequences.
Local economic decisions (tax laws) have most certainly had an impact on
architectural form: witness the use of mansard and gambrel roofs to
avoid paying taxes on the upper story, or the paucity of windows when
England assessed property taxes by window count from 1798-1851.1 But
we are more concerned here with the opposite side of the issue: the
economic impact of building regulations.
"A city is a heterogeneous collection of people, structures, and
neighborhoods. Trying to superimpose escalating convenience and
maintenance requirements over an entire population is both unrealistic
and a disservice to those who wish to pay -- and can only pay -- for
minimum standards and amenities."2 This statement is clearly true for
the very poorest people (i.e., those people with virtually no disposable
income), but the vast majority of people can pay something. Here, we
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argue that even under these conditions, it is wrong and futile to force
the relatively poor to pay for the aesthetics, convenience, or even
safety of structures.
The most telling example discovered in this research is related by
Grenell: at Bhubaneswar, India "[e]ventually the government built some
very modest quarters for the rickshaw pullers next to their shacks [in
response to the squatter problem]. The rickshaw pullers quickly sublet
these new quarters for extra income and stayed in their shacks, indicating
clearly what their priorities were." 3
If the reader recognizes the There-Oughta-Be-A-Law Syndrome in this
scene, he should not be surprised. Turner goes on to say a few pages
later: "The most common objection to changes in public policy which
would increase the user's control in housing at the expense of central
institutions is that standards would be lowered as a result. The
standards which the objectors have in mind, however, are not something
which can be achieved with available resources but, rather, represent
the objector's own notion of what housing ought to be."4 Again, we hear
the minor error that the poor cannot afford standard housing. When true,
the situation is indeed deplorable, but it is seldom true. The choice
is more often between aesthetics and money or convenience. 5
For instance, "poor" immigrants living in impossible slums at the turn of
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the century seemed to have had enough money to return to Europe when
economic conditions in New York City were poor.6 And current-day
slum dwellers in New York City often visit home -- Puerto Rico or some
small rural town. They indicate their priorities just as clearly as the
Indian rickshaw pullers did.7
If the middle-class reader thinks that this argument sounds implausible,
some statistics given by Banfield should be considered. In slum areas,
40% of the white male-headed families and 25% of the black male-headed
families paid less than 10% of their income for housing. 8 And in a
study done in 1964 in the Washington Park Boston Renewal Administration
project, only 13% of the displaced families actually left ghetto
conditions although most could have afforded standard housing (the
median rent at $85 averaged 12% of the income in this group). The
displaced families showed a decided preference for cheap rents (presumably
so they would have more money to spend on higher-valued goods).9
This argument is understandably difficult for building professionals to
believe. Housing and other environmental concerns are very high on our
list of priorities; this is true else we would not have chosen architecture
or city planning as a career. But the fact is that some people do not
share our values; some people really do prefer a new car, a vacation, an
education, or financial security (to name just a few possibilities) to
middle-class "minimum acceptable" housing. It is wrong and futile to
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try to supplant their values with ours.
(1) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Req!ulation in
London 1789-1972 with an Account of the District Surlouors'
A;:,ooiation (London, 1972), p. 95.
(2) Spencer D. Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement
(Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 6.
(3) Peter Grenell, "Planning for Invisible People," Freedom to Build,
eds. John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter (New York, 1972), p. 113.
(4) John F.C. Turner, "Housing as a Verb," Freedom to Build, eds.
John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter (New York, 1972), pp. 149 ff.
(5) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 43 f.
(6) Kate Holladay Claghorn, "Foreign Immigration and the Tenement
House in New York City," The Tenement House Problem, Volume II,
eds. Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London,
1903), pp. 82 f.
(7) Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited, A Revision of
the Unheavenly City (Boston and Toronto, 1974), pp. 127 contains
an enlightening discussion of the lack of real poverty (as
judged by any objective standards) in the United States today.
(8) Ibid., p. 11.
(9) Ibid., pp. 92 f.
7.2 Aesthetics
"People differ greatly in their perceptions and concepts of beauty, and
this makes it most unfair and perilous to progress to allow any one
person or group to impose aesthetic controls. History readily bears out
that society will be enriched by being subjected to a great variety of
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artistic or visual experiences; modern culture i; (l)rlm()lt;ly iidbcl(lted to}
creations that were highly unpopular and virtually subversive in the
past.... 'Snob zoning' creates also 'snob aesthetics.'"'
In theory, most people would agree (at least in the United States), but
the problem is that local building regulations necessarily affect
aesthetic concepts.
On occasion, aesthetic controls have been a direct goal of building law.
Examples of this abound in Europe, but even in the United States, it
happens. Observe the case in which the California Coastal Commission
demanded the removal of the trees at Sea Ranch in order to preserve the
view from the road (thus ignoring the internal aesthetics of the project
as well as privacy considerations).2 Or witness the court in Washington,
D.C. stating that legislation can be enacted to make the capital
"beautiful as well as sanitary." 3 Or, closer to home, observe the
numerous "anti-billboard" regulations4 or the frequent extralegal
imposition of aesthetics controls placed on developers seeking project
approval from local boards.5 And once in a while, a planner actually
proposes to use building legislation to achieve aesthetic objectives. 6
More often, however, local laws which are designed to protect the
public health, safety, morals, or economic position have aesthetic
side effects. In the early 1700s in England, fire codes virtually
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outlawed Queen Anne tyl.e rch(tlitecture.7 Other laws coiItrol led window
shapeu and story height;9 mandated parapets 1° and 4" window and door
reveals;11 and prohibited projecting gables.12 These laws combined with
"Ancient Lights" requirements (controlling the buildings' masses),
materials limitations, and even interior decor laws to limit the
British architectural-aesthetic expression.
Similar (but often less stringent) laws were enacted early in our history
of building regulation. Rugs, wallpaper, and other fabrics were said
to aid contagion of tuberculosis and were thus prohibited in multiple-
dwellings. 14 Ventilation and light were considered "musts" and laws were
enacted which promoted the ubiquitous transom and mandated windows in
w.c.s and required periodic painting and whitewashing. 15 And modern
architects seem forever confronted with problems resulting from fire-
exit rules, platform construction regulations, and other fire and health
laws which seem to bear no reasonable relationship to the aesthetic
wishes or needs of users.
The biggest villains in this section, however, are not building codes and
fire regulations, as annoying as they may be. The real villain is zoning.
Despite the obvious observation that the aesthetic problem is not the fatal
disease which afflicts our country, 16 zoning law continues to enforce the
middle-class aesthetic, continues to preserve "the ideas of beauty
official entertained."17 In the following subsections, we will discuss the
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role of zoning in mandating a particular aesthetic ideal.
(1) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 143.
(2) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), pp. 117 f.
(3) Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
(4) Billboard regulation was first instituted in London in 1891,
C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation
in London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), p. 89, but has been invoked
frequently in this country in the name of public morals
(immoral acts are supposed to take place behind them), safety,
etc. A number of critics of this sort of legislation have
arisen including Robert Venturi and some of Rice's architectural
faculty (Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning, p. 72.) who argue the
matter on either aesthetic or economic grounds. Both arguments
are sound. If a poor man can rent out advertising space on his
property (as is frequent in Houston), he should be allowed to
make the extra money or the objecting few should pay him not to
allow the advertising to be erected. I say "objecting few"
because of the aesthetic argument. Billboards are at least
acceptable to the majority of Americans; if they weren't,
advertisers would alienate more customers than they would attract.
Since advertisers find billboards to be good advertising, it
follows that most Americans are at least neutral on the subject.
(5) Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game, Municipal Practices and
Policies (Madison, Wisconsin, 1966), p. 56. Or see Section 4.3
Graft, the Public Variety. This sort of situation is quite
frequent when seeking zoning variances or approvals from
historical commissions, however, this author knows of instances
when it was encountered in seeking approvals from building
inspectors for underground oil tank installations and rooftop
mechanical installations.
(6) J.J. Dukeminier, Jr., "Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A
Reappraisal," Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed.
Richard B. Andrews (New York and London, 1972), pp. 83 ff.
(7) Knowles and Pitt, pp. 37 f.
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(8) Ibid., p. 19.
(9) Ibid., pp. 19 f.
(10) Ibid., p. 37.
(11) Ibid., p. 41.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Such as those cited in G. Topham Forrest, The Construction and
Control of Buildings and the Development of Urban Areas in the
United States of America (Westminster, England, 1925), p. 29.
(14) Herman M. Biggs, M.D., "Tuberculosis and the Tenement House
Problem," The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W.
DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
p. 454 and Lawrence Veiller "Tenement House Reform in New York
City, 1834-1900," The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds.
Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London,
1903), p. 106.
(15) Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller, "The Tenement House
Problem," The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W.
DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
p. 25.
(16) Edward C. Banfield, The UnheavenZy City Revisited, A Revision of
the Unheavenly City (Boston and Toronto, 1974), pp. 5 f.
(17) Part of Ambler's argument in the trial, Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.
7.2.1 Incompatibilities
Modern day planners have granted that incompatibilities in uses are
fewer and farther between than their predecessors had believed, but they
do believe that they exist,l though they also admit that zoning has not
done an exemplary job of eliminating them.2
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The term "incompatible uses" has, unfortunately, become a catchall term
which is used to help rationalize a particular person's aesthetic
judgments.3 Some commonly accepted "incompatibilities" include housing and
airports, housing and commercial or business uses, churches and factories.
Incompatible? Yes, under some circumstances -- but not all. Housing
built near an airport might prove a blessing to the deaf; land would be
cheap due to noise pollution and the deaf family could have a better home
without any accompanying cost. Housing built near workplaces are a boon to
anyone who hates commuting. Housing built in a 24-hour-a-day commercial
area can serve both the worker with an erratic swing-shift and an older
person who feels more secure when people are on the street. Churches in an
industrial park can take advantage of the Sunday silence and the vast
underutilized parking lots.
The fact is that "incompatible" is as subjective as "beautiful." Only
the user can say what is incompatible and, then, he can only speak for
himself. What is incompatible to one user may be gloriously inspiring to
another.
Thus we see that one of zoning's major tactics, use segregation, is not a
universal blessing. The "pig in the parlor" may provide desired
companionship.
(1) C. McKim Norton, "Elimination of Incompatible Uses and
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Structures," Urban Land Use PoZlicy: The CentraZ City, ed.
Richard B. Andrews (New York and London, 1972), pp. 92 ff.
(2) Carl Feiss, "Planning Absorbs Zoning," Urban Land Use PoZicy:
The CentraZ City, ed. Richard B. Andrews (New York and London,
1972), p. 125.
(3) What attracted this writer's attention to this problem was a
small magazine article about an oil well and a restaurant
("'Incompatible' Land Uses? Who Sez?," AREA BuZZetin, 2, 4
(July, 1976), p. 5.). Offhand one could not think of two more
"incompatible" uses and yet the owner of the land had come up
with a bright idea: he painted his working oil well bright
green, built his MacDonald's right around it, and made his
oil well a minor tourist attraction!
7.2.2 Monotony, Mediocrity, and the Tract House
Despite the previous subsection, it is true that most people do not want
to live next door to an abattoir. Our current legislative system has
appropriately responded to this widespread desire (the problem, of course,
is that the wants and needs of minorities and other non-powerful groups
have been submerged in the preferences of the majority), and the will of
the middle class has been imposed on everyone. These people have promoted
use segregation through zoning. And they have declared maximum densities
and minimum setbacks to preserve the "residential quality" of all
residential neighborhoods. This writer would not presume to say that
these efforts have been a failure -- many hundreds of thousands of
Americans live in suburban Leavittowns and are blissfully happy with their
homes and neighborhoods. In this paper we only note that zoning has been
the major factor which allowed and encouraged monotonous, mediocre tract
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developments to proliferate.1
The mechanism by which this all happened is not very difficult to
explain. The "minimum" established by local laws was higher (more
expensive) than most buyers actually wanted. But buyers did want
their single-family bungalow so they scraped together the extra money
(above what they wanted to pay) and bought the minimum house. The
lot size was as small as zoning would allow; frontages were uniform
and minimum; the homes were built to the limit of the envelope
(ordained by required setbacks and maximum heights); and thus emerged
the monotonous appearance and rhythm on the suburban street.
We mentioned above that the buyers had to scrape together some extra
money, but we did not mention whence that money came. Of course, it
may be that the buyers simply didn't buy a TV or put off the purchase
of some other consumer good, but it is likely that that money came from
the housing budget, that some preferred housing amenity was forgone in
order to afford the minimum house.2 Perhaps the childless artist was
forced to buy a backyard instead of a northern skylight; other families
were forced to buy side yards instead of the big kitchen they had
wanted; still others gave up the services of an architect. And thus
mediocrity became the norm on the suburban street.3
Before we leave this topic, it must be noted that the building codes are
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not totally innocent in this regard. Not only do they also increase
the costs of building, thereby adding to the problems mentioned above,
but they also have some special effects of their own. For the most
part, they encourage and even mandate standard construction techniques
using familiar materials. Radical or innovative designs are discouraged
or even rejected.4
Building codes have also had a similar effect on manufactured housing.
Since virtually every model change requires a new round of code
approvals, manufacturers have been loathe to market more than a handful
of different designs. Obviously, this breeds monotony. 5
(1) For instance, see Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York,
1969), p. 258.
(2) Bernard H. Siegan, Other PeopZe's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), pp. 6 f.
(3) It is probably true that some people want conformity. But
it is also undoubtedly true that other people would prefer
some diversity, but not the lack of control that can exist
in uncontrolled environments. These people have therefore
accepted the homogeniety of residential zoning although it is
not optimal for them.
(4) To dramatize the truth of this statement, Jan Wampler's
anecdote about his strategy for finding unusual owner-built
structures is appropriate. As he traveled across the country
looking for innovative designs, he learned that the easiest
way to locate interesting structures was to visit the local
fire inspector and the local building inspector and to ask them
about the most hazardous structures in town. This technique
led Mr. Wampler to the unselfconsciously beautiful structures
which illustrate his forthcoming book.
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(5) David Falk, Buildinj Cdocas and ManuJfaotllr' lou:.it!J (Washington,
D.C., 1973), pp. 41 ff.
7.2.3 Urban Sprawl or Garden City
One of the most serious value problems with which zoning has been unable
to deal is the problem of density. During the '20s and '30s, the
Ebenezer Howard Garden City ideal had finally filtered down into the
minds of planners in the suburban villages across the United States
(albeit in a very distorted form). Although some of the first and most
successful American Garden Cities had been built without benefit of
zoning,l other suburban communities tried to copy their results using
the force of law. Each town, particularly the towns nearest to the
urban centers, "conserved" open spaces and required grassy lawns and
family-style bungalows. The land that remained near downtowns became
too expensive for development (in part because of the artificially
decreased densities that were required), so developers "leapfrogged"
over the most restrictive intown suburbs and built in the more
hospitable exurbs. 2
This does not disprove the theories of traditional wisdom: federal
highway programs, tax laws, technological transportation innovations,
federal programs encouraging single-family residences, personal
preferences, and a score of other considerations have all played a
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role. Here we only point out that existing land use regulations
encourage urban sprawl rather than curb it.3
The basic problem with the zoning scheme is that densities were
preordained by law. This meant that development could not respond to
the wants of people who did not share the values which had been petrified
into law. It is not only that laws are inflexible. If zoning changes
were allowed on an hourly basis, the results would not be very much
different. The problem is that people already living in town in
established neighborhoods were allowed by law to control, not only their
own neighborhoods, but also undeveloped land in the town. These people
valued open space and low density, so that is what was demanded by the
law. If the laws were to be based on wider participation (i.e.,
regionalization), densities would likely be lowered so that the majority
of people in the region could afford homes, but the minority who were
very poor and individuals with significantly different environmental
values would still be excluded.
Whenever the law mandates a particular value, those who do not share
that value are unjustly harmed. In this particular instance, we have
been looking at the value of "low density," but the phenomenon occurs
across a wide range of values: "proper" sanitary facilities,
segregation of "incompatible" uses, "safe" (read traditional) structures,
"uncongested" (or in the case of Jacobs, "congested") city streets,
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and all other "values" that building codes and zoning ordinances promote.
(1) Sunnyside was built on land zoned for industry and Radburn was
built with covenants for protection. A discussion of the
Garden City ideal and its effect on suburban zoning schemes is
contained in Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969),
pp. 284 ff.
(2) This phenomenon has been noted by several authors: Edmund
Contoski, "Government Controls and Urban Renewal," Reason
Magazine, 7, 1 (May, 1975), p. 23, Bernard H. Siegan, Other
People's Property (Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London,
1976), pp. 5 f., and Carl Feiss, "Planning Absorbs Zoning,"
Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard B.
Andrews (New York and London, 1972), p. 124, among others.
(3) A mechanism with the same results operates with building codes.
If density is artificially decreased in a slum area (through
condemnation, demolition, or forced evictions of illegal
tenants), the displaced persons will simply move to another
area, thus worsening conditions for even more people.
7.3 The Problem with Coercion
The wrongness of building laws, and of so many other laws, is that such
laws force people to act in a manner contrary to what they consider to be
their own best insterests. Planners will necessarily propose regulations
that accord with their own personal values; political interests will
necessarily distort even these value-laden regulations (at least as
long as there is any semblence of democracy in this country); and
everyone's right to pursue happiness in a manner consistent with the
equal rights of others will be abridged.
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Certainly, the results of our building laws are not necessarily always
as unreasonable as those cited in this chapter. Laws with very low
standards will affect fewer people; laws which are not enforced also
avoid most of the problems outlined in this chapter. However, to the
extent that laws do change the voluntary decisions of the people
involved in the building process, and to the extent that these coercive
laws are enforced, a disservice is done to those who would act otherwise.
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In the previous several chapters we have discussed the problems with
building laws. From this discussion, we have extracted ten criteria for
reform.
1. Responsiveness. The most important criteria should be responsiveness.
In order to assure that the controls are responsive, enforcement and
enactment should be in the hands of the people who must live with the
controls. Each individual should have control over his own environment;
control should not be given to bureaucrats, administrators, planners, or
parochial business interests.
2. Exclusion. Closely connected with responsiveness is the criteria of
exclusion. Some degree of exclusion must be allowed -- a "no exclusion"
environment is incompatible with responsiveness. However, we must not
allow excluders to raise costs and influence convenience beyond their
immediate neighborhoods.
3. Flexibility. Also connected with responsiveness is the criteria of
flexibility. Changes both over time and between neighborhoods must be
allowed in order to insure responsiveness. The diversity that exists
among people should be allowed to be expressed through diversity in the
environment. However, again we must note that this flexibility should
not be given to bureaucrats, but rather to the people who are most
interested, the people living in the environment in question.
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4. Objectivity. Whatever controls exist should bear a strong relation
to the goals of the people who live under those controls. Furthermore,
they should be clear and non-discretionary.
5. Graft. Stongly associated with objectivity is graft. Reforms
should minimize both opportunities and motivations for graft. However,
the sort of equitable graft that allows a developer to pay a neighbor for
damages should be allowed.
6. Enforceability. In order for controls to be effective, they must be
enforceable. Of course, if all other criteria are met, it is probable
that enforcement would not be a problem, but reforms should seek a system
that does not require an extensive administrative bureaucracy.
7. Hardship. Enforcement should not create hardship for the poor.
8. Blunder-impact. As we have already seen, no matter what controls are
used, errors will necessarily be made. Our reforms should aim at
minimizing the impact of such errors.
9. Liability. Controls should not be used to limit the liability of
developers, architects, engineers, etc., for the damage that they might
do to non-consenting neighbors.
-98-
8.0 REFORMS (continued)
10. Feasibility. Even if a particular scheme met all of the above
characteristics, if it were politically unfeasible or unconstitutional,
consideration of that scheme would be a waste of time.
Over the years, a large number of reforms for the building law system
have been recommended. Space does not permit us to treat each suggestion
in detail. However, most proposals fall into one or more broad strategy
categories. The remainder of this chapter examines the present system
and compares the major reform categories in terms of the criteria we have
enumerated above.
8.1 The Current System
The current system is far from perfect, however, it is not completely
unworkable. It does respond well to the needs of millions of middle-class,
white, suburban homeowners and it is about as flexible and objective and
exclusive as those people want it to be. The problem is that there are
also millions of other Americans who do not share the values that
predominate in their own communities. Although graft is rampant in our
larger cities, many suburbs are virtually free from this problem and
although the codes and ordinances are often quite unenforceable, this
insures that hardships will be minimized.
The only criterion in which the current system fails completely is
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liability. Current laws allow hiqh levels of nuisallce activity and
no citizen can gain relief; current laws also allow many architectural
and engineering errors to be made without giving owners an opportunity
to gain relief. However, even in this area, although the damage done
can be quite considerable, relatively few people are affected by it, and
thus the present system is not as awful as a building law system could be.
The current system has two real assets, however: it is eminently
feasible and "balkanization" of jurisdictions insures that the impact of
any real blunders will be kept quite low.
Let us see how some suggested reforms rate in comparison.
8.2 Sticks
The saddest and most easily rebutted group of reforms are the ones that
propose more of the same. They call for localities to be given more
discretion and flexibility;l licensing of contractors, inspectors, and
landlords;2 zoned building codes;3 and even stricter regulations and
tighter enforcement.4 Much of any analysis of these programs would
depend on the precise implementation that would be enacted, but all of
them have some necessary flaws.
If towns are given increased discretion and flexibility, user-responsiveness
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may be increased, but it is much more likely that these reforms will
merely serve to entrench further the powers that already control building
laws, thereby reducing user-responsiveness, user-flexibility, and
objectivity. Moreover, the most-discussed problem with building laws,
exclusion, will most certainly be worsened. This sort of "solution"
will probably be of no value in any critical area of concern: it will
only amplify existing difficulties.
Licensing of various special interests may improve quality, but it is
much more likely to prove to be unenforceable,5 graft-ridden, and
non-objective. In every area where licensing has been tried (doctors,
lawyers, architects, engineers, beauty parlor operators, etc.), this
system has led to greater costs and monopolies and has never led to any
real guarantee of competence or ability. This writer sees no reason to
expect that the current proposals would work to public benefit any more
than previous ones. Licensing generally leads to a reduction of user
options and should therefore be rejected.
Zoned building codes, on the other hand do promise some improvements:
the number of hardship cases would be materially reduced and decreased
controls would allow users to exercise more control. The drawbacks
however, heavily outweigh these possible advantages. Like zoned land-use
regulations, zoned building codes will undoubtedly be drawn up to
reinforce segregation and to underline the differences between economic
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and social groupings. Furthermore, such a system entails increased
motivation for graft: if it costs less to bribe an official to downzone
one's own property than it costs to repair the property, and if that
difference cannot be covered by increased rental income, bribery will
surely result. This system might be able to offer users more flexibility,
but since bureaucrats and administrators will be in charge of both
contents and enforcement, it is unlikely that this reform would be a
substantial improvement over the current system.
Stricter regulations and tighter enforcement is the worst reform proposed
and yet it is a very common proposal. By the ten criteria we have
enumerated, this proposal is acceptable on only one count: it is feasible.
Because this "reform" gives more control to government officials and to
those groups who already benefit from building laws, it will necessarily
decrease user-responsiveness, user-flexibility, and objectivity (since
current legislation is frequently non-objective). The housing that
survives may be better quality, but the number of hardship cases would be
increased dramatically. This "reform" will worsen nearly every problem
mentioned in this paper. In short, we don't need more regulation, we need
less of it.
(1) Jan Krasnowiecki, "Legal Aspects of Planned Unit Development
in Theory and Practice," Land Use Controls: Present Problems
and Future Reform, ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey,
1974), pp. 185 ff. Robert Freilich, "Interim Development
Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing Flexible Planning and
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Zoning," Land Use Controls: Present Problems and Future hc' ;P!m,
ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), pp. 213 ff.
Jerome Rose, "From the Legislatures: Proposed Development Rights
Legislation Can Change the Name of the Land Investment Game,"
Land Use Controls: Present Problems and Future Reform, ed.
David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), pp. 273 ff.
R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and Land-Use
Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), Chapter 7. Spencer
D. Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement
(Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 18, p. 131.
(2) Parratt, p. 54, pp. 150 f. Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young,
and Michael A. Fischetti, Survey of the Administration of
Construction Codes in Selected Metropolitan Areas (Washington,
D.C., 1968), p. 5.
(3) For instance, Parratt, p. 7.
(4) Nearly every housing or building code reform contains such a
proposal. See for instance, Delaware State Planning Office,
Codes and Their Effect on Delaware's Housing, An Analysis of
Housing Related Codes (Dover, Delaware, 1970), passim. for a
particularly naive statement of this sort.
(5) Between exceptions; graft-promoted approvals; and problems with
trying to define exactly what constitutes being a contractor or
a landlord (not to mention trying to define what constitutes
being a "competent" contractor or a "responsible" landlord);
such schemes have little chance of enforcement.
8.3 Carrots
More sophisticated reformers have avoided the There-Oughta-Be-A-Law
Syndrome. They have recommended that we use carrots instead of -- or
sometimes in conjunction with -- sticks, incentives to encourage good
trends instead of disincentives to discourage bad trends. Abramsl
suggests that we use the tax structure to provide incentives: by placing
high taxes on undeveloped land and on slum properties we can encourage
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development and renewal. Woodruff2 also suggests that we use the property
tax system, but does not make any specific proposals. Rybeck3 advocates
a Georgist scheme of property taxation: under such a scheme only the
land is taxed, never the structures or other improvements. Babcock,4
Mandelker, 5 and Linowes and Allensworth 6 recommend that we use municipal
blackmail or federal funds to provide the desired incentives. Bergman7
recommends that we eliminate the fiscal incentives for exclusion.
These solutions are very deceptive. They go: if you want to eliminate
exclusion, eliminate the incentives to exclude; if you want to encourage
good housing, motivate people to build and maintain good housing. They
are very attractive because they use the forces of the market, the forces
of self-interest to provide public goods.
The more specific proposals have some obvious flaws. Abrams' solution
may lead to higher rents for the poor and more urban sprawl. Georgist
tax schemes make open spaces in central cities a fiscal impossibility
and impose unfair taxes on rural areas which happen to be adjacent to
development. Bergman's solution seems reasonable, but not truly
feasible (it involves giving up local control of schools and other
public services in order to insure that bringing poorer people into
town will not necessitate higher taxes). But even the non-specific
proposals have a very serious flaw.
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We don't know what the "good" is. What shall we encourage? Garden
City or Urban Sprawl? Growth to accommodate the poor or no-growth to
accommodate the environment? Safe housing or costly housing? This is
the most basic flaw in all building regulations. Since the incentives
and disincentives are designed by some people, they will necessarily
encourage or discourage development in accordance with the values of
the designers of the law.
In terms of the criteria for reform which we have already discussed, we
would expect that the use of incentives would make laws more enforceable
and would therefore cut down on graft, but in other respects there would
be no major improvement. Unless there is an essential change in the
people who frame the laws or unless there is an essential change in the
values of the people who frame the laws, we can hardly expect any real
improvement over the present system.
(1) Charles Abrams, "Opportunities in Taxation for Achieving
Planning Purposes," Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City,
ed. Richard B. Andrews (New York and London, 1972), pp. 222 ff.
(2) Archibald M. Woodruff, "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Property
Tax," Property Tax Reform, The Role of the Property Tax in the
Nation's Revenue System (Chicago, 1973), p. 112.
(3) Walter Rybeck, "Making the Property Tax Work for Urban
Development," Property Tax Reform, The Role of the Property Tax
in the Nation's Revenue System (Chicago, 1973), pp. 125 ff.
(4) Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game, MnicipaZ Practices and
Policies (Madison, Wisconsin, 1966), passim.
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(5) Daniel R. Mandelker, "The Basic Philosophy of Zoning: Incentive
or Restraint," Land Use ControZs: Present ProbZems and Future
Reform, ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974)
pp. 203 ff.
(6) R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and Land-Use
Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), p. 174.
(7) Edward M. Bergman, Eliminating Exclusionary Zoning: Reconciling
Workplace and Residence in Suburban Areas (Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, 1974), pp. 15 f.
8.4 Subsidies
Noting that tenants themselves are a major cause of poor housing,1 some
authors have recommended that the rich subsidize the poor.2
This proposal has a number of real advantages. If we give the poor
enough money, they will be able to afford housing that meets our standards.
The need for housing and building codes could be eliminated entirely
and even zoning and subdivision regulations might prove unnecessary.3
This proposal also has the advantage of allowing the poor a maximum
amount of freedom in finding an environment suitable for themselves.
In terms of our criteria, this proposal is nearly ideal. Since building
laws would be eliminated, enforcement and graft would disappear.
Obviously no hardship cases would be possible under such a scheme and
responsiveness and user-flexibility would be maximized. If a user didn't
like something, he could afford to change it. Some exclusion might still
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exist, but it would be no more than people actually wanted. The
elimination of codes would also insure that blunder-impact would be
minimized and even objectivity would prove to be but an academic issue.
Of course, liability laws would probably remain as they are now, but
if everyone had enough money to pay for the architect's and neighbor's
mistakes without hardship, liability would not be an important issue.
There are problems with this proposal, however. Aside from any
philosophical convictions one may have about the immorality of taxing
some people in order to confer benefits on other people, there is the
problem of feasibility. The government would have to give the poor
enough money to satisfy all their desires that rank higher than "decent"
housing if we wanted to insure that everyone had "decent" housing. Thus
we would not only incur prohibitive costs (even for the most liberal of
income-redistribution proponents), but we might well find ourselves
subsidizing new cars, vacations, television, heroin, and a variety of
other highly questionable goods.
If we subsidized to a lesser degree, we would have the problem of the
Indian rickshaw pullers. No feasible level of subsidy could correct
housing problems because large numbers of poor people simply do not value
"decent" housing very much. If we subsidized with the proviso that the
money be used only for housing, we encounter a different, but equally
intractable, set of problems. First, we must enforce our proviso: for
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pteople who do not val!Lt tIous.i. l( very iglly, t, mol. ivtlt-ioll to Cil'iicumventl
the proviso is strong enough so that we can safely assume that enforcement
would be difficult and costly.4 Second, and more important, our proviso
destroys the possible freedoms that subsidy promised. In our paternalism,
we would destroy the independence, the values, and the dreams of those
we had wanted to help.
Overall, it can be seen that, although subsidies may be the best solution
in specific individual instances, they will not be able to provide us
with a comprehensive solution to building problems.
(1) Spencer D. Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement
(Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 31 ff.
(2) Ibid., pp. 55 ff., for instance.
(3) If the logic seems hazy, consider the situation of an individual
with "enough" money. If the slightest inconvenience or health
hazard exists, he simply pays to have it corrected or, if he is
a tenant, he moves to perfect (for him) housing. If a noxious
use threatens to move in next door, he buys the property or
bribes the owner not to build the unwanted development or moves.
If he thinks a particular building has historical significance
or if he wants extensive open space, again, money can buy these
things. Thus we can see that if everyone had "enough" money,
the need for building laws would be eliminated.
(4) Subsidized housing projects are one possibility under this
strategy; their dismal failure to provide safe, sanitary
environmental conditions should debunk forever the subsidy-cum-
proviso strategy. The other tactic of giving the money to
the people directly but requiring that the money be spent on
housing, has resulted in government subsidies to slum-lords,
a result which has been widely criticized.
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"The main argument for state planning is that local tplnnlinq is not
working. The idea is that the local nature of the current decision-making
process produces parochial decisions, and that when only the interests of
small areas are involved, land-use decisions do not reflect the needs of
the broader universe. The contention is that since the wider public is not
included in the process, its wishes are therefore excluded. Sometimes it
is suggested that local governing bodies are no match for developers and
that only the state can handle them."'
The most popular reform schemes seem to suggest that the problem with
local building laws is that they are local. Numerous reformers have
called for regional, state, and/or federal control of various aspects of
zoning and building code regulation.2
Certainly this sort of reform would solve or at least alleviate many
problems for many people. Diversity of regulations and parochialness of
decisions would be eliminated -- especially in suburban towns. This
would reduce costs and exclusion would be somewhat alleviated. However,
suburban communities could be expected to retaliate by using other local
powers to offset high-level government schemes -- in all, perhaps a
reasonable balance could be struck between the pro-poor and the pro-
environment groups, but it is doubted considering Hawaii's experience.
Higher levels of government could be expected to do a better job of
enforcement, but that would likely cause greater numbers of hardship
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cases unless standards are drastically reduced. Since lower standards
in both zoning and building code regulations will probably prove
necessary, middle-class suburbs will be unable to maintain the high
amenity and security levels to which they have become accustomed.
Enforcement would not be eliminated as a problem for other reasons as
well: first, civil service and other problems with poor administration
would surely result in hardship (as any individual who has ever dealt
with the Social Security, V.A., or even state-house bureaucracies can
readily testify), and second, the possibilities for graft and corruption
at higher levels of government are becoming well known.
This brings us to the essential problem with higher-level government
solutions: responsiveness. The federal government, like the local
government, will respond to the wants of whatever group happens to have
the most influence with it. When this mechanism operates on a local
level a certain level of responsiveness and diversity results: some
towns are exlusive, others are business-oriented, some urban areas seek
order and rationality, others seem bent on total chaos. This provides a
large number of people with some options. But if higher levels of
government take control, even this small amount of diversity will be
destroyed. This writer would not venture to say what group or groups
would be most influential in controlling the laws of higher levels of
government, but one thing is clear: the very poor and the very
individualistic will not be among the influential -- they are too few
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or too disorganized. The end result will be that standards will be
changed, but we will be left with essentially the same problems that
we started with.
Higher-level government solutions would carry another serious disadvantage
also. When a blunder is made, it would have wider impact. Our present
balkanization prevents errors from harming large numbers of people. A
more unified system could cause serious hardship to vast numbers of
people. Because of this, higher level governments can be expected to be
quite conservative and inflexible. The possibilities for local, low-penalty
experiments in architecture and land-use planning will largely be lost.
Where statewide building law has been tried, it has drawn criticism from
nearly everyone.3 Pro-growth (or pro-poor) proponents point to red tape,
rising costs, and reduced supplies; no-growth proponents claim conflicts
of interest, nonenforcement, and lack of professionalism.4 Pro-freedom
proponents see such "takeovers" as removing control from the hands of
those who are most affected by the regulations. 5 And pro-poor proponents
say that there's still too much exclusion.6 To a large extent, these
goals are mutually incompatible when applied to the same land area. There
is no reason to expect that government bureaucrats will be able to solve
these problems justly whether the decisions are made on a local or
federal level. In general, it can be expected that higher-level
government controls will merely enlarge the scope of the problems by
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insuring that they will have regional, statewide, or federal impact.
(1) R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and L;:d-.Use
Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), p. 112.
(2) For instances: Herbert M. Franklin, Land Use Controls as a Barrier
to Housing Assistance (Springfield, Virginia, 1973), passim.,
Fred Bosselman, "Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the
Rights of the Entire World?," Land Use Controls: Present Problems
and Future Reform, ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New
Jersey, 1974), pp. 241 ff., Paul Davidoff and Neil N. Gold,
"The Supply and Availability of Land for Housing for Low- and
Moderate-Income Families," Land Use Controls: Present Problems
and Future Reform, ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey,
1974), pp. 279 ff., Richard Babcock, "Comments on Model Land
Development Code," Land Use Controls: Present Problems and
Future Reform, ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey,
1974), pp. 321 ff. Babcock advocates the American Law Institute
Model Land Development Code which grants substantial powers to
the states. Some specific problems with this code include:
(1) it allows states virtually complete control over all
development in a number of western states (Section 7-201), (2)
the powers it allows states are so "flexible" that any decision
made by the state could be justified, thus encouraging non-
objectivity and graft (Section 7-502), and (3) use of the code
will most certainly aggravate unemployment problems (Section
7-405). Furthermore, the code which attempts to balance
interests between the pro-poor and the pro-environment groups
will likely be unsatisfactory in practice to either group. AS
has happened already in Hawaii, both groups will claim
"favoritism" though the code calls for sensitivity to both issues.
See also, William Reilly, "New Directions in Federal Land Use
Legislation," Land Use Controls: Present Problems and Future
Reform, ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974),
pp. 331 ff., Charles Haar, "Wanted: Two Federal Levers for
Urban Land Use -- Land Banks and Urbank," Land Use Controls:
Present Problems and Future Reform, ed. David Listokin (New
Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), pp. 365 ff., Lawrence A. Williams,
Eddie M. Young, and Michael A. Fischetti, Survey of the
Administration of Construction Codes in Selected Metropolitan
Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 5, Charles G. Field and
Steven R. Rivkin, The BuiZding Code Burden (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1975), pp. 103 ff., Linowes and
Allensworth, p. 48, Spencer D. Parratt, Housing Code Administration
and Enforcement (Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 158 f., David Falk,
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Building Codes and Manufactured Housing (Washington, D.C., 1973),
pp. 82 ff.
(3) A sampling of state and regional programs are described in Fred
Bosselman and David Callies, "The Quiet Revolution in Land Use
Controls," Land Use Controls: Present Problems and Future Reform,
ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), pp. 285 ff.
The descriptions are reminiscent of Veiller: overly sanguine.
They do not mention the dissatisfaction of both pro-growth and
no-growth proponents in Hawaii; they do not mention that the
Vermont plan has not been implemented because of widespread
grassroots antagonism; they do not mention that the San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission has been responsible
for forbidding development that would have been ecologically and
economically beneficial to everyone simply because it was not
"water related" (Ferry Port Plaza Project); they do not mention
the virtual confiscation without compensation of privately-owned
property under the California Coastal Commission or the
Massachusetts' Wetland Act. The most obvious flaw of all the
programs mentioned by Bosselman and Callies, however, is that each
plan is conservation-oriented and will therefore have a negative
impact on the situation of the poorest people in our society.
How these programs could gain the apparent approval of men who
are aware of the exclusionary problems in building law, is a very
puzzling question.
(4) For instance, Hawaii's experience as outlined in Linowes and
Allensworth, p. 69.
(5) For instance, Vermont's experience as outlined on p. 93, ibid.
(6) For instance, Massachusetts "antisnob" legislative experience as
outlined in Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 174 f.
8.6 Partial Freedom
A fair number of writers have recognized the problems discussed throughout
this paper and have concluded that the only solution is to eliminate (or
substantially to reduce the restrictiveness of) at least some provisions
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of some building laws. Babcock proposes to abolish virtually all
density controls.I Siegan opposes all land-use controls. 2 And several
reformers have recommended partial abolition or selective enforcement of
building codes.3
There is really only one serious problem with these solutions: they
don't go far enough. If we eliminate one set of local controls, let us
say zoning, the other powers of local government would likely be invoked
to take up the slack. This has happened and is visible in Houston.
Although Houston has no zoning ordinance, strict subdivision controls,
massive amounts of restrictive regulation of certain building categories
(e.g., townhouses), building codes, and municipal enforcement of private
covenants (regardless of the wishes of the interested parties) have
eliminated many possible advantages of the "no-zoning" option. Although
Houston does have some desirable characteristics (notably cheaper
apartment rentals and a relatively dynamic construction industry), it is
not a noticeably better place to live than, say,...Los Angeles.
In the final chapter, we will discuss the advantages of a non-coercive,
non-governmental solution to the problems with building law.
(1) Richard F. Babcock and Fred P. Bosselman, "Suburban Zoning and
the Apartment Boom," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, III,
8 (June, 1963), passim.
(2) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
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Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), passim.
(3) R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and Land-Use
Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), p. 207. Spencer D.
Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement (Washington,
D.C., 1970), p. 129.
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"Granting that no one can tell how much worse our cities would have been
had we not had zoning, redevelopment, conservation, and public housing, it
must nevertheless be admitted that we have not eliminated the slum, urban
transportation is a greater problem today than it was 40 years ago, we
have not achieved adequate schools, park and recreation systems, and we
have failed dismally in planning public finance."1
It is commonly assumed that the net effect of building laws is beneficial.
In Chapter 2.0 A Taxonomy of Laws, we attempted to show that such an
assumption is incorrect theoretically. In following chapters, we attempted
to show that such an assumption is highly suspect in reality. In this
chapter, we will discuss the possibilities for instituting a voluntary
system of building control.
(1) Charles M. Haar and Frank E. Horack, Jr., "Emerging Legal Issues
in Zoning," Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard
B. Andrews (New York and London, 1972), p. 116.
9.1 A Proposal
"Few philosophic and administrative concepts have bedded down so securely
so quickly. Few need such drastic reform."l Everyone is agreed that our
current system of building law is inappropriate and needs a revamp. Very
few agree on the specifics of reform. This thesis has attempted to show
that the difficulties we have encountered in building law are inherent in
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any coercive system. We should be very skeptical of any system of
building law that requires complicated enforcement mechanisms and that
depends on legal coercion. We should seek systems that do not involve
government interference; we should seek systems that provide user control
and diversity; we should seek systems that take advantage of each
individual's personal motivation to create an ever-improving environment
for him- or herself.
The following subsections describe this writer's suggestions for achieving
such a voluntary system.
(1) Carl Feiss, "Planning Absorbs Zoning," Urban Land Use Polic y:
The Central City, ed. Richard B. Andrews (New York and London,
1972), p. 125.
9.1.1 Damage Laws
It is this writer's feeling that most people would feel insecure in an
environment that did not carry the government's stamp of approval.
Concommitant with any apparent lessening in government control, an
increase in user control must be offered.
The first step in reform would benefit greatly from judicial reform. If
and individual is (or will be) harmed by some building or by some
construction activity, he or she must be given an opportunity to gain
-117-
9.1.1 Damage Laws (continued)
fast, inexpensive relief. This is an admittedly difficult task:
courts are overburdened and conservative. The elimination of government-
imposed building controls should help to cut the number of real estate
cases in the courts however, and the freed judicial resources should be
spent on the provision of speedy, inexpensive relief for damaged
individuals.
The first step would be to clarify and, in some instances, strengthen
existing laws. Any new legislation that is enacted should prohibit
actions that are harmful per se. Performance standards which are defined
by measurable, objective criteria could be useful in this context.
Precise levels of noise, air, water pollution which harm human beings
or their property should be found and those levels should everywhere be
prohibited except, of course, on one's own property. It is true that
such levels will not be perfect and should therefore be subject to
change, but certainty is the most important consideration in this
context. Variations from the legal standards could be accommodated
through negotiation amongst private property owners. For instance, a
factory might buy the rights to allow a slightly higher level of
pollution on the property of neighbors or alternately the neighbors
might bribe a factory to install stricter pollution controls. It is
strongly recommended that the legal levels of allowable pollution be
rather strict. The difficulties of organizing a large neighborhood to
bribe a business are such that the burden of varying the legal standards
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should generally be placed on the factory owner. The following five
criteria should be applied to our reformed laws:
(1) The laws should be clear. Fuzziness in standards would lead
to a breakdown in the contractual variation process.
(2) The laws should be associated necessarily with damage. Only
actions which harm other people or their property should be
prohibited.
(3) No "victimless crime" laws should be implemented. If a person
chooses to harm himself or his own property (as long as no harm
to other people or their property results), he must be allowed
to do so. This provision allows individuals to bargain with
their rights to a clean, safe environment if they so desire.
(4) Courts must recognize the validity of contractual variation
agreements.
(5) The laws must be self-enforcing. No administration (other
than damage courts and normal police) should be necessary.
Condition 2 above guarantees that someone would be damaged by
a violation; any legal action to ensure enforcement should be
instigated by the harmed party.
Another area where increased government action might prove useful is in
the area of implied warranties.1 There are two implied warranties: the
warranty of merchantability (which requires goods to be (among other
things) adequately labeled and in conformance with the promises or
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affirmations of fact made on the label) and the warranty of fitness for
particular purpose. Although these warranties have not generally been
applied to buildings, there is no reason why they ought not to be. Such
application might or might not (depending on judicial decisions) mean
that producers of buildings would be required to label their goods, but if
labeling were required, buyers and users of buildings would be provided
with the information necessary to the making of intelligent user
decisions. In any event, minimal structural and functional standards
are implied by such warranties. The reader may wonder how these
"warranties" differ from minimal building codes. They differ in one
very important way: they are not absolute. They apply normally, but
the seller may contract to be relieved of the responsibilities imposed on
him by the implied warranties. Any exceptions to or varaiations from
the minimal standards implied by these warranties must be clearly
established however, because the courts have traditionally favored the
consumer when the clearness of the provisions of sale have been in doubt.
Thus warranties can be seen to allow unlimited user control over building
conditions, to provide some needed information regarding the quality of
the building in question, and to guarantee a minimum standard of safety
and utility. Another advantage of a warranty system is that it is
self-enforcing. If a product is subminimal, the consumer instigates
legal action.
A final step which the government might take which might prove helpful
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would be clarification of the laws which apply to separation of
property rights, i.e., land-use covenants, easements, negative
easements, conditions, leases, etc.2 Both judicial and legislative
action could improve the consumer's position. In particular laws
which facilitate creation, enforcement, and termination of private,
voluntary agreements applying to the land would be useful. Although
the current legal framework allows great diversity (see Subsection 9.1.2
Voluntary Community Action), only a competant attorney can cope with
this area of the law with any degree of certainty. De-professionalization
which would allow laypeople more control and greater facility in
handling such voluntary agreements is greatly to be desired.
(1) A discussion of implied warranties is contained in Harold F.
Lusk, Charles M. Hewitt, John D. Donnell, and A. James Barnes,
Business Law Principles and Cases (Homewood, Illinois and
Georgetown, Ontario, 1970), pp. 774 ff.
(2) For an extended discussion of the problems associated with
these (essentially private, voluntary) building and land-use
controls see Charles M. Haar, Land-Use Planning, A Casebook on
the Use, Misuse, and Re-use of Urban Land (Boston and Toronto,
1971), pp. 561 ff.
9.1.2 Voluntary Community Action
For those who want and are willing to pay for higher building and
neighborhood standards than those promised by strengthened nuisance and
warranty standards, the free market provides us with a wide range of
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choices.
In the absence of zoning, between 150 and 200 civic neighborhood clubs
have formed in Houston. These voluntary groups maintain common space,
arrange for police protection and insect control, and create a social
environment that is conducive to neighborhood maintenance.
Other voluntary organization interested in maintaining natural
conservation areas have spent their monies in buying up ecologically
rse; itivr areas instead of lobbying for stricter environmental controls.-
These groups have chosen the only fool-proof method for conservation --
no legislative act can cheat them of their gains. Instead of spending
money trying to force landowners to comply with their wishes, they have
spent their money acquiring legal control over the land in a voluntary
manner. How does this sort of mechanism differ from the legislative
variety? Although some of the older land trusts have been quite
successful in acquiring sizeable tracts, no private voluntary association
can every be expected to be able to afford to buy enough land to have
any noticeable effect on the total supply. They can however afford to
buy the land near the homes of their members; they can afford to buy
those properties that most concern their members. And finally, only
those people who belong to the organization must pay for the land --
never the poor (who currently pay for conservation land with their taxes).
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Private charitable groups have sometimes been interested in helping
the destitute or incompetent to improve housing conditions.3 Although
this mechanism has had negligible effect on general housing conditions,
in the absence of building codes the growth of such organizations could
be expected to help the least well-off and most-deserving of the people.
The single most important voluntary tool at a neighborhood's disposal
is the covenant. A covenant is a contract between individuals which
places a restriction on the use or alienation of the land. A covenant
may apply to one parcel of land (made, perhaps, between the buyer and
the seller) or it may apply to a neighborhood (made between all property
owners in that neighborhood or made by the developer and inserted into
all the deeds in a development). Most covenants run with the land --
or, in English, covenants are binding on all future owners of the land.
And they may cover nearly any aspect of land usage: occupancy; building
type; restrictions as to race, creed, or color of occupants; aesthetics;
fire precautions; structural, plumbing, or electrical minimum standards;
etc. Covenants may be enforced by original signers, their heirs and
assigns, and by persons for whose benefit the covenant was effected.4
They may not be enforced by random neighbors who may accidently benefit
from enforcement of a covenant but who were not subject to its limitations
(this provision provides ample incentive for individuals to enter into
covenants).5
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Until zoning became popular, the covenant was used in much the same way
that zoning is being used today except that covenants have at least five
distinct advantages:
(1) They are purely voluntary.
(2) The courts are expected to enforce them as valid contracts
(not true with zoning since zoning involves governmental
action and many things should be allowed to individuals which
are not allowed to the government).
(3) Covenants are known to the buyer of land in advance of the sale
(not imposed or changed by the government after the sale is
consummated).
(4) Covenants can be used to control a wide variety of problems
including aesthetics (probably not absolutely true of zoning).
(5) Covenants usually apply to very limited areas (not to whole
towns as do building laws).
Given these impressive credentials, it can be seen that covenants offer
the individual more protection and more control over his immediate
environment than zoning or building codes. At the same time, covenants
cannot be expected to cover any sizeable fraction of the land in any
municipality so it is unlikely that they will cause strongly adverse
supply-demand-cost problems.6
Moreover, when covenants are used, the results seem normally to be
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satisfactory. The new town of Radburn, New Jersey was protected by
restrictive covenants with widely acclaimed results.7 In Houston,
approximately ten thousand covenants have been created. 8 Even with
this extremely large number of contracts in effect, enforcement has not
been a serious problem. 9 This device has proved so successful that the
FHA demands covenants on mortgaged properties that adjoin strip
development10 and the city of Houston often enforces private covenants
on its own initiative.ll
Covenants are subject to some limitations however. Though they offer
much wider and more secure coverage than government-imposed building
laws, covenants may be overturned or declared unenforceable for a variety
of reasons. First, racially restrictive covenants, though legal, are
unenforceable.12 Second, covenants that are too old (usually 25 to 50
years or older) may be overturned.13 Third, covenants will not be
enforced if the neighborhood conditions materially change during the life
of the covenant. 14 Fourth, sometimes covenants will not be able to
restrict the right of alienation (i.e., they will not be able to restrict
the conditions of sale of the property).15 As serious as these constraints
are, it is obvious that they are not as limiting as the constitutional
constraints placed on building laws.
Private land-use agreements are not limited to covenants. Easements,
negative easements, conditions, leases, and a variety of other private
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sector tools allow property owners to sell some portion of their
property rights. The availability of such tools allows neighbors an
almost unrestricted choice in finding a set of restrictions and a suitable
means for their expression.
(1) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 35.
(2) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), p. 113.
(3) Spencer D. Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement
(Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 56.
(4) 14 Am. Jur. Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 311 (1938).
(5) Toothaker v. Pleasant, 315 Mo. 1239, 288 S.W. 38 (1926).
(6) This is true first because governments already own over a third
of all property in the United States and second because roughly
92% of the land in the United States (Arthur P. Solomon, The
Effect of Land Use and Environmental Controls on Housing: A
Review (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976), p. 10.) remains
undeveloped and neither of these two categories of property
could be expected to have a covenant.
(7) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), p. 285.
(8) Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning, p. 33.
(9) Ibid., p. 32.
(10) In the absence of zoning, ibid., p. 47.
(11) Ibid., p. 32.
(12) SheZZey v. Kraemer, McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hodge v.
Hodge, Urciolo v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
(13) Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918). This
problem is regularly avoided by providing for "automatic
extensions" every 25 years or so unless the majority of covenant
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holders vote out the covenant (although termination and
continuation clauses vary); see Siegan, hLmand / Witlholt
Zoning, p. 34.
(14) Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 Fed.2d. 24 (D.C.Cir. 1942).
(15) TitlZe Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal.App. 152,
183 Pac. 470 (1919).
9.1.3 Market Mechanisms
What would have happened in the event that building laws had never been
enacted? To some large extent, the world would have been no different.
Invisible-hand natural market mechanisms tend to produce ever-improving
conditions even without laws.
Early reformers noted this and often did not recommend that a provision
be enacted unless the free market was already providing the mandated
amenity. For instance, separate water closets for each dwelling unit
were not recommended until most new tenements were already being provided
with them.1 Today, so few people would buy or rent a dwelling without
separate sanitary facilities, that developers would not build them
even in the absence of a law. The developer who is ignorant of, or
indifferent to, the needs and wants of users will find himself in a very
unprofitable position.2
Market mechanisms that would lead to high levels of amenity and safety
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are fairly obvious, but many writers feel that the more complicated goals
involving use separation could not be accomplished without zoning. The
facts belie this opinion.
The Fifth Avenue Association was a major backer of the first New York
comprehensive zoning law, but they soon discovered that the wheels at
city hall were grinding too slowly to offer them protection. They
quickly formed a "Save New York" committee and instituted a well-publicized
boycott on those garment manufacturers who were moving into the retail
district. By midsummer of 1916, 95% of the transgressors were willing
to move. "What the new zoning law promised was actually less than [what
the "Save New York"] committee was accomplishing by private action."3
There i nothing unusual about this anecdote except that it is a case of
a community cooperating to prevent the intrusion of an external-diseconomy,
internal-economy producing use. In this situation the retailers were
harmed by the intrusion of the manufacturers, but the manufacturers were
benefited by such location decisions since they could cut transportation
costs by being near their buyers. This situation is rather unusual and is
the worst case. Under normal circumstances, no such cooperation is
necessary. The proof of this statement can be found in Houston, Texas.
Houston which lacks any use-segregation rules has been studied
extensively by Siegan. His studies are so revealing that four of them
are summarized here:
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Study 1.4 In a study done of all twenty-four Chevrolet, Ford, and
Plymouth dealerships in Houston, only three were contiguous with an
unbuffered residential area. Moreover, all three were next to very low
income areas (one with unpaved roads) -- exactly the sort of neighborhoods
which would be unsuccessful in fighting a dealership's variance request
in zoned cities.
Study 2.5 In a study done on a very poor Mexican-American district
wherein the asking price of homes ranged between $7,000 and $11,000,
there were 950 structures and no private covenants. 7% of the structures
had home occupations or commercial use; 5% were duplexes or apartments;
2% were trailers; 1% were industrial; and 13% of the land was unbuilt.
Between 30% and 50% of the non-residential uses would have been allowed
under zoning proposals had they been approved by the voters.
Study 3.6 In a working class district where in the asking price for
homes ranged between $9,000 and $19,000, there were 240 structures and
about half were covered by private covenants. 5% of the structures had
home occupations or commercial use; 20% were duplexes or apartments;
0% were industrial uses; and 2% of the land was vacant.
Study 4.7 In a middle-class white district wherein the asking price
for homes ranged between $19,000 and $25,000, there were 450 structures and
no private covenants since 1936 or before. There were two apartment
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comll.cxes; and p)art: o ,a !;lo} )ii ( c(lnt-:er; 4% were conu-lc.i.l.. st::,:;
25% were duplexes or multiple-family; 0% were industrial uses; and
4% of the land was unbuilt. None of the apartments exceeded two stories
in height.
These four studies indicate that uses seem to segregate naturally.
Apartments do seem to move into residential neighborhoods, but they seem
compatible with other dwellings. Why does such extensive use segregation
occur without laws or even covenants? In poor areas, commercial uses
won't invade because the poor people in the neighborhood can't afford to
build up high demand levels for goods and services. Some convenience
services do appear, but they cater to the needs of low-mobility
residents. Moreover, inner residential streets are seldom fiscally
sensible for commercial uses that require visibility and traffic. Because
of accessibility, apartments tend to be built on major thoroughfares or
in downtown areas. When suburban apartments are built, they tend to
segregate themselves also. 8 This phenomenon may in turn lead to Zess
pressure for multi-family uses on quieter residential streets. Finally,
industry would not be likely to choose to locate in residential areas
where they are unwanted on purpose. Industries seek easy transportation
(i.e., railways, highways, and airports), not bad publicity generated by
angry neighbors.
Of course, market mechanisms are merely "tendencies." Without private
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action, no guarantees can be offered under a purely voluntary system.
But it must be remembered from Chapter 4.0 Nonenforcement that zoning
and building codes cannot offer guarantees either. Between the various
mechanisms of graft, beneficent nonenforcement, variances, appeals,
special exceptions, and rezoning, the average neighborhood is probably
as well protected by free market "tendencies" as by costly zoning and
building code laws.
(1) Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller, "The Tenement House
Problem," The Tenement House ProbZem, VoZume I, eds. Robert W.
DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903), p. 24.
(2) Bernard H. Siegan, a great advocate of market mechanisms, relates
a particularly excellent example in Land Use Without Zoning
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 140. In
the early 1970's MacDonald's management discovered that people
didn't like the garish architecture and that they were losing
business. The management quickly switched to a more subdued
style. Of course, building laws may actually impair the ability
of the market to respond in such a beneficial manner -- the
powers of zoning and building codes may grant a virtual monopoly
to a local business which would materially reduce the incentives
for the local business to provide responsive goods and services.
(3) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), p. 179.
(4) Siegan, pp. 56 f.
(5) Ibid., p. 37.
(6) Ibid., pp. 39 ff.
(7) Ibid., p. 39.
(8) This writer has no idea of why this happens, but that it does is
noted by Siegan, p. 68.
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In order for us to attain a voluntary system of control, traditional
building laws should be completely abolished. There are several ways in
which this could be accomplished.
(1) The Supreme Court might declare zoning and other land-use controls
to be illegal on "substantive due process" reasoning.l This is
unlikely given the mood of the current Court. It is also highly
unlikely that building codes could be abolished in this way.
(2) A large number of judicial decisions by lower courts could over-
turn all building laws on a variety of grounds (equal protection
and substantive due process being the prime candidates, but
freedom to travel, freedom of association, and other constitutional
issues could be raised). This would be a slow, haphazard route
and would probably prove ineffective in many areas of the country.
Not only are the costs associated with such suits prohibitively
high, but lower courts have also been reluctant to overturn
legislative acts.
(3) Localities could repeal building laws. Given the incentives for
suburban communities to maintain building laws, it seems unlikely
that this route would work except in poor or highly urban or
highly exurban municipalities. Such communities could provide
testing grounds for voluntary systems, but one could not hope that
this route would be effective everywhere.
(4) State legislatures could repeal enabling statutes for building
laws. This has the advantage of being orderly and comprehensive,
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but it seems unlikely that legislatures would willingly cede
any government powers.
(5) The laws could be voted out of existence via ballot initiatives
in state-wide elections. This would not only be orderly and
comprehensive, but it would also be possible in today's
political climate in a large number of midwest and western
states. When zoning has been put to the vote, it has fared badly
(see Appendix A -- Section 10.2 Zoning Is Popular). Subdivision
controls would be unlikely to do much better. Other land-use
controls and building codes could be expected to survive the vote
in many (probably most) areas -- they are much more popular. But
if some states voted them out of existence, and if these large-
scale experiments were seen to be successful, judicial or
legislative repeal might prove feasible in the other states.
(1) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 218 f.
9.1.5 Transition Measures
The proposal to implement a voluntary approach is very radical. In order
to allay citizens' fears about the consequences of a voluntary approach
(and in order to uncover and correct flaws), a number of transition
measures should be associated with repeal proposals.
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Tn the area of land-use control, a short moratorium on use changes in
residential neighborhoods would be necessary.! This would give owners an
opportunity to create needed covenants. Although covenants have usually
been imposed by developers, many covenants have been created in existing
neighborhoods2 and it would be politic to allow homeowners ample
opportunity to protect their neighborhoods in this way.
Another deregulatory action that might prove helpful would be the repeal
of all building codes coupled with temporary "mandatory advertising. " 3
Builders and self-helpers would be allowed to build whatever structures
thjer wa;lltr] 11;iriq whatever standards they wanted (providinq these actions
harmed no one else, of course). However, builders would be required
to inform buyers and users of what standards had been used in construction.
One could build a flimsey building, but it would have to be advertised as
such. This system would help users and buyers to learn not to depend on
government's (often non-existant) protection and to start taking control
of the building process themselves. This method also encourages the
expansion of implied and explicit warranties which could play an
important role in a voluntary system.
A third transition measure would be deregulation of all undeveloped land.
Existing neighborhoods could retain their protections without covenants,
but new neighborhoods would be built with covenant protection only. This
measure would immediately reduce exclusion and would reintroduce covenants
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into common usage under favorable conditions. When the superior
protection of covenanted areas becomes obvious (admittedly the likelihood
of this observation being made would be enhanced by the fact that the
covenanted areas are newer developments), voluntary protections will
become more palatable in older areas. Moreover, this system lends itself
to serial deregulation of use zones: first, undeveloped land; then,
industrial land; third, commercial areas; and finally, residential zones.
Finally, before any total repeal is considered, a number of urban,
suburban, and exurban municipalities should try the voluntary approach.
These test areas should be studied carefully to insure that the market
mechanisms work smoothly enough to be adopted on a wider scale. Possible
problems might result if nuisance levels were set too high or too low
(although as we showed in Subsection 9.1.1 Damage Laws, small variations
from a "perfect" level can be accommodated through contract). High
levels would place too much burden on the developer and low levels would
place too much burden on the neighborhood. Only through field testing
could an appropriate level be achieved. Another set of problems might
arise from the novelty of such a scheme. It would undoubtedly take time
for neighbors and developers to adjust to the voluntary system.
Educational efforts or even more slowly-moving transitions than have so
far been discussed might prove necessary to make the system work well.
(1) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
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Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 238 f.
(2) Ibid., pp. 239 ff.
(3) This idea was suggested to the author by Michael O'Hare.
9.2 The Houston Experience
Although Houston, Texas is not an ideal testing ground for the voluntary
approach to building control, it is the best that is available. Houston
has typical subdivision regulations, building codes, and some provisions
normally contained in zoning ordinances are contained in other regulations
in Houston. Houston does not have mandatory use segregation and many
of the provisions normally contained in zoning ordinances are so
unrestrictive that they have no substantive effect on development.
The most obvious characteristic of Houston is that it is growing. In 1975
it was ranked as the sixth largest city in the nation, but since 1960
it has always ranked third or fourth in volume of construction.l 180
major industries supporting over 200,000 new households have moved into
Houston since 1970 (a startling figure given the out-migration so
noticeable in other major cities).2 In 1976 building permits ran 82%
above the previous year's total with 6,900 new homes completed in the
first quarter.3
The situation for apartment dwellers is significantly better in Houston
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than it is in most urban areas. The vacancy rate is 4.4% desite the
extreme pressures from in-migration4 and rents are among the lowest for
any major American city. 5 This low rental cost seems to be a result of
the fact that land suitable for apartments in Houston is cheaper than
land zoned for apartments in zoned cities. 6 In fact, in Houston land
for apartments is often cheaper than land for single-family residences.7
The lack of zoning seems to have affected single-family residences only
slightly. FHA-insured homes generally cost a bit more in Houston than
in Dallas (a city similar to Houston in all pertinent respects except
zoning), and they are generally on smaller lots, but Houston homes are
usually equipped with more amenities and are always larger. 8
Downtown Houston is about as blighted and sprawling as any urban center,
but the lack of building law has made several large private renewal
project feasible9 which indicates that these may be self-correcting
problems in the absence of government interference. The only "real
problem" area that Houston has (that other large urban areas don't have
to the same or a worse degree), is that the administrators who plan
public facilities claim that planning for such unpredictable and dynamic
growth is difficult. TM On balance, even the small amount of freedom
allowed in Houston seems to have had beneficial results.
(1) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
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Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), pp. 238 f.
(2) "Houston in the News -- Again!," AREA Bulletin, 2, 4 (July, 1976),
p. 3.
(3) Ibid. Some of the growth may be attributed to the extremely low
property tax rates, climate, large amounts of undeveloped land,
and other factors, but it is important to note that the lack of
zoning does not seem to inhibit growth.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Siegan, p. 50.
(6) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 95 ff.
(7) Ibid., p. 121.
(8) Data for States and Selected Areas on Characteristics of FHA
Operations under Section 203 (Washington, D.C., 1968).
(9) Houston Center and Greenway Plaza are noted and discussed by
Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning, pp. 68 ff., pp. 127 ff.
(10) Ibid., pp. 130 ff. and "Houston in the News -- Again!," p. 3.
9.3 The Problem of Diseconomies
"Zoning is of interest to the economic theorist because of its relation
to certain peculiarities of the urban property market. These peculiarities,
external economies and diseconomies, have never been completely understood,
although it is generally agreed that the presence of such uncompensated
externalities means that the unrestricted market cannot function in such
a manner as to achieve Pareto optimality." 1
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A Ihe oreti0al 1 ('xmii,. l r,' :f I:h ex Urrial i. lion o(f d1 i ::eolloiny i; the
building of a gas station in a residential neighborhood. The parcel on
which the gas station is located may be increased in value, but
surrounding parcels might be decreased in value. The net result of the
transaction may even be a loss of value (i.e., the gas station gain
could be insufficient to offset the abutters' losses). Zoning was
implemented largely for the purposes of prohibiting the externalization
of diseconomies.2
However, strong evidence exists to indicate that external diseconomies
either do not exist3 or that if they do exist, they are of such a nature
as to insure that zoning will be unable to treat them.4 "InI fact,
[zoning's] simple segregation method alone cannot be said to accomplish
[Pareto optimality]. The reason is that for certain uses 'internal'
profit considerations may be such that compensation theoretically could
be paid for those external diseconomies which might be created." Moreover
zoning's use segregation method may actually aggravate the problem by
prohibiting mixtures of uses that are not only compatible, but mutually
beneficial (see also Subsection 7.2.1 Incompatibilities).
A number of writers on the subject have therefore recommended compensatory
programs. 5 These schemes are normally based on some sort of zoning, but
the developer is allowed to give (and, this writer assumes, accept)
"bribes" in the making of location decisions. This sort of system would
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approximate Pareto optimality. When one makes such a proposal, one is
saying, in effect, that zoning laws (and, by extension, building codes)
form a base line. If a developer wishes to intrude a below-base-line
use, he must compensate the affected neighbors.
When worded like this, it becomes obvious that current building laws are
not the necessary base line. If we were to use current laws, we would,
in fact, have numerous undesirable consequences: poor people would end
up paying suburbanites in order to overcome exclusionary zoning, for
instance. A much more appropriate base line would be the expanded nuisance
and warranty levels discussed in Subsection 9.1.1 Damage Laws.6 Theoretically
of course, the level of amenity suggested by the base line standards is
inconsequential as long as variations are controlled by the people involved
in the transaction, i.e., neighbors and developers and not municipal
bureaucrats and administrators. If the base line is low, the neighbors
would have to band together to "bribe" the developer to locate elsewhere
or to raise his standards; if the base line is high, the developer would
have to "bribe" the neighbors. In both cases, Pareto optimality is
approximated.
But other considerations urge us to set standards at the most equitable
level we can humanly discover. If standards are unrelated to objective
damage (as in the case of large-lot zoning or unnecessarily high housing
standards) people will end up paying for the privilege of committing
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acts that harm no one. If, on the other hand, standards allow some
damage (as is the case with modern airport decisions and other pollution
controls), people will end up paying for the privilege of preventing
damage to themselves. As a result, reformation of nuisance laws would
involve lowering of standards in many instances (legislative use separation
should be eliminated entirely, for instance) and raising them in many
others (allowable pollution levels should be quite low, airports and
power plants would likely fall under such conditional prohibitions).
There remain a number of real difficulties with this approach. If we
conditionally prohibit airports, who, exactly, will a developer have to
"bribe" in order to build one? What, exactly, is the physical land area
affected by such development? If neighbors do "bribe" a developer to
locate elsewhere, does this mean that the property will remain unused
forever? These and a host of similarly serious questions must be
answered by the courts, but these are questions of damage and, in the case
of unclear contracts, intent. These problems are certainly of a much
smaller scale than those problems which have been plaguing both courts
and local boards for many years under our current system.
(1) Otto A. Davis, "Economic Elements in Municipal Zoning Decisions,"
Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard B. Andrews
(New York and London, 1972), p. 41.
(2) See, for example, the analysis given by Daniel R. Mandelker,
The Zoning Dilemma, A Legal Strategy for Urban Change
(Seattle, 1971), p. 24.
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(3) Hugh O. Nourse, A Rationale for Government Intervention in
Housing: The External Benefit of Good Housing, Particularly
with Respect to Neighborhood Property Values, could not find
the expected relationship.
(4) John Crecine, Otto Davis, and John Jackson, "Urban Property
Markets: Some Empirical Results and Their Implications for
Municipal Zoning," Land Use Controls: Present Problems and
Future Reform, ed. David Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey,
1974). A theory which reconciles the results of studies which
are unable to find diseconomies and the common-sense observation
that diseconomies must occur does exist. Perhaps normal
diseconomies (and externalized economies) affect only abutters
and not whole neighborhoods. Of course, it is also possible
that the common-sense observation is mistaken: although
individuals have preferences to which pricetags attach, there is
always the possibility that no particular preference is accepted
widely enough to have an effect upon prices.
(5) Davis, "Economic Elements in Municipal Zoning Decisions,"
pp. 49 f. contains the most detailed plan that this writer has
found.
(6) A base line consisting of prohibitions of all diseconomy-
producing uses and all pollution, though it sounds appealing,
would be impractical. Such a base line would prohibit gas
stations, funeral homes, industries, and homes -- any development
is diseconomy-producing under some circumstances. Such a base
line would also prohibit internal combustion engines -- not a
bad idea in this author's opinion, but certainly impolitic.
9,4 The Problem of Collective Goods
Collective goods, in the troublesome sense are goods which require
collective action to achieve but which individuals acting in a rationally
self-interested manner will not cooperate to achieve. The reason that
individuals will not contribute to the achievement of these goals is that
the "good" will be achieved or not achieved regardless of the action of any
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particular individual and that, if the good is achieved, all will
benefit regardless of whether they contributed to the good or not, i.e.,
if the good is achieved, there is no way to exclude non-participants
from enjoying the benefits. National defense and union labor benefits
are two commonly cited examples of such goods.l If such goods exist
in the land and buildings market, an economic argument could be used
to support further government intervention. Most writers assume that
such goods exist but either do not attempt to cite examples in real
estate or cite examples that are caused by inappropriate current
regulations. It is this writer's belief that such collective goals
are relatively rare in the land and buildings market and that, when
and if they do exist, noncoercive means of attaining them can be found
that will work more justly than legislative means.
In the first place, in order for there to exist a collective good,
there must exist unanimity of opinion as to its desirableness. If
unanimity does not exist, people who do not want and will not use the
goods will be unjustly forced to pay for them if government coercion is
used to attain them. Such a system currently exists with our national
park system: millions of poor Americans are forced to pay for acquisition
and maintenance of a park system that they will never be able to use.
The sort of unanimity required is patently impossible: diversity of
opinion is the rule, at least in the United States. Even if we relax
the criteria to require only a 90% majority goal (accepting the fact that
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some injustice will done to the 10% minority), it is doubtful that many
collective goods could be found.
Now we come to a second problem. Most of those goals that possess near-
universal desirability have more to do with the prevention of harm than
with the acquisition of some good -- pollution control, defense by police,
national defense, etc. The reform system suggested in this paper specifies
that a proper function of government is to prevent objective damage,
however, so those who would increase government control in the name of
these collective goods should have no complaints.
Undoubtedly there exist some goods which large numbers of people want which
can bo cla; ;i. Ficd as amenities rather than !)rotection, but. th is i;
exactly what is wrong with our current system of building law -- minority
desires are ignored, the poor are forced to pay for amenities which they
cannot afford, and so on. This does not imply that majority amenities
cannot be acquired, however. As we have pointed out, most collective goods
are of neighborhood (rather than town-wide, state-wide, or nation-wide)
import. Covenants on this small scale (given social incentives, small
numbers of people involved, and economic motivations) are demonstrably
feasible without government intervention (except in contract enforcement). 2
This leaves us with a very limited set of possible collective goods: they
must have regional impact; they must be widely accepted as desirable;
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they must be an amenity; they must not be damage-preventing. This writer
can think of no good that meets these criteria. Even if one can be
found, however, it seems unlikely that our bureaucrats and legislators
could cope with it any more effectively than they have coped with other
problems; better to leave it in the hands of prestigious charitable
institutions and the like than to allow the government bureaucrats to
mishandle the situation.
(1) For a more complete discussion and analysis see Mancur Olson, Jr.,
The Logic of CoZZective Action, PubZic Goods and the Theory of
Groups (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965).
(2) The prevention of "risky" actions which cause no objective harm,
e.g., the building of fire traps, should be handled through
covenants, warranties, and insurance company agreements; they
ought not to be prohibited under nuisance laws. Insurance
companies (with government help) already play an important role
in this area. They can be expected to offer stronger incentives
to build safe buildings if a voluntary system is adopted and if
coercive laws are removed from their repertoire of risk-reducing
tools. An alternative view is presented by Robert Nozick,
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, 1974) who is a limited-
state libertarian. The anarcho-libertarian usually argues that
safety is an amenity rather than a right.
9.5 Evaluation
In Chapter 8.0 Reforms we discussed ten criteria for evaluation of reform
proposals. Let us here investigate how our voluntary system compares with
other proposals.
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1. esponsiveness. Complete control is in the hands of the people. No
control is given to bureaucrats, politicians, planners, or parochial
business interests. If an individual values amenity, he may seek it
through covenants, easements, bribes to neighbors, or whatever. If
an individual places little value on environmental considerations, he
is free to choose to spend his money on non-environmental goods. This
is the most responsive system.
2. Exclusion. Some degree of exclusion is allowed in a voluntary system,
but those who seek to live in an exclusive neighborhood will have to pay
the costs through covenant agreements: either they must pay money to
neighbors in exchange for promises to be exclusive or they must accept
mutual restrictions on their own property. In either case, the costs
will be commensurate with the degree of exclusion. At the same time,
the amount of land that would be likely to be subject to costly
exclusive agreements would be miniscule -- under 10% even in urban and
suburban areas. Thus the effect of exclusion on the less affluent will
be negligible. The voluntary system, because it is responsive, will
probably strike the most equitable balance in this regard.
3. Flexibility. Changes between neighborhoods would be accommodated
easily under covenants. More diversity should result than under any other
system. Moreover if new environmental values emerge (e.g., industrialized
housing), they would be able to be expressed in communities built on
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undeveloped land not already subject to covenant agreements. Of course,
covenants, easements, etc. are not very flexible, but that is why
they will be formed -- those residents want security and certainty
rather than innovative freedom. And if unanimity can be reached, all
covenantees might agree to nonenforcement. In any event, the voluntary
system offers the maximum amount of flexibility consistent with security.
The controls are firmly in the hands of the people most affected by
the controls, not in the hands of bureaucrats who can offer neither
security nor freedom to innovate in any honest manner.
4. Objectivity. It is not expected that every covenant will be
objective -- peoples' wants and desires are too irrational to expect
that. But the costliness of covenants will insure that the provisions
of the covenant will bear some strong relation to the values of the
people in the covenant area (if they did not, why would an individual
buy land in the area or agree to have the covenant restrictions placed
on his property?). With respect to the government's role, in a sense,
we hedge the problem: we specified that government nuisance laws,
warranty laws, and private land-use laws should be clear and objective.
This defining-the-problem-away tactic is useful in determining intent
and it does indicate what principles ought to be used, but it does not
get down to the real problems. There is some possibility that the
reformed nuisance standards would not be very objective even if
objectivity is a stated goal. Nonetheless, no other reform proposal has
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a better chance of being enacted any more justly, so we must conclude
that (in the absence of the exact wording of the potential laws) the
voluntary system is acceptable in terms of this criteria.
5. Graft. The elimination of the present bureaucracy will insure that
the unacceptable sort of graft will not occur. The voluntary system
is easily the most graft-resistant.
6. Enforceability. Enforcement problems will largely disappear under
a voluntary system. No enforcement agency is required over and above
the usual police and court system. Standards are voluntarily accepted
in all instances so it may reasonably be expected that reneging on
contracts would be minimal (the Houston experience bears this out).
Nuisance law and warranty standards are sufficiently low so that, in
most instances, their violation would not be necessary or desirable.
And when violations of an uncompensated nature do occur, the harmed
individual will, if the harm is above some nominal level, have
sufficient motivation to seek judicial relief. A voluntary system
can be expected to minimize (though admittedly not eliminate) enforcement
problems. No system of government intervention can be expected to
achieve such general levels of compliance so effortlessly.
7. Hardship. The reason for such effortless enforcement is, in part, due
to the fact that the voluntary system minimizes hardship. No standard
-148-
9.5 Evaluation (continued)
ca:;t e unilaterally force:d on an individual except perhaps in cases
where severe physical handicaps combine with age, mental incompelntence,
or destitution to insure that one party to an agreement has a substantial
advantage over the other. For a normal, healthy individual the
alternative of self-help is always available. For the few people who
are truly resourceless (the aged, the physically or mentally handicapped,
and the very young), subsidies would be necessary to eliminate hardship
completely.
8. Blunder-impact. The greater the "balkanization" in building controls,
the less the blunder-impact. Balkanization encourages innovation and
diversity because whatever errors are made will have relatively unimportant
consequences. Most reform schemes, particularly building code reforms,
seek greater uniformity, and are thus undesirable in this respect. Our
voluntary system, on the other hand, suggests extreme diversity in
controls -- every neighborhood covenant area could be subject to a slightly
different set of restrictions. This means that the voluntary system is
the only system that reduces blunder-impact. The real goals of those who
call for uniformity will not be completely thwarted, however. Since most
undeveloped land would not be subject to any covenants, manufactured
housing producers and consumers would have increased freedom to build and
innovate. Whole neighborhoods of industrialized housing which meet
manufacturer and user standards (though they may not meet suburban
middle-class neighborhood standards) could be formed and covenanted. The
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nuisance laws, warranties, etc. that apply to such undeveloped areas
would be uniform however. The voluntary system thus provides uniformity
where it is most meeded (i.e., in undeveloped areas) and diversity
where it is most needed (i.e., in neighborhoods where the diverse tastes
of residents should be accommodated). At the same time, blunder-impact
is reduced to allow creativity and innovation. This is not an unmixed
blessing: it is likely that uneducated users will make more errors than
the conservative government experts. But the impact of such errors will
be small and the costs associated with the errors will be borne by the
error-makers -- a much better situation than the one which we have now.
9. Liability. Normal building codes and zoning ordinances have very
weak peo'na.lties for violations even when demonstrable harm results. lhis
author has inadvertantly violated building laws on numerous occasions
without ever paying a fine; this author has also paid out large sums of
money for architect- and engineer-caused errors. Few reform schemes
address this problem though it is of great concern to people in the
industry. As long as building laws bear weak relationship to traditional
concepts of damage, the situation is unlikely to change. A voluntary
approach is unlikely to solve all problems in this area, but it is
likely to accomplish some good. First, by tying nuisance laws to real
damage, by developing implied warranties, and by controlling amenities
through contracts, we place building controls in the mainstream of
business law. No longer will the courts have to try to balance interests
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between a private individual and a town government, between a person
and a bureaucracy. Many legal issues dealing with the constitutionality
of regulations, legislative intent, and other regulatory concerns would
fade in importance. The real issues -- who damaged whom and how much --
are much more likely to be addressed. Second, naive users make many
invalid assumptions about the building process because they feel protected
by legislation. If we remove the false protection offered by building
laws, it seems likely that users would be more wary. Bonding companies,
private inspection services, and owner construction representatives would
be hired more frequently. This would reduce the number of problems
caused by ignorance, and facilitate both the building process and the
judicial process when disagreements do reach the courts. A voluntary
approach, as outlined in this paper, will not solve the problem of
determining liability, but it is the only reform scheme that attempts to
clear the legal waters.
10. Feasibility. A voluntary approach is clearly constitutional, but
its political feasibility is in doubt. The popular mood favors ever
greater government intervention and large numbers of people benefit from
building laws (see Appendix C -- Chapter 12.0 "Haves" and Building Law).
There is hope, however, in the counterculture, in some western states,
in transition measures, and in recent anti-government grassroots
working-class movements. Since the voluntary approach is so successful
in regard to every other criterion, and since it is not hopelessly
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unfeasible, there is ample reason to discuss this proposal seriously.
The following three appendices discuss some issues which may further
convince the reader of the desirability and feasibility of a voluntary
approach to the problems of environmental control.
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There are a great number of commonly accepted beliefs about building laws
and their effects. Some of them are myths, and these myths sometimes
obstruct our vision so that we are unable to suggest improvements. It
is the purpose of this chapter to dispel some of these myths.
10.1 We Haven't Had a Complete and Thorough Test
of the Effectiveness of Building Laws
Some people believe that our current system of building regulation is quite
bad, but that the problems are temporary maladjustments. The assumptions
one must make to hold this belief are threefold: (1) building laws are
relatively new, (2) building laws aren't very widespread, and (3) building
laws have not granted enough power to the regulators. All three assumptions
are unfounded.
Building laws are old. The first building code on record appeared in the
Code of Hammurabi in 2100 B.C.1 As we have noted in various sections,
building laws in London are about as old as the city is, but the real push
toward modern codes started in Elizabeth I's reign. It was the Great Fire
in 1666 that gave regulators a real chance to show what they could do. The
code in effect during the rebuilding of London controlled street width,
frontages, maximum wages and prices for men and materials, structural
considerations, signs, sewers, taxes, and much more. The code required
uniform roof lines, brick and stone facades, 12' o.c. joists, etc. It
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forced flammable uses to locate on back streets and required inspections.
It also allowed for eminent domain takings and demolitions and there was,
expectedly, a variance procedure.2 These powers were extensive and were
enforced as well as could be expected. Yet the new Building Act of 1844
cited narrow streets, explosive population growth, speculation, and fire
and disease as problems which demanded even greater controls. The new
powers were granted and the old powers were reaffirmed.3 In 1890 and
1894, in response to the bulk of the "Queen Anne's Mansions," bulk
controls were added. In 1894 the Open Spaces Act added extensive city
planning powers 5 and shortly after the turn of the century, structural
steel and reinforced concrete codes were added.6 With all of this power
in the hands of planners, one would expect London to be a beautiful model
city. Such is not the case. London is crowded, dirty, squalid, notably
inferior to most Western cities in architectural style, and a prime
example of urban sprawl. This does not imply that building laws caused
these conditions, only that building laws were unable to eliminate these
conditions despite over three hundred years of virtually absolute control.
Housing and building controls were likewise incapable of dealing effectively
with American problems: the first extensive building code here was
enacted in New York City at about the turn of the century (earlier codes
were so generally ignored that it would be unfair to mention them). After
over 75 years of the strictest building codes in the country, New York City
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is acknowledged to have the most serious housing problem in the country,
and not even the most ardent "Fun City" booster would dare call it clean,
safe, or uncongested. Again we are not implying that the laws caused the
problems (although we believe that they contributed substantially in at
least the case of New York City), only that the laws could not cope
successfully with building problems.
Zoning regulations are also quite old (they have not traditionally been
considered a thing apart from other building codes until quite recently),
but use segregation was first implemented by Napoleon; he instituted
use segregation in the conquered German cities,7 but this zoning
principle spread throughout orderly Germany quite quickly. Germany
again led the way with the first complete, modern set of national zoning
laws which was enacted under the Nazis in 1936. 8
In the United States the first land-use controls date back to the 1600s.9
With the exception of the National Land Ordinance of 1785, however,
control generally stayed at the municipal level until Franklin D.
Roosevelt came to office.10 Shortly after the turn of the century both
building codes and zoning codes spread quickly. St. Louis adopted partial
zoning in 1901, followed eight years later by Los Angeles. During the
the 1910s, several states including Massachusetts passed enabling
statutes for zoningll and among the cities to adopt zoning were Boston,
-155-
10.1 We Haven't Had a Complete and Thorough Test of the Effectiveness of
Building Laws (continued)
Baltimore, Duluth, Minneapolis, St. Paul, San Diego, Seattle, New York
City, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and numerous Wisconsin cities. 12 At
the same time building and housing codes became popular too, and by the
time New York City was considering the adoption of an enforceable code,
most cities of any size already had at least some sort of housing or
building code: San Francisco, Philadelphia, Chicago, Baltimore, Buffalo,
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Washington, D.C., Providence, and Toledo.13 Of
the major cities, only New Orleans seemed to be completely free of
restrictions. 14 After well over 50 years of controls, none of the
controlled cities is remarkable clean, beautiful, or uncongested.
As to the current extent of building regulations, they are indeed
widespread. Planning and regulatory activities, zoning and subdivision
rules involve thousands of government employees and affect a high
proportion of the population of the United States.l5 97.3% of all
towns with populations over 5000 within SMSAs have some regulation and
95.8% of all towns with populations over 5000 outside SMSAs have some
regulation. 16
There are no major cities and only a few rural areas which have no
building codes. 17 A survey of construction codes noted that some areas
such as the New York City Metropolitan Area are completely covered by local
building codes.1 8 Zoning codes are almost as widespread with 90.1% of
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all towns with populations over 5000 reporting that they had zoning
ordinances. 19 Of the major cities, only Houston has no formal zoning
ordinance. 2°0
For at least the last fifty years, local building laws have had
considerable control over all of our urban and most of our rural
areas. At one time or another in the history of building law, nearly
everything has been tried: carrots, sticks, local control, regional
control, state control, federal control, and various combinations. If
mere laws could effect the city beautiful, one would have expected some
set of rules to have worked properly by now. It seems clear to this
writer that the notion of building control by law has been adequately
tested and has been found lacking.
Of course, there is always the possibility that building laws have
alleviated building problems -- since every situation is different
there can be no absolute proof of the ineffectiveness or effectiveness
of building law. All we can say with surety is that building laws cannot
accomplish the goals which they were designed to accomplish and we can
only hint at the mechanisms by which building laws may actually do harm.
(1) George N. Thompson, "Preparation and Revision of Building Codes,"
Urban Land Use PoZicy: The CentraZ City, ed. Richard B.
Andrews (New York and London, 1972), p. 133.
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(2) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation
in London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), pp. 30 ff.
(3) Ibid., pp. 60 ff.
(4) Dean Hawkes, Building Bulk Legislation: A Description and
Analysis (Cambridge, England, [n.d.]), p. 26.
(5) Knowles and Pitt, p. 93.
(6) Ibid., pp. 98 f.
(7) G. Topham Forrest, The Construction and Control of Buildings and
the Development of Urban Areas in the United States of America
(Westminster, England, 1925), p. 41.
(8) Sidney Cohn, Practice of Architectural Control in Northern
Europe, A Report Prepared for HUD (Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
1968), p. 87.
(9) R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and landi-l.
(Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), pp. 21 ff.
(10o) £bid., p. 23.
(11) Forrest, p. 41.
(12) Ibid. and Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969),
p. 139, p. 155, p. 126.
(13) Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and Michael A. Fischetti,
Survey of the Administration of Construction Codes in Selected
Metropolitan Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 8. Lawrence
Veiller, "Housing Conditions and Tenement Laws in Leading
American Cities," The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds.
Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London,
1903), pp. 131 ff.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Allen D. Manvel, Local Land and Building Regulation, How Many
Agencies? What Practices? How Much Personnel? (Washington, D.C.,
1968), p. 2.
-158-
10.1 We Haven't Had a Complete and Thorough Test of the Effectiveness of
Building Laws
(16) Ibid., p. 28.
(17) Bernard H. Siegan, Other PeopZe's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), pp. 27 ff.
(1.8) Williams, Young, and Fischetti, p. 90.
(19) Manvel, p. 28.
(20) It must be noted that many provisions which might normally
appear in a zoning ordinance are included in the building codes,
nuisance laws, and subdivision regulations in Houston. The
major difference between Houston and other cities seems to be
that Houston has no use separation (except, of course, by
private agreement) -- a slender, but as we have seen, significant
difference.
10.2 Zoning is Popular
In Appendix C -- Chapter 12.0 "Haves" and Building Law we will see that
a great number of people want controls if only to protect their special
interests. However, in Appendix B -- Chapter 11.0 "Have Nots" and
Building Law we will see that there are a large number of people who can
be expected to wish for the repeal of such laws. Most writers have
assumed that the "haves" are in the majority, but there is evidence to
suggest otherwise.
The National Land Use Bill was twice defeated. In 1974 the Alaskan
pipeline debacle was still fresh in people's minds and the environmental-
ists failed to support it because they felt that it would deliver
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insufficient protection; others who voted against it objected to its
ambiguity and technical complexity.l In 1975 it was again defeated,
this time due to "grassroots antagonism."2 State controls have fared
little better. Hawaii is the only state with an operable law, but
its circumstances uniquely favor state legislation.3 Vermont actually
passed statewide legislation,4 but public opposition has been so strong
that Vermont politicians have been unable to adopt an implementation
plan.5 Utah's state land control proposal was defeated 60 to 40. 6
This antagonism to federal, or even state, intervention in traditionally
local affairs is understandable without proving anything about the
popularity of land-use controls. Obviously, many of the "haves" would
lose their benefits if higher level governments take control, so they
will fight such proposals. In addition, there is a growing distrust in
this country of big government, so a number of people will fight such
measures on principle.
More surprising than the public's reaction to state or federal measures
is the response to local controls when they have been put on the ballot.
The people almost always reject zoning proposals and have occasionally
even rejected building codes. An example of the latter occurred when
Racine, Wisconsin voted to abolish their building code;7 apparently,
they were miffed at the invasion of privacy necessitated by inspections.8
The following list of votes on zoning is by no means comprehensive, but
-160-
10.2 Zoning Is Popular (continued)
insufficient protection; others who voted against it objected to its
ambiguity and technical complexity.l In 1975 it was again defeated,
this time due to "grassroots antagonism." 2 State controls have fared
little better. Hawaii is the only state with an operable law, but
its circumstances uniquely favor state legislation.3 Vermont actually
passed statewide legislation,4 but public opposition has been so strong
that Vermont politicians have been unable to adopt an implementation
plan. 5 Utah's state land control proposal was defeated 60 to 40.6
This antagonism to federal, or even state, intervention in traditionally
local affairs is understandable without proving anything about the
popularity of land-use controls. Obviously, many of the "haves" would
lose their benefits if higher level governments take control, so they
will fight such proposals. In addition, there is a growing distrust in
this country of big government, so a number of people will fight such
measures on principle.
More surprising than the public's reaction to state or federal measures
is the response to local controls when they have been put on the ballot.
The people almost always reject zoning proposals and have occasionally
even rejected building codes. An example of the latter occurred when
Racine, Wisconsin voted to abolish their building code;7 apparently,
they were miffed at the invasion of privacy necessitated by inspections.8
The following list of votes on zoning is by no means comprehensive, but
-160-
10.2 Zoning Is Popular (continued)
these are all of the results that this research uncovered. From the
votes, one might suppose that the apparent popularity of zoning at town
meetings is actually the result of the upper-middle-class dominance
of local government. Bond County, Illinois defeated zoning by 71%;9
Jersey County, Illinois defeated zoning by 60%;10 Escambia County,
Florida defeated zoning by 64%;11 a town-by-town vote in Pulaski County,
Indiana voted "no" to zoning in each of its twelve townships, with the
lowest anti-zoning vote being 78.6% and the average of all towns
being 85.2% (Spring, 1976);12 in April, 1976, the Adams County,
Illinois board of supervisors voted 22 to 5 to avoid implementing a
zoning proposal (zoning had been tried there and repealed in 1958); 13
the Burt County, Nebraska board of supervisors voted to repeal a
thirteen-month-old zoning law after 95% of the county's voters had
signed a petition expressing opposition to the regulations; 14
numerous towns in Allegheny and Cattaraugus Counties, New York rejected
zoning overwhelmingly (in Wellsville by 88.8%), but most were persuaded
to adopt some controls because federal money for flood control would
have been withdrawn had they not done so;15 Newton County, Missouri
defeated zoning by 34 to 1 and land-use planning by 27 to 1;16 Colorado
Springs, Colorado defeated two proposals to adopt open space acquisition
mechanisms by 63% and 61%;17 zoning has been rejected by voters in
numerous elections in Texas, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, and Missouri;18 of all
the votes in all Missouri counties, 22 voted for zoning, 13 voted against
zoning, and four counties which originally supported zoning have since
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repealed it.1 9
Even this list is not very impressive, however, because most of the areas
where zoning has been rejected are rural and unpopulous. The most
significant results of zoning votes are found in Houston, Texas, the
only major urban city to vote on zoning.20 The conclusions of a study
done on the Houston zoning-vote results are clear: the rich support
zoning; the poor and minorities, when given the opportunity, defeat
zoning. 21 Zoning first came on the ballot in 1949 and was rejected
14,142 to 6,555.22 In 1962 zoning was again defeated 70,957 to 54,279.23
When Siegan analyzed the results from the 1969 anti-zoning vote in
Baytown (a 90% residential, single-family, "bedroom community" located
in the Houston zuburbs), he found that only one precinct favored zoning
and it was a newly-built middle- and upper-income neighborhood; the
strongest opposition to zoning was found in a predominantly black
neighborhood.2 4 Siegan notes that Houston and probably Wichita Falls
and Beaumont, Texas followed a similar pattern. 25
These results show clearly that zoning is not popular -- at least
among the poor and the minorities. That middle- and upper-class
civic-minded community leaders support zoning is probably true --
they have enacted zoning ordinances all across this country. But
wherever these community leaders have polled the people, zoning has
usually suffered an ignominious defeat.26 In these results lies the
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hope of the deregulator.
(1) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), p. 70.
(2) Ibid., p. 71.
(3) In Appendix C -- Section 12.3 Monopolists and Oligopolists we
will discuss the oligopolistic land market as one factor which
enabled such a law to be enacted. Another circumstance which
favored state legislation in Hawaii is that the state has always
had land-use control -- even before the coming of westerners,
tribal chiefs had great discretion in these matters. As in
Germany, if a people is accustomed to a lack of freedom, building
laws have a better chance of gaining acceptance.
(4) At least one Vermonter interested in these problems has said
that the urban retreat population (emigres from New York,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut) got the law through before
native (usually poorer) Vermonters had had an opportunity to
organize the opposition.
(5) Siegan, p. 72.
(6) ibid.
(7) Spencer D. Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement
(Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 73.
(8) HUD had threatened to withdraw federal money if codes were not
enforced in owner-occupied non-rental buildings, ibid., p. 57,
and apparently this combined with vigorous enforcement triggered
the grassroots demand for a referendum.
(9) Siegan, p. 53.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12) "Thumbs Down on Zoning in Midwest," AREA Bulletin, 2, 5
(September, 1976), p. 6.
(13) Ibid.
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(14) "Nebraska County Repeals Zoning," AREA Bulletin, 2, 3 (May,
1976), p. 3.
(15) "Zoning Fight Spreads in Western New York State," AREA
Bulletin, 2, 1 (January, 1976), pp. 2 f.
(16) Siegan, p. 72.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid., p. 54.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 25.
(21) Siegan, Other PeopZe's Property, p. 54.
(22) Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning, p. 25.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Ibid., pp. 25 f.
(26) It should be mentioned that even voting percentages are not the
most accurate measures of popularity. For various reasons,
predominantly poor neighborhoods, black neighborhoods, and
anti-government sympathists do not vote in proportion to their
numbers. If their strength were to be considered, the anti-zoning
votes would be considerably larger.
10.3 Zoning Protects Residential Values
This statement is usually made by a slightly insecure, urban- or
suburban-family, residence owner living in an area restrictively zoned
for single-family residences. This fellow often has one or more of three
assumptions on his mind when he says this.l First, he may be worrying
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about racial integration or about large influxes of poor neighbors; he
reasons that, without the costly restrictions, small houses on small
lots would be built and the cost of housing in his neighborhood would
fall to the point where ghetto residents and other excluded persons could
afford to move in. Second, he may be worrying about invasion from other
uses such as the proverbial glue factory or commercial development.
Finally, he may be concerned about the more general issues of
aesthetics and urban blight (this issue is not necessarily unconnected to
the previous two); he may not object in theory to an integrated, diverse
neighborhood, but only to side issues such as lack of adequate open
space to meet his aesthetic tastes or pollution. The following subsections
discuss each of these three issues in more detail.
(1) Tax-related issues are discussed separately in Appendix A --
Section 10.5 Zoning Maintains Low Property Tax Levels.
Numerous subconscious reasons may also be a factor as mentioned
by Richard F. Babcock and Fred P. Bosselman, "Suburban Zoning
and the Apartment Boom," University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
III, 8 (June, 1963), p. 1072. Here we discuss only the more
tangible factors.
10.3.1 The Blacks Will Invade
If the objector is a racial bigot, pure and simple, zoning does not
provide the sort of racial discrimination he seeks. Racially restrictive
zoning is illegal. Racially restrictive covenants, although not illegal,
are unenforceable (a fine legal distinction accomplishing the same end).
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Thus the bigot has no legal protection with or without zoning and his
worries, while founded, are not remediable.
But the bigot notices that many of those whom he wants to exclude are
also poor, and he reasons correctly when he believes that costly zoning
restrictions keep the poor out. Some writers believe that repeal of all
zoning restrictions might result in the sort of ghetto migrations the
bigot fears,l but others, including this writer, find such a scenario
implausible. As was noted in Section 7.1 Economics, the poor sometimes
voluntarily choose to live in deplorable conditions in order to save
money for other, more highly-valued goods. There is no reason to
suspect that they have any enormous urge to move from their present
surroundings to middle-class white neighborhoods. In fact, there is
reason to believe otherwise. The first evidence is provided by the BRA
study mentioned in Section 7.1 Economics: the poor blacks often cited
expense, but some also claimed fear of bigotry when they told the
researchers why they had not moved to the suburbs. Understandably, they
did not want to move into neighborhoods where they would be unwanted.
Banfield provides us with additional evidence: only 17% of the blacks
(70% of whom live in cities) questioned in one study reported that they
were dissatisfied with their neighborhoods2 and in another study two-
thirds of the blacks questioned indicated that they preferred to live
in a predominantly black neighborhood. 3 Thus we have reason to suspect
that blacks would not invade "lily-white" neighborhoods even if zoning
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were completely abolished.
This does not mean that poor ghetto residents would not benefit if zoning
were to be repealed. First of all, those blacks who were dissatisfied
with poor or predominantly black neighborhoods would have an opportunity
to live in suburban communities where some inexpensive housing could be
built if zoning did not prevent it. But probably more important, without
zoning, more housing could be built and the densely populated cores of our
urban centers would be relieved. Each new house built and bought starts
a chain of moves, each of which represents a bettering of housing
conditions for each mover. These chains do reach down to the poorest
segments of our society, thereby causing an improvement in their position.4
Thus we see that the "no-zoning" option probably would not result in
significant harm to the wealthy or middle-class neighborhoods (the
influx of poor would probably be insignificant -- especially if most
neighborhoods adopted exclusionary covenants), but it might result in
a considerable improvement in housing conditions for both the working
classes and the very poor.
(1) For instance, Richard F. Babcock and Fred P. Bosselman,
"Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, III, 8 (June, 1963), p. 1071 believe
that a black suburban migration is possible.
(2) Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited, A Revision
of the UnheavenZy City (Boston and Toronto, 1974), p. 22.
(3) Ibid., p. 90. Other results have not shown such a marked
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preference for bilacks! to want to live in black neiqliborhood;,
but Banfield points out that even a very mild preference would
result in considerable segregation.
(4) In a study of the filtering process, John B. Lansing, Charles
Wade Clifton, and James N. Morgan, New Homes and Poor PeopZe,
A Study of Chains of Moves (Ann Arbor, 1969), p. 66 and passim.,
the very poor (earning less than $3000 per year) and the working
class (earning between $3000 and $6000 per year) were
benefiters from the construction of new housing.
10.3.2 A Glue Factory Will Move Next Door
The possibility of invasion of residential neighborhoods by industry and
commerce is quite complicated. First of all, some invasion would
probably occur -- especially in poor, transportation-deficient
neighborhoods. Beauty parlors, antique shops, "Mom and Pop" groceries,
and the like would spring up. This sort of growth, however, would be
beneficial to nearly everyone involved. It provides needed services
in locations convenient to the neighborhood and it provides opportunities
for working out of one's home for those who need it most. Furthermore,
since this sort of commerce is often dependent upon neighborhood
patronage, if it is to be economically viable, it must conduct business
in a manner that will not alienate its patrons. Thus we see that some
commercial or industrial invasion is not unacceptable.
At the other extreme are industries which are location-independent. These
industries theoretically might locate anywhere, including in residential
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neighborhoods where they may cause the character of the neighborhood to
deteriorate in the eyes of the residents. As we have seen, there are
several market mechanisms which tend to reduce the incidence of
diseconomy-producing location decisions.
At this point we need only note that zoning does not significantly alter
the "no-zoning" pattern. The proof of this statement is found in the
Houston area where there are virtually no use-segregation controls.
Siegan notes that there is no clear difference in use-segregation patterns
between zoned and unzoned areas.l He notes that in unzoned Baytown,
Wichita Falls, Laredo, and Pasadena, Texas, industry "automatically"
(by market mechanisms) segregates itself.2 Even after land-use
covenants expire, industry does not seem to invade residential
neighborhoods.3
This does not imply that "no-zoning" results in 100% use segregation, but
as we have seen in Chapter 4.0 Nonenforcement, even zoning is unable to
accomplish complete use segregation. This only means that zoning has no
observable effect on the quantity or quality of use segregation. This
statement is impossible to prove in any scientific manner since there is
no quantifiable measure of use segregation, but Siegan's results noted in
Subsection 9.1.3 Market Mechanisms indicate that, although some use
desegregation would occur if zoning were abolished, it would be unlikely
to reach undesirable levels.
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Understandably, many people would have little faith in market
tendencies. Those people, if they valued use segregation, could create
covenants which would result in more use segregation in their
neighborhoods than zoning could deliver. Moreover, stricter nuisance
standards would supply use segregation between necessarily harmful
activities (such as airports) in neighborhoods with or without covenants.
Thus a neighborhood under the reform scheme we propose would be more
protected from undesirable uses than neighborhoods are today under
traditional zoning controls.
(1) Bernard H. Siegan, "The New Approach to Planning: Nonzoning,"
Reason Magazine, 4, 12 (April, 1973), pp. 8 ff.
(2) /bid., . 7.
(3) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 32.
10.3.3 Neighborhoods Would Grow Ugly, Unsanitary, and Unfit
To the extent that this anxiety is motivated by an aesthetic judgment,
little can be said. If a neighborhood contains homes that are more
expensive than the minimum house, the abolition of zoning would probably
have little or no effect on the appearance of the neighborhood. But if
a neighborhood contains mostly homes that are minimum homes and if the
homeowner finds the monotony of such development pleasing, the "no-control"
option will not be acceptable. However "no-control" is not synonymous
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with "no-zone" or "no-law." The private voluntary controls outlined in
Subsection 9.1.2 Voluntary Community Action could attain the same
aesthetic results, and perhaps with more consistancy given the difficulties
inherent in zoning. In any event, whatever aesthetic objectives zoning
has achieved bear no necessary relationship to the desires of community
members. Each individual should decide for himself if the "control"
aesthetic is more pleasing than the "no-control" aesthetic; in no case
should a law mandate a particular vision of beauty across an entire
municipality.
Other people might worry that a lack of codes would bring about a dark,
unventilated housing condition.l Early reformers claimed that dark,
unventilated conditions and even density per se caused unacceptable
health hazards2 despite the fact that their own statistics showed no
correlation between death rate and dense slum living conditions. 3
At most times the laws were only thinly veiled in the language of public
safety, health, and morality as can be seen in the case of billboards
or in justifications for building size limitations. Such limitations
were imposed to protect the public safety, for instance, because it was
shown that in the event of fire, if all the people in all the buildings
in one section of lower Manhattan had to be evacuated, there would not
be enough room for them on the street!4 And fire code enactors cited
41 deaths in one year from tenement fires (when well over 2 million
people were living in such buildings) as justification for their pet
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laws.5 Although this deathrate does seem moderately high, it is hardly
justification for fire codes: the virtually unregulated, turn-of-the-
century New York City deathrate from fires was 17 per million which
compares favorably with the highly regulated, modern Canbridge,
Massachusetts deathrate from fires which in fiscal 1975-76 was 19 per
million and is projected to be 49 per million in fiscal 1976-77.6
More recent writers have noted that dark, unventilated conditions are
not overwhelming problems given modern technological innovations such
as electricity7 and admit that housing codes have little to do with health
or safety anyway.8 This writer feels that such a view does not give
sufficient weight to the values of sunshine and fresh air. The solution
to this problem seems to be similar to the solution to the aesthetics
problem above. Each individual should be free to find the optimum
conditions for himself; in no case does a law covering an entire
municipality seem justified or desirable. Some people want (and are
willing to pay for) more light and air than the minimum zoning standards
could guarantee. Others less. It would only be by accident that a
particular zoning law or building code provision delivered an optimum
mix to any individual.
(1) Richard F. Babcock and Fred P. Bosselman, "Suburban Zoning and
the Apartment Boom," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, III,
8 (June, 1963), p. 1065. They argue against many aspects of
modern zoning processes, but they favor setbacks because they're
supposed to insure that enough light and fresh air reach buildings.
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(2) Lawrence Veiller, "Tenement House Reform in New York City,
1834-1900," The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert
W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
p. 82.
(3) Although the Italian tenements had a deathrate twice as high as
the average New York City rate, the Jewish tenements had a
deathrate which was only half the average. See Robert W.
DeForest and Lawrence Veiller, "The Tenement House Problem,"
The Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W. DeForest
and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903) pp. 54 f.
(4) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), p. 153.
(5) Deforest and Veiller, p. 23 and Robert W. DeForest, "Tenement
House Reform in New York since 1901," The Tenement House Problem,
Volume I, eds. Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New
York and London, 1903), p. xix.
(6) Based on statistics given to the author by the Cambridge Fire
Department and Cambridge City Hall in early February, 1977.
A fiscal year runs from July 1 to July 1.
(7) Dean Hawkes, Building Bulk Legislation: A Description and
Analysis (Cambridge, England, [n.d.]), p. 40.
(8) Spencer D. Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement
(Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 154 ff.
10.4 Zoning Curbs High Density, Congestion, Sprawl, and Blight
As was pointed out in Subsection 7.2.3 Urban Sprawl or Garden City,
zoning does not curb sprawl. If anything, zoning encourages sprawl.
Blight is probably a similar phenomenon: zoning certainly cannot offer
protection from blight and may actually aggravate it. Local building
laws frequently have the effect of limiting the supply of apartments.
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This forces the vacancy rates lower, which reduces landlord incentives to
maintain property in adequate repair.l This is of course not the only
cause of blight -- regressive property taxes, urban renewal projects,
simple poverty, and natural wear and tear all play a role -- but zoning
doesn't help the situation.
Building codes also encourage blight under some circumstances. For
instance, if a roof needs repair, the owner must get a permit to embark on
such a job. But before he can obtain the permit, the building must be
brought up to compliance with the local code. This may be too costly and
thus a whole building may be lost because of irrational enforcement of
the building code. Codes probably do not always have such a negative
impact, but this example shows how they can contribute to blight.
Congestion is often defined as excessive street traffic. Since zoning
often aims at restricting car washes, gas stations, and the like, it
might be believed that zoning could alleviate traffic problems. Such is
probably not the case. Limiting the number of gas stations only results
in longer waiting lines and longer average trips to such services.2 If
all goods and services were available on one's home block, there would
be no need for cars and therefore no congestion. Thus we see that use
segregation as implemented in zoning ordinances probably promotes
congestion rather than curbs it.
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Finally, there is the often-stated myth that without density controls
developers would overdevelop their parcels, that skyscrapers would be
built on every block. This is pure nonsense. Developers will voluntarily
choose the highest density of development that is appropriate considering
the quantity and quality of demand. If most people hated dense living
conditions, the developer who built dense residential areas would find
that he would be unable to attract consumers and would therefore lose
money -- a developer who was that stupid would not long stay in business.
Furthermore, if demand for housing were low (meaning that not many people
needed new housing), the developer who built too many units might also
find that he could not sell or rent them. In this way the market process
insures that both the quality and quantity of demand are met if the zoning
laws or some other legal restrictions do not interfere. That the above
logic is correct is verified by the situation in Houston. Some high-rise
residential towers were built, but were found to be economically
unsuitable for the area. Developers quickly switched to garden apartments
which have been built at ever-decreasing densities over the past twelve
years.3
But the conditions that lead to low density in a free market situation
do not always obtain. Some people prefer dense living conditions. As
Jacobs observes, density per se is not necessarily evil, and, in fact, may
be an asset;4 densities of 400 luxury apartments per acre in Chicago and
275 units per acre in Boston's North End and unbelievably high densities
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in Hong Kong do not seem to be unacceptable to the residents. Other
people, of course, prefer low densities. It is therefore expected that
Houston might offer a greater range of densities than do zoned cities,
and such is the case.5
In this section we looked at four building "problems." In each case we
found (1) that zoning does not necessarily insure that these problems will
not exist, and (2) that zoning may even be a major factor in the genesis
of these problems.
(1) High vacancy rates result in high maintenance standards. Richard
F. Babcock and Fred P. Bosselman, "Suburban Zoning and the
Apartment Boom," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, III, 8
(June, 1963), pp. 1065 ff.
(2) A good discussion of zoning and traffic is contained in Bernard
H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington, Massachusetts,
Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 48 f. Limiting the number of gas
stations obviously cannot limit the demand for gas.
(3) Ibid., pp. 66 f.
(4) Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities
(New York and Toronto, 1961), pp. 200 ff.
(5) Siegan, pp. 65 ff.
10.5 Zoning Maintains Low Property Tax Levels
It is argued that zoning excludes uses that would not pay their way
and uses that would depress property values and would thereby force
-176-
10.5 Zoning Maintains Low Property Tax Levels (continued)
property tax rates upward. The facts belie the myth. Zoning usually
excludes apartments (especially efficiencies which cater to young,
mobile singles) and overzones for single-family residences and choice
light industries. How does this policy affect tax rates?
A study done in Cook County, Illinois showed that a single-family
residence had to have an assessed value of $70,000 to support fully
one grade-school student in school.1 Single-family residences were
obviously not a paying proposition. Subsidized housing and townhouses
are also usually tax-detrimental, but garden apartments (usually built
for the one-child or childless family), are tax-beneficial.2 In
1971 Chicago adopted a zoning provision limiting the number of
efficiency apartments and New York has passed similar measures.3
Considering the number of school-age children who are likely to live
in efficiency apartments, such zoning is fiscally irresponsible. An
ASPO study in Philadelphia concluded that apartments, particularly
high-rises, were tax-beneficial. 4 Since it is inexpensive for a
municipality to provide city services to concentrated populations,
and since few multiple-child families are attracted to apartments, it
appears that apartments are almost always tax-beneficial. 5 "In short,
the best fiscal zoning is no zoning."6
As for the popular belief about zoning preventing land devaluation, it
is an ambiguous case. Land prices for homes are actually somewhat
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higher in unzoned Houston than they are in zoned Dallas.7 However,
land suitable for apartments in Houston costs much less than land zoned
for apartments in Dallas.8 This is not surprising since zoning often
restricts apartment development by limiting supplies of land zoned for
apartments and thus raises the costs of such land. It appears that the
oligopolistic owner of zoned land would have his land devalued, but that
the average owner would not be damaged (and might be benefited) by the
abolition of zoning.
(1) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 125.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid., p. 126.
(4) Ibid., p. 127.
(5) These results are not clearly true. See Richard F. Babcock and
Fred P. Bosselman, "Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom,"
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, III, 8 (June, 1963),
pp. 1062 ff. for a discussion of the various issues involved.
(6) Siegan, p. 127.
(7) Ibid., p. 110.
(8) As reflected by the lower rental costs, ibid., pp. 117 ff.
10.6 Land-use Controls Protect the Environment
This statement is most certainly not completely a myth. As we pointed out
in Chapter 4.0 Nonenforcement, some building laws seem justified. Those
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laws that prevent one person from doing material harm to another person
without the other person's permission are just and necessary. Building
laws do sometimes fall into this category. But most building laws do
not prevent damage; they try rather to promote a good.
Modern ecologists justify building laws by citing problems with the
pollution of aquifers, destruction of delicate marshland environments,
and the like.' These are relatively new ideas. The laws of our
country should reflect the increased knowledge that we have about our
environment. For instance, if a developer in the course of construction
will necessarily pollute or partially destroy an aquifer which affects
millions of acres of other peoples' land (or even one acre of an
abutter's land), that construction should be prohibited. The legal
action required in this instance does not necessitate a building law
however. The reformation of nuisance laws outlined in Subsection 9.1.1
Damage Laws would suffice. This case needs no complicated administrative
machinery and no nosy building inspector. The person (or people) who
is damaged should simply be able to sue the developer for damages or
seek a restraining order to keep the developer from committing damaging
acts.
The building laws of our country do not prevent damage, however; they
only tell developers that some standards must be maintained. These
standards may or may not prevent damage to innocent abutters. The effect
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of these laws is to allow developers to harm others (without being
held legally liable for the damage) and to prohibit them from doing
acceptable damage to themselves and others. The following hypothetical
examples illustrate this point.
Case I. A structural engineer designs an enormous building using and
obeying the local building code, but it is discovered that the building
is unsafe and the changes needed to make it safe will cost $100,000 more
than if it had been designed correctly in the first place. Under our
present laws the person responsible for the damage, the structural
engineer, is held harmless and the damaged party, the owner, must accept
the cost without recompense. This is an unjust result. When this
principle is extended into the area of environmental law, the results
could be catastrophic -- because of simple oversights on the part of
the framers of the law (a common occurrence in this rapidly changing
field), careless developers could destroy an invaluable asset and the
damaged parties would be unable to stop them or even seek redress. As
long as the developer can remove his legal liability by filing an
environmental impact statement or by meeting the standards promulgated
by law (without reference to the particular situation), injustice and harm
to innocent others will result.
Case II. A self-helper with 40 acres of land moves to the site and
starts to build. Temporarily he uses an outhouse and buries his
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garbage on his own property. No pollution results on abutters' property.
Under present law, the self-helper may be prosecuted despite the fact
that the only person damaged was himself. Obviously, this result is also
unjust.
Case III. A self-helper with a 40' by 40' plot of land moves to the
site and starts to build. Temporarily he uses an outhouse and buries
his garbage, but he cannot prevent pollution so he makes a deal with
his abutters: he pays them each $10 if they will not object to the
level of pollution that his project will generate for four months and
they agree. Under present laws, the self-helper may be prosecuted
despite the fact that those who were damaged were justly compensated
(compensation was just by definition; if it were not, the abutters
would not have agreed to the deal). This result too is unjust.
These three cases are all very simplified versions of injustices
that may result from the sort of environmental protection we now have.
The principles are clear: neither the environment nor people will be
protected by such simplistic regulation. Both causes might better be
served with reformation of existing nuisance laws and abolition of
building laws.
(1) For instance, as in Edward M. Bergman, EZiminating ExcZusionary
Zoning: ReconciZing WorkpZace and Residence in Suburban Areas
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974), p. 9.
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The chaos in land-use planning, in standards, and in building laws today
is not the result of an uncontrolled free market. That we have chaos
already cannot be denied, but mightn't we have even more chaos in the
no-control situation? This contention is hard to rebut. A no-control
situation might well look chaotic. No one, neither the powerful nor the
powerless, could control it. But therein lies its attractiveness.
When each individual is given freedom to choose his own housing and when
no individual has the power to dictate standards and requirements to
others, then we will all have the freedom to find the most appropriate
environments for ourselves. And that is, after all, what this paper is
all about.
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APPENDIX B -- 11.0 "HAVE NOTS" AND BUILDING LAW
As we have seen, building laws favor some people at the expense of
others. Although the distinction between those who are harmed and
those who harm is not found along traditional class lines, the
preponderance of the former are poor and the preponderance of the
latter are rich. Let us investigate the plight of those who are
damaged by building laws first.
11.1 Racial Minorities
"The more general pattern involves the imposition of zoning and
subdivision regulations so strict as to make development prohibitively
expensive. These regulations are then varied downward only for those
developers who the local leaders are confident will be properly selective
in determining future residents. All of these techniques are justified
by the superficially appealing slogan of protecting the tax base."1
A pattern like the one described above certainly fosters economic
segregation. Unfortunately, high consumer demand for housing correlates
well with high consumer demand for services and both correlate with
high income and whiteness.2 Because of this correlation it is difficult
to ascertain exactly how much racial prejudice has motivated exclusionary
practices, but it was certainly one factor and since we must not allow
our laws to discriminate on racial grounds, this situation must be
investigated.
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The notorious "Laundry Cases" of San Francisco which abetted the rise
of local zoning and building code laws were most certainly motivated by
racial hostility. In these cases the marked prejudice against the
oriental population was only thinly veiled by rationalizations about
nuisance and fire protection. 3 Although such schemes came under fire,
some towns, notably Atlanta, actually built explicit racial segregation
into the zoning laws. Cold comfort was the provision assuring both
whites and blacks that their servants could live with them regardless of
color. 
But a deeper understanding of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
started to creep into the judiciary and the more flagrant, directly
racially segregatory provisions of zoning were declared unconstitutional
in Buchanan v. Warley.5 Judge Westenhaver in his lower court decision in
Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of EucZlid said, "the result to be accomplished
is to classify the population and segregate them according to their
income or situation in life."6 There is no doubt that Westenhaver
considered the implications for racial segregation when he rendered his
opinion, but the Supreme Court was not as perceptive as the lower court
judge.
Since then the courts have grown even more aggressive. In Kennedy Park
Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, New York7 racially
segregatory intent invalidated local laws and in Shannon v. HUD8 the
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courts prevented HD from building subsidized housinq in the inner city
because it would have had the effect of reinforcing residential racial
segregation patterns.
Although the more recent cases have had an optimistic ring, de facto
racial segregation has not been eradicated. Not only are the courts
unwilling to strike down racially segregatory zoning when racial
segregation is not the apparent goal of the legislation, but federal
programs such as 701 Planning Assistance Plan9 and local ordinances
such as rent controll °continue to subsidize the racial bigotry of some
at the expense of others in the community who would not discriminate.
Thus, though all of our laws are superficially race-neutral, many of them
-- including zoning ordinances -- have de facto racially segregatory
results. Such laws, while not necessarily improper, should be
scrutinized carefully to be certain that they do not aggravate our
racial problems needlessly.
(1) Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game, Municipal Practices and
Policies (Madison, Wisconsin, 1966), p. 93.
(2) Bruce Walton Hamilton, The Impact of Zoning and Property Taxes
on Urban Structure and Housing Markets (Ann Arbor, Michigan,
1972), p. 29.
(3) Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885) and Soon Hing v.
Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885). These cases usually involved
violations of local land-use laws which regulated the location
of shops and prohibited night work. Since the laundries
involved were usually wood-frame structures, the city claimed
the power to close the laundries in the name of fire prevention.
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The courts usually upheld that city ordinance despite frequent
claims by orientals that the laws were racially segregatory in
their intent.
(4) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), p. 262.
(5) 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
(6) 297 Fed. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), reversed, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
(7) 436 F.2d 108, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
(8) 436 F.2d 908 (1970). See also Crow v. Brown, 332 F.Supp. 382
(1971) and Gautreaux v. The Chicago Housing Authority, 296
F.Supp. 907, 304 F.Supp. 76 (1969).
(9) Herbert M. Franklin, Land Use Controls as a Barrier to Housin7
Assistance (Springfield, Virginia, 1973), p. II-11.
(10) William R. Havender, "Race and Economics," Reason Magazine, 8,
7 (November, 1976), pp. 28 ff.
11.2 Alternate Life-stylers and Third Worlders
"The minimum standards for housing, building, and planning to which I
refer are those which specify what should be built, and, very often, they
go a long way to determining how the subdivision, dwelling, or ancillary
equipment should be built as well. Almost all official codes, in the
wealthiest and poorest countries alike, require that a building plot be
fully equipped with modern utilities, and even with paved streets and
sidewalks, before it may be sold to a would-be home builder. Even then
the buyer cannot occupy his house until it is completed, at least to a
minimum standard, which usually means separate bedrooms, an equipped
bathroom, and a kitchen separated from the living room. An investment
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of this kind demands a mortgage loan, and, if the property cannot be
occupied until it is finished, or at least certified as habitable, it
is extremely difficult for the owner to build it himself -- he is
virtually obliged to employ a general contractor or, more likely, to
buy a ready-made unit in a speculative development or in a publicly
sponsored project....
"Hence it is not surprising to find that two-thirds of all new dwellings
built in Lima [,Peru] since the early 1940s...were put up by squatters
or buyers of lots in clandestine subdivisions. Neither is it surprising
to observe that since it became illegal to build tenements which the mass
of the people can afford, those remaining have become grossly overcrowded
while illegal shanty towns have proliferated.... In fact, housing
conditions for the poorest fifth or quarter of Lima's population are
far worse now than they were in the 1890s, and demand substantially
higher proportions of personal income to boot."1
Whether because of poverty or because of philosophical convictions, a
growing number of people are rejecting minimum standards in housing and
workplace. They want to build their own homes in peace and privacy, but
our laws prevent it. They are willing to live in a partially finished
home while they work on it, but occupancy permits may make this
impossible. They are willing to suffer lack of electricity and modern
plumbing but our paternalistic laws won't give them this option. They
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want to unify their lives by working and sleeping i the same place,
but zoning forbids it. And they know that they could do better for
themselves without interference from the government, and they are right.
From the beginning, building laws have militated against this group
by requiring non-cost-effective features and prohibiting innovations,
but only during the last two decades have any sizable number of people
voluntarily chosen a life-style which emphasizes this primitiveness.
Before this only the very poor and very unpowerful lived so close to
nature. But now young, energetic, intelligent people have joined the
movement, and we can expect more and more challenges to our middle-class
standards from this group. In Mendocino County, California, a group of
self-helpers calling themselves United Stand has already won several
court cases involving "inadequate" plumbing and are working on a
reformation of the local codes.2 They and their counterparts in Oregon,
Washington, Vermont, and other states may well contribute to the death
of our building laws.
(1) John F.C. Turner, "Housing as a Verb," Freedom to BuiZd, eds.
John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter (New York, 1972), pp. 149 ff.
(2) "Owner's Victory," Reason Magazine, 8, 7 (November, 1976),
p. 15 f.
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"Control over the local building code gives the traditional homebuilding
industry a capacity to frustrate competition almost without precedent
in other industries. Any technological change can be killed at the
city's doors by writing into the code the appropriate prohibitions.
Since most residential codes specify materials and techniques,
restrictions are easily added."l
Most zoning and building codes have discouraged innovations. A
developer often is forbidden from experimenting with mixed-use projects,
innovative structural systems, alternate plumbing systems, or novel
residential plans. Disneyworld and Radburn2 could not have been built
had zoning been in effect and Sunnyside, New York had to be built on land
zoned for industrial uses.3
Model codes have often been adopted by municipalities, which would seem
to alleviate this problem. But localities modify these codes to
reflect local conditions (often the condition is one of ignorance on the
part of the building inspector), and these modifications are frequently
restrictive. The appeals procedure would also seem to afford some
remedy, but in practice neither the time nor the money is usually
available to pursue such a slow, costly course of action; and as a
result few appeals are ever made. 5
Another factor which increases diversity, even in uniform code areas,
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is differences in enforcement procedures. In a study done in southern
Michigan, it was noted that "in the judgment of most persons interviewed
during this study, the personal variations among building officials and
inspectors do even more to prevent uniform regulation than does the
diversity of codes and ordinances. This variability among officials can
never be done away with." 6
Thus the innovator (and those who would use his product) suffer and are
denied any substantive relief. The extent of this harm is extremely
hard to document because there is no objective measure of the value of
innovation that has been forbidden, but in a study done on building codes,
developers and construction managers ranked such codes as the most
serious problem in the development of innovative products.7
(1) Charles G. Field and Steven R. Rivkin, The Building Code Burden
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1975), p. 68.
(2) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), p. 287.
(3) Ibid., pp. 284 f.
(4) Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and Michael A. Fischetti,
Survey of the Adbninistration of Construction Codes in Selected
Metropolitan Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 2.
(5) Ibid., p. 3, p. 91.
(6) Public Administration Service, A Study of Local BuiZding Codes
and Their Administration in the Southeast Michigan Six-County
Region (Detroit, Michigan, 1966), p. 21.
(7) Field and Rivkin, p. 73. See also Appendix B -- Section 11.6
Producers and Consumers of Mobile and Manufactured Homes.
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Building laws harm not only innovative developers, but ordinary ones
as well. From the earliest times, developers and slum housing owners
have been characterized as inhumane, money-grubbing profiteers. Turn-
of-the-century reformers indicted them for "exploiting" the poorl and
modern socialists find it fashionable to iterate the same accusations.
In fact, building laws were enacted, in part, to control the avarice of
these businessmen -- these businessmen are intentionally damaged by
such laws. But before we implement a public policy which harms some
group of individuals, we should be very certain that that group has
done something to deserve it.
Reformers have noted high rents and presumably high profits as "proof"
of exploitation. But this belief does not agree well with the actual
situation: bankruptcies among developers and abandonments among
slumlords are frequent and serious problems. Presumably, a profit-
hungry developer would not dissolve a profitable business -- if it
was profitable, he could sell it and make more money.2 The same argument
holds true for the slumlord: if he was making so much money, why did he
abandon his building?
The fact is that building or owning real estate -- especially inexpensive
housing -- is not particularly profitable at all. The profits cited by
turn-of-the-century reformers seem quite reasonable (i.e., equivalent to
saving money in a bank) given the considerable risks (e.g., how many
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projects are finished? how many tenants don't pay rent or vandalize the
property?) and given the considerable public opprobrium attached to such
a livelihood.3 Modern owners and developers, if anything, seem to be in
a worse position than their turn-of-the-century equivalents (abandonments
were unheard of then and modern government interference has certainly
worked to the detriment of such groups). If the reader remains
unconvinced of the nonprofitability of owning slum apartments, the
results of a recent auction in New York City should dispel all doubts.
Although the city offered low down payments and subsidized interest
rates, only 72 of 123 properties were sold -- no one wanted the rest!4
Another popular misconception is that the innocent homebuyer or small
tenant is no match for the big slumlord or big contractor-developer.
The truth of the matter is that market concentration in the building
industry is almost non-existant. Land is very widely held; the only major
landowner is the government.5 Contractor-developers are notably small
and impotent -- the contractor with more than three full-time employees
is rare. The average landlord is also merely a small businessman. In
a study done in Newark, New Jersey 40% of the properties in the slums
were owned by people who owned no other property. Less than 25% of the
property was owned by people who owned more than 6 parcels. 36.6% of
the parcels were owned by occupant-owners. Results of New York City
showed only a slightly higher degree of market concentration: 31.3% of
the parcels were owned by occupant-landlords. The study noted that rent
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control laws which drive some (less efficient) small landlords out of
business probably account for the difference.6
It appears that our public policy which reduces the profitability of
owning and/or developing land (especially inexpensive development) and
which drives small occupant-owners out of business is inappropriate. It
reduces both quantity and quality of housing for the poor and increases
market concentration.
How does our building law system accomplish such undesirable results?
The small developers, contractors, and landlords cannot cope with
government. The small builder simply cannot afford to appeal the
arbitrary decisions of local governments; he cannot afford the corps
of lawyers and technical specialists needed to fight city hall.7
Moreover, the stakes in any given instance are so low that court battles
cannot economically be pursued. 8 And appeals are also avoided because,
even if won, the contractor fears reprisals. If the developer alienates
local officials by going "over their heads" to appeals boards, he might
find it difficult to get other approvals. "The developer who is
unwilling to compromise is either highly principled or in contact with
a remarkably patient and generous financial angel."9
The small landlord is in even worse shape. "In many cities in the United
States, for example, owner-building is virtually prohibited, and, in many
-193-
11.4 Ordinary Owners and Developers (continued)
more, the administration of building codes is an important factor in the
precipitate abandonment of older housing, so badly needed by the urban
poor. The disastrous abandonment rate of structurally sound but
obsolescent housing -- which each year in New York City alone currently
amounts to the stock of a fair-sized town -- is in part due to housing
codes and their administration. A license has to be obtained in order to
replace a defective roof, for example. But if the building is obsolescent,
this may not be granted unless the entire building is brought up to
standard and by licensed builders. Therefore, because the owner or a
willing tenant is forbidden to do a job he would have been quite able
to do, and very cheaply, an entire building is lost, thus accelerating
the decay of the neighborhood." 10
It seems that here, again, we have found that building laws which aim at
protection of the poor only serve to worsen housing for the poor and that
they probably compound the problem be driving-small (handleable) landlords
out of business and leave large (unhandleable) reality corporations in
charge. 11 When we damage ordinary developers and owners, we also hurt
the poor who depended on them for affordable housing.
(1) See, for instance, Elgin R.L. Gould, "Financial Aspects of
Recent Tenement House Operations in New York," The Tenement
House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence
Veiller (New York and London, 1903), pp. 357 ff., or Lawrence
Veiller, "The Speculative Building of Tenement Houses," The
Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W. DeForest and
Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903), pp. 369 ff.
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(2) Thlere may b( all ( lemernt of "cr-am-sk imminliq"  oi nt on in t-te
bankruptcy situation (collecting construction payments and
reneging on debts), but this only proves that such businesses
do not have long-term profitability.
(3) It has been claimed that the developer is more socially-
conscious than local government administrators and a rather
good case for this contention has been made. See Richard F.
Babcock, The Zoning Game, MunicipaZ Practices and PoZlicies
(Madison, Wisconsin, 1966), pp. 47 ff. It has also been
claimed that the slumlord is a "hero" for continuing to provide
housing for the poor in the face of social opprobrium and
government interference. Walter Block, Defending the
Undefendable (New York, 1976), "The Slumlord."
(4) Spencer D. Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement
(Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 45.
(5) Hawaii is an exception. Strict laws which abrogate the right of
alienation and strict land controls have undoubtedly helped to
cause this unusual situation. But even there, the percentage
of land held by the largest landowners cannot compare to the
percentage of land held by the government.
(6) Parratt, pp. 49 f.
(7) Bernard H. Siegan, "The Case Against Land Use Planning,"
Reason Magazine, 7, 9 (January, 1976), p. 8.
(8) Babcock, p. 93.
(9) Ibid., p. 54.
(10) John F.C. Turner, "Housing as a Verb," Freedom to BuiZd, eds.
John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter (New York, 1972), pp. 150 f.
(11) Parratt, pp. 49 f., though in general agreement with the
contents of this chapter, believes that codes are desirable
because they favor the large, efficient landlord. He apparently
believes that codes can be more easily enforced against such
landlords and that the efficiency of such landlords works to the
benefit of the poor. There may be some validity to this
reasoning, but the author believes that the trend toward
merging private enterprise and state is unhealthy in other
respects. Furthermore, it does not rebut the argument that
building laws reduce both the quantity and quality of housing
for the poor.
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Probably tile J.argest group tat has been p)enalized by building law.w ill
the United States are apartment dwellers. As described in previous
sections, building laws increase the costs of building considerably.
While these laws are a serious problem in the building industry
generally, the especially stringent regulations on multifamily
dwellings aggravate the problem even further for apartment builders and
dwellers.
Apartments first became popular in the United States in the 1830s when
emigrants flocked to New York City from the "teeming shores" of Europe
where many of them had grown accustomed to densely-populated, unsanitary
conditions.l But Americans were shocked by the nasty tenements and
soon passed laws that were aimed at correcting apartment conditions. 2
Thus apartments were among the first buildings to be affected by building
laws and they remain among the most regulated.
Because Americans' first experience with apartments was so negative, the
courts tended to think of them as disease carriers, fire hazards, and
blots on the landscape rather than as homes, and they upheld unusually
restrictive provisions that were aimed at multiple-family dwellings.3
One of the most serious problems facing apartment builders has been
finding land zoned for apartments. 13.3% of all municipalities with
populations of over 5000 people do not allow any apartments.4 If only
SMSA governments are considered, this figure jumps to 14.8%.5 And many
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of the towns which do allow apartments, plan such land in unsuitable
locations or as buffers between industrial and commercial areas and
"real residential areas."6 But there is even little of this unsuitable
land.
Since so little land is allotted to apartments, the supply is abnormally
restricted. To make matters worse, high speculative land prices (in part
caused by zoning policies), high tax rates, and strict subdivision
controls serve to price many customers out of the single-family
residential market, 7 thus artificially increasing the demand for
apartments. To this is added the problem that apartment builders are
usually unable to obtain variances in neighborhoods suitable for
residences because of neighborhood opposition.8
Because of the strict building coes and restrictive zoning ordinances,
apartment buildings became excessively costly and these costs were
passed on to tenants. Early reformers noted the rent increases, but
claimed that such increases had little to do with the building laws and
paternalistically added that even if the laws had caused an increase in
rent "[i]t would be sorrowful comment on the intelligence of the working
people if they were not willing to pay a little more for vastly improved
living accommodations." 9
The experience of New York City is a striking example showing how local
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building laws affect hou;iinq. The problems of New York City are, of
course, extreme and are complicated by other (non-building-related)
factors, but the pattern is clear and has been repeated in city after
city across the country. When building codes were first enacted in
New York City, rents ranged around $8 per week and tenement vacancy
rates averaged about 9% and ranged up to 43% in Ward 12.10 This
indicates that an adequate supply of apartments existed and that a
brisk competition between landlords was occurring. These large
quantities of vacant apartments insured that each (aware) landlord,
acting in his own self-interest, would try to offer the most desirable
(for the users) mix of price and quality to this tenants in order to
achieve low vacancy rates and high profits. Under such circumstances,
the landlord is obligated to please his tenants for if he doesn't, they
will move and his profits will fall. As suburban areas prohibited
apartments and building codes cracked down on "inadequate" conditions,
rents skyrocketed. Instead of seeking ways to increase supplies of
housing, New York City adopted rent control which naturally discouraged
new construction and maintenance 1 which only aggravated the problem.
After 75 years of strict building law, New York City has a vacancy rate
of under 1% (compared to 5% nationally and 3% in the heavily restricted
Northeast).12 This figure indicates that the supply is insufficient to
motivate landlord competition -- no matter the landlord's indifference
to the wants and needs of tenants, the tenants have little choice but to
accept high prices and poor quality housing. Added to this are over
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400,000 "deteriorated or dilapidated" apartments, a gap of $274 million
between the price of proper maintenance and the revenues actually
allotted by controlled rents, the abandonment of between 15,000 and
30,000 apartment units annually,l3 and notoriously exorbitant rents.
That strict building codes and restrictive zoning ordinances cause rents
to rise can hardly be doubted,14 but we have no way of estimating
actual costs. There is no metropolitan area in the United States where
neither set of laws exists, and only one, Houston, Texas, where zoning
has never existed. If we look at Houston's experience, however, our
theory seems to be affirmed -- at least with respect to zoning.
Dallas and Houston are almost twins: they are similar in terms of cost
of living, available land, unions, and virtually every other consideration
that might enter into the cost of housing. But Houston, despite a
reasonably strict building code which actually incorporates some of
zoning's features and despite city enforced covenants which effectively
"zone" some sections of the city, has no zoning. Predictably Houston
rents are considerably lower.15
Since the neediest people in our urban areas are usually apartment
dwellers and since building laws have increased costs and worsened housing
conditions for apartment dwellers, it follows that our building policies
run counter to our stated policies. Our building policies increase the
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cost of housing and decrease its availability while our stated goals
were to provide decent housing at affordable costs. Again, we must
question the efficacy of legal requirements in dealing with housing
problems.
(1) Richard F. Babcock and Fred P. Bosselman, "Suburban Zoning and
the Apartment Boom," University of PennsyZlvania Law Review, III,
8 (June, 1963), p. 1041.
(2) Ibid., p. 1043.
(3) Ibid., pp. 1044 f.
(4) Allen D. Manvel, LocaZ Land and BuilZding ReguZation, How Many
Agencies? What Practices? How Much PersonneZ? (Washington, D.C.,
1968), p. 32.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Convincing proof of this statement can be found in Norman
Williams, Jr. and Thomas Norman, "Exclusionary Land Use Controls:
The Case of North-eastern New Jersey," Land Use ControZs:
Present ProbZems and Future Reform, ed. David Listokin (New
Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), pp. 17 f.
(7) Babcock and Bosselman, p. 1053.
(8) Chris Kristensen, John Levy, and Tamar Savir, The Suburban
Lock-out Effect (White Plains, New York, 1971), p. 6 and
Daniel R. Mandelker, The Zoning DiZemma, A LegaZ Strategy for
Urban Change (Seattle, 1971), p. 151.
(9) Robert W. DeForest, "Introduction, Tenement Reform in New York
since 1901," The Tenement House ProbZem, VoZume I, eds. Robert
W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
p. xvi.
(10) Lawrence Veiller, "A Statistical Study of New York's Tenement
Houses," The Tenement House ProbZem, VoZume I, eds. Robert W.
DeForest and Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903),
p. 195, p. 214.
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(11) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), p. 25 f.
(12) Richard E. Slitor, "Tax Incentives and Urban Blight," Tax
Incentives (Lexington, Massachusetts, 1971), p. 259. David
M. Grant, "Phasing Out Rent Control," Reason Magazine, 6, 4
(August, 1974), p. 24.
(13) Grant, p. 24.
(14) Both proponents and opponents admit this readily. Spencer D.
Parratt, Housing Code Administration and Enforcement (Washington,
D.C., 1970), passim. and Siegan, p. 8.
(15) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 117 ff.
11.6 Producers and Consumers of Mobile and Manufactured Homes
Most of what we have already said about apartment dwellers and innovators
in previous subsections is true and worse for mobile and manufactured
home producers and consumers.
First, high costs in traditional housing and apartments have forced the
demand for alternate homes higher than it would normally be. Then
building codes and zoning have been used virtually to ban this sort
of housing from many parts of our country. Needless to say, this policy
frustrates a large number of would-be consumers and producers of
alternate homes.
Manufactured housing producers find it difficult to achieve the
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potential cheapness inherent in mass production methods. Not only is
this sort of housing subject to the same minimum lot, minimum floor
area, frontage, and setback requirements that burden traditional
housing, but it has especial difficulties with building codes. A HUD
report! lists four major problem areas.
First, prefabricated housing is difficult to inspect.2 Either the
local inspectors must be sent to the factory (usually a financial
impossibility since these factories may be located anywhere in the world)
or the components must be partially disassembled on site which largely
destroys the cost savings involved in preassembly. Although a number
of states have adopted state-wide factory inspection systems, local
inspectors still require partial disassemblies and sometimes even
prohibit manufactured housing altogether.3
Second, the lack of uniformity of codes forces the manufacturer to obey
all codes -- the strictest requirements of each apply.4 As we have seen,
local codes, even when based on a model code, are likely to have some
expensive, restrictive provisions. The traditional contractor can,
because of his one-house-at-a-time methods, build a minimum house and
make the necessary variations as the local inspector and codes require.
The manufactured home producer, because of his assembly line techniques,
finds it difficult to make changes for the small number of homes that
might be built in any given town. Therefore each expensive, restrictive
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requirement must be incorporated into every manufactured home or
sufficient flexibility must be built in to allow on-site variations.
This naturally forces costs up. Furthermore, efforts at implementing
state-wide codes have not met with notable success: manufactured housing
per se is illegal in at least one town in Massachusetts despite the
adoption of the BOCA code.5 Local variations in enforcement and
administrative policies are the most likely cause of such anomalies.
Third, local unions and local inspectors are often unable to cope with
the technological advances that could make manufactured housing
inexpensive.6 As a result, lengthy approval procedures and rejection
of new techniques are often the result. This is expensive at best and
prohibitive at worst.
Finally, partially as a result of the above and partially as a result
of structural problems in the industry, manufactured housing suffers a
competitive disadvantage. 7 The rules were made for a different game,
traditional homebuilding, and as a result, manufactured housing has
never been able to attain the volume of sales necessary to take full
advantage of its mass production techniques. It is not surprising to
find that manufactured housing has not fared well on the market; it is
only surprising to find that it exists at all.
Mobile homes have a different set of problems. A uniform mobile home
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code disallowed the use of building codes to burden mobile homes, so
localities switched to zoning laws to keep out this variety of cheap
housing. As noted previously, the courts have held that zoning
prohibitions against mobile homes are enforceable (Vickers v. Township
Committee of Glouster Township).8 Although some courts have not followed
this decision, 9 the complete prohibition of mobile homes is not uncommon.
In a study done on four New Jersey counties 100% of the 500,000 acres
studied effectively excluded mobile homes. 10 We say "effectively"
because even when a community does allow mobile homes, they may put
such onerous zoning restrictions on them that they lose the competitive
cost advantage. For instance, one of the New Jersey towns in the study
required a one-acre minimum lot size and a 1500 square foot minimum
floor area for almost all mobile homes.ll
Thus we see that people seeking inexpensive detached housing have also
been disadvantaged by our building laws.
(1) David Falk, Building Codes and Manufactured Housing (Washington,
D.C., 1970).
(2) Ibid., p. 8.
(3) Private conversation with Paul Kelly James of Boise Cascade.
(4) Falk, pp. 9 f.
(5) Private conversation with Paul Kelly James of Boise Cascade.
(6) Falk, pp. 12 f.
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(7) Ibid., pp. 13 ff.
(8) 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962).
(9) Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d
322 (1971).
(10) Norman Williams, Jr. and Thomas Norman, "Exclusionary Land Use
Controls: The Case of North-eastern New Jersey," Land Use
Controls: Present Problems and Future Reform, ed. David
Listokin (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974), p. 114.
(11) Ibid., p. 117.
11.7 The Supersensitive
This is a rather amorphous group of people whose standards for housing
are higher than or different from standards which the building law
enforces. First, they may be Jews, blacks, or philosophical pacifists
(or any other religious, ethnic, or ideological group members) who
want to live and raise their children in a sympathetic environment.
Second, they may be physically handicapped or noise-sensitive or
asthmatic and be unable to cope well in an environment geared for
average people. Or, third, they may be average gullible people who
rely on the promises of safety and security contained in our building
laws.
Society has answered the first group of people with a resounding,
"No, you may not do that, you bigots." Our dubious vision of America
as the great melting pot has dimmed our vision of reality. Many
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people want to exclude "the others" (although this had traditionally
been used against racial minorities, this writer does not necessarily
mean it in that sense), and, whether this desire stems from bigotry
or a sincere desire to conserve and pass on cultural values, "the others"
will be excluded one way or another. It is indeed wrong to enforce
religious, ethnic, or ideological segregation with our building laws
(although it is often done because the excluders find it easy to
manipulate local laws to their advantage). But what is wrong is that
it is enforced segregation -- that people living under such laws often
do not have the option of living in a more diverse neighborhood. It
is equally wrong (and futile) to try to enforce integration. This
problem obviously is of greater dimension than building laws, but
because building laws have played such an important role in enforcing
segregation and because building laws could play such an important role
in enforcing an equally repressive cultural homogeneity, we must make
some attempt to deal with the problem.
Society's answers to handicapped, noise-sensitive, asthmatic, or other
physically special people has been mixed. Sometimes we say yes:
Massachusetts recently adopted an accessibility code which forces
everyone to live in and pay for an environment modified for the blind,
the aged, and the wheelchair-ridden. Such a code, if enforced (and it
shows every sign of being enforced), is rife with all the problems of
normal building codes: graft, increased cost, decreased supply, and
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all their ancillary difficulties. We have not given a satisfactory
answer to the majority of our populace when we say yes to special
interests -- no matter how legitimate the needs of those special
interests may be.
At other times, society has said no to these people: "Of course, many
of these [noise] risks must be accepted as the inevitable burden of
community living and for the over-sensitive the choice must be the
soundproof apartment or the secluded farm."1 We have not given a
satisfactory answer to our physically special people when we adopt
positions which allow them no feasible environmental alternatives.
This then is a problem with which our building laws have dealt
inadequately.
Finally, in this category are the many people who, because of the
existence of the law, naively rely on the structural integrity,
electrical capacity, or fire resistance of structures. They feel that
their neighborhoods are adequately protected because they are appropriately
zoned, and they trust contractors, engineers, architects, and their
workmen because the law sets standards which everyone must obey.
But as we saw in the chapter on nonenforcement, these people are sadly
led astray. Because of legal variances, illegal graft, inspector
discretion or ignorance, and beneficent nonenforcement, the standards
promulgated in our laws are often not achieved. For the same reasons,
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our neighborhoods are not protected from unwanted encroachments. A
striking example of our lack of protection can be seen if we review an
earlier hypothetical example: Nature Lovers' Association vs. Cheapo
Homes, Inc. Previously, we grieved over the fact that the poor would
usually be excluded because the nature lovers were able to exert more
influence over local decisions. However, in light of recent complaints,
it seems likely that the courts will eventually recognize the fact that
potential residents should have some standing and will start to decide
these cases in favor of the developer. The result may often lead to
subsidized projects invading middle- and upper-income neighborhoods
and occupying desired recreation or conservation areas. Invasions of
low-income, powerless neighborhoods have been common; such invasions in
wealthier neighborhoods, although perhaps more equitable, are no more
desirable. Residential neighborhoods should be allowed some protection
that is inviolate from the whims of a local official or even a Supreme
Court judge. The sad fact is that our building laws frequently have
been unable to deliver the promised goods and, sadder still, our building
laws have lulled many millions of Americans into believing that their
homes and neighborhoods are secure, safe, and sanitary when they are not.
This too, then, is a problem any reformation of building laws must address.
The factor that ties all these examples together is their basic
unsolvability. Forced segregation is wrong, but so is forced integration.
Forcing poor tenants to pay for wheelchair ramps is wrong, but can we,
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as a society, ignore the real needs of some members just because they
were unfortunate enough to be physically handicapped? How safe is
safe enough? How secure is secure enough? How sanitary is sanitary
enough? Each of us has answers to these questions that are appropriate
for ourselves, but are we so sure of our personal solutions that we are
willing to enact them into law and force others to comply with them?
When the law intrudes into these areas, it will, no matter how carefully
interests are balanced, necessarily err. The decisions that must be made
in these areas ought not to be made in the political arena -- such
insures that whoever controls the government will control the values
that are enacted into law. Only a dispersed, voluntary decision-making
process can be equitable.
(1) Frank E. Horack, Jr., "Performance Standards in Residential
Zoning," Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed. Richard
B. Andrews (New York and London, 1972), p. 76.
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We: h;ave nrot(d that a larg(! llmber of peop (lle, 'r-lhl); most peoplte,
are harmed by building law. But building laws would have been repealed
long ago, good intentions notwithstanding, unless someone benefited
from them. Those are the people discussed in this chapter. Siegan
provides us with our first hint of where to look to find these
people: "Use will be determined by who has the political power, who
has the graft, who has the influence, who has the multitude of things
that causes the political powers to act as they do."l
(1) Bernard H. Siegan, "The New Approach to Planning: Nonzoning,"
Reason Magazine, 4, 12 (April, 1973), p. 6.
12.1 Building Law Professionals
It is no accident that architects, engineers, lawyers, and planners have
often played starring roles in the enactment of various building laws.l
Such laws provide them with work and increase demand for their services
while the supply is usually being limited by registration laws or bar
requirements. Obviously, under these conditions of artificially created
excessive demand and artificially created limited supply, their wages
rise. This does not imply any actual dishonesty on the part of such
professionals; it does mean that, as professionals, we have been loathe
to consider the possibility of doing away with such laws and we have
often been blind when considering the results of our legislation. Not
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only is economic self-interest at stake however. Often we honestly
believe that we have special skills and insights which consumers ought
to be forced to buy, and this puts our self-esteem at stake also.
Once the laws were enacted, the professions quickly moved in to administer
them and to keep an eye on them so that unfavorable trends could be
blocked. Thus we find that the first building inspectors in England were
often architects;2 the aesthetics commission in the Netherlands provides
numerous jobs for architects;3 and in Sweden, where architects have not
been able to get registration laws passed, the City Architects reject
all plans not prepared by fellow-professionals thus insuring that the
lack of registration laws will not result in fewer jobs for architects.4
In this country, building laws provide the same sort of incentives:
planners, architects, engineers, and realty lawyers almost always
benefit because of the existence of such laws and the more stringent the
law, the more they benefit. Since these same professionals oftentimes
control the contents of our building laws, the incentives we offer favor
strict laws.5 Our policy of intervention has offered inappropriate
incentives. Only a policy of non-intervention can correct this difficulty.
(1) In England, the RIBA played a major role in instituting
architectural controls (see Sidney Cohn, Practice of Architectural
Control in Northern Europe, A Report Prepared for HUD (Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, 1968), p. 120.) In New York City, the AIA,
the Architectural League, and the Society of Beaux Arts Architects
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all supported tenement building codes (see Robert W. DeForest
and Lawrence Veiller, "The Tenement House Problem," The
Tenement House Problem, Volume I, eds. Robert W. DeForest and
Lawrence Veiller (New York and London, 1903), p. 67.). Early
zoning efforts were supported by planners seeking a wedge to
get into the door of our laissez-faire land-use policy and by
numerous architects and lawyers. See Seymour I. Toll, Zoned
American (New York, 1969), p. 125, p. 147, pp. 155 ff. and
R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and Land-
Use Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), pp. 42 ff.
(2) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation
in London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), p. 54.
(3) Sidney Cohn, Practice of Architectural Control in Northern
Europe, A Report Prepared for HUD (Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
1968), pp. 67 f.
(4) Ibid., p. 44.
(5) See, for instance, Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and
Michael A. Fischetti, Survey of the Administration of Construction
Codes in Selected Metropolitan Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968),
p. 3 and passim. for documentation of how various professional
groups infludence decisions and code contents.
12.2 Inspectors
Probably the single group deriving the most obvious benefits from building
laws is comprised of the enforcers of the law -- without building laws
they would have to find another way to make a living.l The first building
inspectors were "scavengers" and "city viewers" who worked in London as
early as 1193; they were compensated by a tax-exempt status.2 In 1774
"surveyor" was made an official government post; these building inspectors
earned their livings from fees charged to the builders -- a situation
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which, combined with their extensive powers to mandate demolitions and
issue occupancy permits, led to notorious abuse and graft.
The modern American situation has not much improved on the medieval
English situation. Inspectors are poorly paid and are often only part-
time employees4 -- a circumstance which encourages graft and discourages
conscientious professionalism. Inspectors are often older men at the end
of their careers who take the position out of civic pride or employment
security.5 They are often chosen "informally"6 -- in other words, on the
basis of kinship, friendship, or political support -- and this naturally
leads to insecurity, conservativism, and general incompetence. Finally,
the inspectors often have much control over the contents of the codes they
enforce.7 Thus building law enforcers are a group of 33,000 building code
administrators and an unknown, but large, number of local zoning
administrators who form a built-in and influential lobbying group in
favor of ever more stringent controls.
(1) In the absence of building laws, private inspection and construction
management firms would be likely to grow since many people want
some assurance that buildings meet requirements. Many government
inspectors could be expected to be hired by such firms. It is
impossible to say how inspectors would fare under a free-market
situation because of complications in the market. Some inspectors
for private firms earn considerably less than government inspectors
and some earn considerably more. This is further complicated by the
fact that building codes sometimes require owners to hire private
inspection firms in addition to local services. This writer
suspects that, under a non-interventionist policy, the number of
inspectors would decline slightly, the less professional inspection
services would be driven out of business, and the better inspection
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companies would benefit. This belief, however, is contradicted
by some evidence: in Massachusetts the better private inspection
agencies have supported legislation to increase the scope of
mandated inspection services while the marginal private inspection
companies have ignored the lobbying efforts.
(2) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation in
London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), pp. 45 f.
(3) Ibid., pp. 51 f.
(4) Allen D. Manvel, Local Land and Building Regulation, How Many
Agencies? What Practices? How Much Personnel? (Washington, D.C.,
1968), p. 30.
(5) Charles G. Field and Steven R. Rivkin, The Building Code Burden
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1975), pp. 48 f.
and Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and Michael A Fischetti,
Survey of the Administration of Construction Codes in Selected
Metropolitan Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 67.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Field and Rivkin, pp. 51 ff.
(8) Williams, Young, and Fischetti, p. 65. Even if they do not control
code contents, they have considerable discretion in enforcement.
12.3 Monopolists and Oligopolists
This group is comprised of all businessmen (and workers) who use building
law's capability to limit market entry to their own advantage: local
businesses, contractors, unions, speculators, and landlords. As has
been pointed out by many writers, local private interests regularly
influence the contents and enforcement of building laws.l This is
because monopolistic or oligopolistic situations can be created by skillful
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manipulation of these laws. 2
Probably the first private interest group to influence building legislation
was the union -- or, as it was known in those days, the guild; Queen
Elizabeth's proclamations strengthened the monopolistic market position of
London's guilds.3 Our modern codes accomplish a similar goal: for
instance, a plumbing code typically serves to delineate "plumbers' work"
and often contains a provision requiring that all "plumbers' work" be
done by licensed plumbers.4 Union influence has been well documented. 5
It is clear that the incentives favor actions that contribute to union
member's well-being and to homeowners' costs. Probably unions have had
their worst effects in the areas of self-help and manufactured housing.
Many of the local provisions which require that only licensed tradesmen
(with licensing being controlled by the tradesmen themselves) may do the
work, and many of the provisions prohibiting preassembly were likely
instigated by local unions.
Unions also have been known to help a second group of monopolists and
oligopolists: local contractors. "Like many regulatory processes,
[building regulation] is complex and influenced by those it purports to
regulate."6 Local contractors have long influenced local building laws7
by making codes so restrictive and complicated that they discourage
self-helpers, manufactured housing producers, and competitors who might be
located in the next town. "Codes are thus powerful documents favoring
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certain ways of doing business and excluding others, which limits
competition."8 Another interesting way in which contractors have
sometimes limited competition is the contractor licensing system. This
is a system whereby only licensed contractors are allowed to do construction
work in a given locality. Since contractors themselves often control entry
requirements, oligopolistic practices and prices result.9
Despite our previous defense of landlords, it should be recognized that
many landlords enjoy a monopolistic or oligopolistic market position. As
we have shown, building laws have artificially increased demand for and less-
ened supply of various building goods. This situation leads to artificially
high rents (and often high profits) 10 -- especially in the absence of
offsetting conditions such as differential taxes, rent control laws, and
the like. One measure of the extent of oligopoly is the vacancy rate:
highly restricted situations such as that found in New York City result
in low vacancy rates.ll Since zoning is a prime weapon of landlords in
obtaining monopoly profits, we might expect Houston to have a comparatively
high vacancy rate; such is the case. 12 Thus in every place where zoning has
been enacted (and that is in almost every urban place), we must expect
landlords who have been favored with an oligopolistic position to fight to
maintain zoning ordinances.
Another benefiting group is composed of speculative realtors. Realtors,
though significantly inactive in housing code enactment, have, along with
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architects and Jawyer;: arid lanners, been the stars of zoning enactment
dramas. 13 They recognized zoning's potential for "raising the value of
land." A typical example of the profitability of zoning-enhanced
speculation is the following. A speculator with local "connections"
(i.e., a friend or a bribable zoning official) buys a large tract of land
which is presently a farm and is presently zoned for agricultural use.
He pays relatively little for the land (because so much land is zoned for
agriculture, it is typically quite cheap) and, while he holds the land, the
property taxes are low (because land zoned for agriculture is lightly
assessed). When the speculator finds a buyer, a developer seeking to
build tract houses, the speculator applies for a rezoning. With the help
of his "connection," the land is rezoned for single-family residences.
And the speculator sells the land to the developer at a considerable
profit. Of course, the "connection" in this scenario is unnecessary if the
speculator knows that rezoning decisions are usually approved by the local
board or if he is willing to accept some risk. Speculative realtors can
also capture profits by controlling the uses of properties adjacent to
their own land. Thus we see that, while realtors are unlikely to object
to building code reform, they benefit so much from current zoning practices
that they will most certainly lobby to maintain the status quo in zoning.
Finally, we will look at local businessmen. They too are generally more
interested in zoning regulations than in building codes. The impetus for
implementing zoning in New York City first came from the retailers of
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Fifth Avenue (the Fifth Avenue Association) who were being pushed uptown
by the Jewish-Italian-Russian garment industry. 14 They were joined by the
neighbors of the duPont building who feared that duPont (and other
potential skyscraper builders) would supply so much office space that they
would be unable to compete. 15 More recent cases have been similar. In
the Atherton case, zoning had allotted only one and one-tenth acres of land
for commercial purposes; this bestowed a monopoly on the existing
businesses. "A businessman who had been convicted of running a store in a
residential zone challenged the ordinance.... The court invalidated the
ordinance for having conferred a monopoly on existing businesses. While
the Atherton case has never been overruled, its rationale has not been
followed in recent decisions."16 In another case "[a] recent development
plan for one community in East Sussex noted that shoppers had been taking
their trade elsewhere, and planned the community accordingly. The addition
of new shops was restricted."17 Unfortunately, despite the lessening of
consumer choices and the increase of prices involved in these monopolistic
practices, at least one author favors the use of zoning to control competition.
He writes, "No question of fulfilling community demand is presented, but an
application is denied because another filling station or shopping center is
located close by. Were the application granted, the service areas of the
two stations (or centers) would overlap and neither would be completely
successful."18 Unhappily, the public costs accompanying such a paternalistic
zoning policy far outweigh the private benefits to businessmen. At any
rate, we must expect our businessmen to resist any reformation which would
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allow competitive businesses to locate in their communities.
(1) R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and Land-Use
Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), pp. 1 ff., pp. 134 ff.
Charles G. Field and Steven R. Rivkin, The Building Code Burden
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1975), p. 81. Lawrence
A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and Michael A. Fischetti, Survey of the
Administration of Construction Codes in Selected Metropolitan Areas
(Washington, D.C., 1968), pp. 39 f.
(2) Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (Lexington, Massachusetts,
Toronto, London, 1972), pp. 135 ff.
(3) C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building Regulation
in London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association (London, 1972), p. 13.
(4) Field and Rivkin, p. 41.
(5) Williams, Young, and Fischetti, p. 2.
(6) Field and Rivkin, p. 71.
(7) Williams, Young, and Fischetti, p. 2.
(8) Field and Rivkin, p. 2.
(9) Williams, Young, and Fischetti, pp. 3 f.
(10) Edmund Contoski, "Government Controls and Urban Renewal,"
Reason Magazine, 7, 1 (May, 1975), p. 24.
(11) See discussion of this mechanism in Siegan, starting on page 137.
(12) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), pp. 8 f.
(13) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), p. 147.
(14) Ibid., pp. 108 ff., p. 146.
(15) Ibid., p. 71.
(16) Daniel R. Mandelker, "Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose
in Zoning," Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City, ed.
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Richard B. Andrews (New York and London, 1972), p. 21.
(17) Ibid., p. 22.
(18) Ibid., p. 19.
12.4 Big Business and the Wealthy
From the beginning, building laws have always favored the wealthy. The
framers of housing codes in New York City lamented the fact that they
could not discriminate between upper-class apartments and tenements, and
the first setback law was instituted to ensure that only wealthier
people could afford to live on the grand avenue envisaged by the planners.1
A common complaint in the various political zoning battles in New York
City has been that the laws do not threaten the bigger architects,
builders, or realtors -- they give the larger firms a competitive
advantage.2 Today the situation is more complicated, but not essentially
different. The townships in which zoning is most popular are populated
by the wealthiest, the least unemployed, the most educated, young, white,
mobile, white-collar workers;3 and what they institute in the way of
zoning regulations has been termed snob-zoning, or "Ivy League Socialism."4
The only state with a working state-wide land-use policy is Hawaii -- a
state in which 85% of the land is owned by 100 individuals:5 these owners
don't mind zoning; they use it. Most of the land is zoned for agricultural
uses and is taxed accordingly.6 But landowners are powerful enough to
get the zoning changed to allow development at a rate which has prompted
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charges of "conflict of interest," "pro-growtlh poolicies," lll(i much elsIe.
This situation should remind the reader of the speculator's mechanism in
the last section.
The objections cited above involve simple favoritism. They are a result
of someone possessing legal power to enforce legislation which has
economic consequences. Historically, such situations have favored the
powerful, but even if we could turn the tables (an unlikely event),
the laws favoring minorities or the poor would be no more equitable.
But, let us suppose for the moment that we could enforce a truly
equitable law. The powerful and wealthy would still have at least two
advantages: (1) they are wealthy enough to obey the law and (2) they
are wealthy enough to fight the law.
The situation in the first case is illustrated by a study8 done on
building bulk regulations. The act of adding a number of small sites
(a possibility that is feasible only for relatively wealthy developers)
increases the size of the maximum permissible envelope disproportionately,
thereby allowing greater built volume factors than had been anticipated
by planners. 9 In this way minimum setbacks favored the agglomeration
of parcels and percentage reductions per story allowed taller buildings
on agglomerated parcels than would have been allowed on any of the
component smaller parcels. This consideration was used by developers in
New York City until 1961 when FAR legislation was enacted.l°0 But since
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most municipalities have not adopted FAR, and rather rely on setbacks,
this advantage for the large landowner is retained by most communities.
Similarly, careful study of the complex daylight indicator legislation
used in London shows that the first high-rise builder (usually the
wealthiest) has a significant advantage over later builders. 11
The second situation has been noted by many writers. The most frequent
type of case in zoning law involves gas stations;12 the large oil
companies can afford the fight. In at least one study,13 it was
suggested that appeals were generally sought only by the owners of larger
parcels.14 Only the largest developers and landowners can afford
litigation, thus assuring them of a favored position. 15
(1) 50' setbacks were established on some grand avenues in London
in 1757. C.C. Knowles and P.H. Pitt, The History of Building
Regulation in London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District
Surveyors' Association (London, 1972), p. 39.
(2) S.J. Makielski, Jr., The Politics of Zoning (New York and
London, 1966), p. 136, p. 140.
(3) Seymour I. Toll, Zoned American (New York, 1969), pp. 293 f.
(4) Ibid., pp. 296 f.
(5) About 40% is held by government and about 40% is held by less
than 100 individuals, corporations, and trusts. R. Robert
Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and Land-Use Control
(New York, Washington, London, 1975), p. 61.
(6) Ibid., pp. 62 ff.
(7) Ibid., pp. 69 ff.
-222-
12.4 Big Business and the Wealthy (continued)
(8) Dean Hawkes, Building Bulk Legislation: A Description and
Analysis (Cambridge, England, [n.d.]).
(9) Ibid., p. 9.
(10) Ibid., pp. 19 f.
(11) Ibid., p. 36 and diagrams following.
(12) Richard F. Babcock and Fred P. Bosselman, "Suburban Zoning and
th, Apartment Boom," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, III,
8 (June, 1963), p. 1040.
(13) Daniel R. Mandelker, The Zoning Dilemma, A Legal Strategy for
Urban Change (Seattle, 1971).
(14) Ibid., p. 140.
(15) See, for instance, Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1972), p. 171.
12.5 The Middle Class
As we have seen earlier, large segments of the middle class are harmed by
building laws, but those middle-class families who live traditional
life-styles and who would choose voluntarily to pay for some of the costs
associated with building law may actually benefit from the existence of
building laws. As was pointed out in the Supreme Court decision in
Euclid v. Ambler, "Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is
followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free
circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise
would fall upon the smaller homes, and bringing as necessary accompaniments,
the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and
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the occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of larger
portions of the streets thus detracting from their safety and depriving
children....." Large segments of the middle class subscribe to the
reasoning cited in this case and, since the middle class is numerous
and the local political process is democratic, the middle class does
have a large role in deciding the exact provisions of building laws.1
This means that this group has usually benefited from building laws.
They get open space; some protection for the residential character of
their neighborhoods; some guarantee that the home that they buy will be
safe and sanitary, and many miscellaneous benefits varying from community
to community. Of course, the middle class not only receives these
cultural and aesthetic benefits; economic considerations also play a
role. "It seems unlikely that a community with housing units of widely
divergent values is viable so long as there are alternative communities
available which offer the financial benefits of homogeniety. Residents
would have to be willing to make explicit payment for the privilege of
living in a heterogeneous community and I expect that the demand for the
opportunity to live among lower-income people is rather limited in this
country." 2 Given that the poor have been excluded and given that many
suburban communities have maintained their traditional residential
character in the face of explosive growth, we cannot doubt that some
substantial portion of the middle class has been benefited.
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Through the force of law, the traditional middle-class family receives
these benefits without having to pay -- they voluntarily obey the laws.
Even when a middle-class individual is oppressed by zoning or building
codes, he will often perceive that the net effect of the law in question
is beneficial to him and will support it. The problem is that they are
able, through building laws, to force people with different values to obey
the building laws too, and this causes hardship for those whose values
are not traditional middle-class ones.
(1) R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and Land-Use
Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), p. 170.
(2) Bruce Walton Hamilton, The Impact of Zoning and Property Taxes
on Urban Structure and Housing Markets (Ann Arbor, Michigan,
1972), pp. 30 f.
12.6 Environmentalists
The most common building law struggles in the courts have recently
revolved around, not the question of property rights versus human
rights, but the question of ecology versus the poor.l The open space
proponents and conservation commissions have been quite successful:
between 35% and 40% of all land in the United States is owned by some
level of government;2 despite numerous complaints, the growth of
development in Hawaii seems to have been significantly retarded;3
despite the fact that the vast majority of applications for development
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on the California coast are approved by the California Coastal
Commission, many of them are modified and development has proceeded
at a slower pace than would have been expected in the absense of the
environmentally conscious Commission.4 Our various "conservation"
programs have quite clearly worsened conditions for the poor and
bestowed unearned rewards on the environmentalists. The quantity of
land suitable for development decreases which forces housing prices
higher which pushes the poor out of the market. At the same time,
environmentalists get "free" open space.5
(1) R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, The States and Land-
Use Control (New York, Washington, London, 1975), p. 198.
(2) Bernard H. Siegan, Other People's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), p. 112.
(3) Linowes and Allensworth, pp. 60 ff.
(4) Bernard H. Siegan, "The Case Against Land Use Planning,"
Reason Magazine, 7, 9 (January, 1976), pp. 6 f.
(5) This open space is not truly "free:" either the owner of
regulated property must pay for the environmentalists' goods
(because of reduced opportunities to use the land profitably)
or everyone must pay for eminent domain takings through taxes.
In no case do the environmentalists have to pay the full costs.
Of course, we must assume that environmentalists would be
willing to pay for some conservation areas (if they could not
obtain them more cheaply through government interference), so
an exact prediction of the ratio of conservation land to buildable
land under free market conditions is impossible. This author
believes that, absent government, the ratio would decrease
substantially because conservation land would no longer be so
inexpensive.
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12.7 Some Politicians
As we saw in Section 4.2 Graft, the Personal Variety, some politicians
gain quite directly from the existence of building laws: without such
laws they would not have been able to extract graft from developers.
This graft can either be used as disposable income or as additions to
one's campaign funds. An "honest" politician can gain the same benefits
with much less risk by consistently using his official capacity to serve
some special interest group.l For instance, the "environmentally
conscious" politician gains respect as a concerned public servant and also
gains a staff of dedicated, energetic, young campaign workers. No matter
how unsound a proposal might be, this politician will support it if it is
labelled "conservationist." To this writer's mind there is little
difference between the politician who accepts money in exchange for
support of an unsound law and the politician who accepts campaign staff
help in exchange for support of an unsound law. Both types of politicians
benefit from building laws unjustly.
(1) Read Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game, Municipal Practices
and Policies (Madison, Wisconsin, 1966), pp. 140 ff. for a
discussion of how local legislators "cave in" under neighborhood
pressure. Read Lawrence A. Williams, Eddie M. Young, and
Michael A. Fischetti, Survey of the Administration of Construction
Codes in Selected MetropoZitan Areas (Washington, D.C., 1968),
p. 3 for a discussion of how special business interests control
appeal board members and other government decision-makers. Read
Bernard H. Siegan, Other PeopZe's Property (Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1976), p. 15 for a discussion of
how "pro-enviornment" politicians win support from ecologically-
minded voters.
-227-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Building Codes,
A Program for Intergovernmental Reform. Washington, D.C.: self-
published, 1966.
Andrews, Richard B., ed. Urban Land Use Policy: The Central City.
New York and London: The Free Press, Collier-Macmillan Limited,
1972.
Babcock, Richard F. The Zoning Game, Municipal Practices and Policies.
Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.
and Fred P. Bosselman. Exclusionary Zoning, Land
Use Regulation and Housing in the 1970s. New York, Washington,
London: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1973.
"Suburban Zoning and the
Apartment Boom," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, III,
8 (June, 1963), 1040-1091.
Banfield, Edward C. The UnheavenZy City Revisited, A Revision of the
Unheavenly City. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company,
1974.
and Morton Grodzins. Government and Housing in
Metropolitan Areas. New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1958.
Bellman, Richard F. and Alice Baker. Summary of Recent Court Challenges
to Exclusionary Land-Use Practices. Washington, D.C.: National
Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc., 1972.
Benevolo, Leonardo. The Origins of Modern Town Planning. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1971.
Bergman, Edward M. Eliminating Exclusionary Zoning: Reconciling
Workplace and Residence in Suburban Areas. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974.
Block, Walter. Defending the UndefendabZe. New York: Fleet Press
Corporation, 1976.
Brown, Susan Love, et aZia. The Incredible Bread Machine. San Diego:
World Research, Inc., Campus Studies Institute, 1974.
Building the American City. Report of the National Commission on Urban
Problems to the Congress and to the President of the United States.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968.
-228-
BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Citizens Committee on Zoning Practices and Procedures. A Program to
Improve Planning and Zoning in Los Angeles, Final Report. Los
Angeles: City Administrative Officer, 1969.
Cohn, Sidney. Practice of Architectural Control in Northern Europe,
A Report Prepared for HUD. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Center
for Urban and Regional Studies, Institute for Research in Social
Science, University of North Carolina, 1968.
Contoski, Edmund. "Government Controls and Urban Renewal," Reason
Magazine, 7, 1 (May, 1975), 23-27.
Data for States and Selected Areas on Characteristics of FHA Operations
under Section 203. Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 1968.
DeForest, Robert W. and Lawrence Veiller, eds. The Tenement House
Problem. 2 Vols. New York and London: The Macmillan Company,
Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1903.
Delaware State Planning Office. Codes and Their Effect on DeZeware's
Housing, An Analysis of Housing Related Codes. Dover, Delaware:
self-published, 1970.
Falk, David. Building Codes and Manufactured Housing. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.
Field, Charles G. and Steven R. Rivkin. The Building Code Burden.
Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London: Lexington Books,
D.C. Heath and Company, Inc., 1975.
Forrest, G. Topham. The Construction and Control of Buildings and
the Development of Urban Areas in the United States of America.
Westminster, England: London County Council, 1925.
Franklin, Herbert M. Land Use Controls as a Barrier to Housing
Assistance. Springfield, Virginia: National Technical Information
Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973.
Gans, Herbert J. The Urban Villagers. New York and London: The Free
Press, Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1962.
Goldman, Arthur S. The Influence of Model Codes and Their Associations
on Acceptance of Innovative Technology at the Local Level.
Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1973.
-229-
BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Grant, David M. "Phasing Out Rent Control," Reason Magazine, 6, 4
(August, 1974), 24-28.
Griffiths, Hugh, Alfred Pugsley, and Owen Saunders. Report of the
Inquiry into the Collapse of Flats at Ronan Point, Canning Town.
London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1968.
Grigsby, William G. Housing Markets and Public Policy. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963.
Haar, Charles M. Land-Use Planning, A Casebook on the Use, Misuse, and
Re-use of Urban Land. 2nd ed. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown
and Company, 1971.
Hamilton, Bruce Walton. The Impact of Zoning and Property Taxes on
Urban Structure and Housing Markets. Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University Microfilms, 1972.
Havender, William R. "Race and Economics," Reason Magazine, 8, 7
(November, 1976), 28-30.
Hawkes, Dean. Building Bulk Legislation: A Description and Analysis.
Cambridge, England: Centre for Land Use and Built Form Studies in
the University of Cambridge, [n.d.].
"Hot Potato," AREA Bulletin, 2, 4 (July, 1976), 9.
"Houston in the News -- Again!," AREA Bulletin, 2, 4 (July, 1976), 3.
"'Incompatible' Land Uses? Who Sez?," AREA Bulletin, 2, 4 (July, 1976), 5.
Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York and
Toronto: Random House, Inc. and Random House of Canada, Limited,
1961.
Jones, Rudard A. A Rationale for Government Intervention in Housing:
Diversity in Community Building Codes Acts to Constrain the
National Effectiveness of the Housing Technical Community.
Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1973.
Knowles, C.C. and P.H. Pitt. The History of Building Regulation in
London 1189-1972 with an Account of the District Surveyors'
Association. London: Architectural Press, 1972.
Kristensen, Chris, John Levy, and Tamar Savir. The Suburban Lock-out
Effect. White Plains, New York: Suburban Action Institute, 1971.
-230-
BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
"Land Use: Rights of the Regulated," ARI7A ulti[tl, 2, I (,JaTlar\, I 76),
1-2.
Lansing, John B., Charles Wade Clifton, and James N. Morgan. New Homes
and Poor PeopZe, A Study of Chains of Moves. Ann Arbor: Survey
Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of
Michigan, 1969.
Linowes, R. Robert and Don T. Allensworth. The States and Land-Use
Control. New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, Inc.,
1975.
Listokin, David, ed. Land Use ControZs: Present Problems and Future
Reform. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy
Research, Rutgers University, 1974.
Lusk, Harold F., Charles M. Hewitt, John D. Donnell, and A. James Barnes.
Business Law Principles and Cases. Homewood, Illinois and Georgetown,
Ontario: Richard Irwin, Inc. and Irwin-Dorsey, Limited, 1970.
Makielski, S.J., Jr. The PoZitics of Zoning. New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1966.
Mandelker, Daniel R. The Zoning Dilemmna, A LegaZ Strategy for Urban
Change. Seattle: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971.
Manvel, Allen D. LocaZ Land and Building ReguZation, How Many Agencies?
What Practices? How Much PersonneZ? Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1968.
"Nebraska County Repeals Zoning," AREA BuZZetin, 2, 3 (May, 1976), 3.
Nourse, Hugh 0. A RationaZe for Government Intervention in Housing: The
External Benefit of Good Housing, ParticuZarly with Respect to
Neighborhood Property VaZues.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books,
Inc., Publishers, 1974.
Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Logic of ColZective Action, PubZic Goods and the
Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1965.
"Owner's Victory," Reason Magazine, 8, 7 (November, 1976), 15-16.
Parratt, Spencer D. Housing Code Administration and Enforcement.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
-231-
BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Property Tax Reform, The Role of the Property Tax in the Nation's
Revenue System. Chicago: International Association of Assessing
Officers and the Fund for Public Policy Research, 1973.
Public Administration Service. A Study of Local Building Codes and Their
Administration in the Southeast Michigan Six-County Region.
Detroit, Michigan: Metropolitan Fund, Inc., 1966.
Rivkin, Steven R. Creating a National Market for Innovation in Building.
Part I. Alternative Regulatory Mechanisms. Washington, D.C.:
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1973.
Rosenau, Helen. The Ideal City, Its Architectural Evolution. New
York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1972.
Sagalyn, Lynne B. and George Sternlieb. Zoning and Housing Costs, The
Impact of Land-Use Controls on Housing Price. New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, The
State University of New Jersey, 1973.
Siegan, Bernard H. "The Case Against Land Use Planning," Reason
Magazine, 7, 9 (January, 1976), 6-12.
Land Use Without Zoning. Lexington, Massachusetts,
Toronto, London: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, Inc.,
1972.
"The New Approach to Planning: Nonzoning," Reason
Magazine, 4, 12 (April, 1973), 4-13.
Other People's Property. Lexington, Massachusetts,
Toronto, London: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, Inc.,
1976.
Solomon, Arthur P. The Effect of Land Use and Environmental Controls on
Housing: A Review. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Joint Center for
Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
Harvard University, 1976.
Tax Incentives. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971.
"Thumbs Down on Zoning in Midwest," AREA Bulletin, 2, 5 (September, 1976)
6.
Toll, Seymour I. Zoned American. New York: Grossman Publishers, Inc., 1969.
-232-
BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)
Turner, John F.C. and Robert Fichter. Freedom to Build. New York:
Macmillan Company, Inc., 1972.
Williams, Lawrence A., Eddie M. Young, and Michael A. Fischetti.
Survey of the Administration of Construction Codes in Selected
Metropolitan Areas. Washington, D.C.: National League of Cities,
1968.
Wolfe, Myer R. Urban Planning and Development Series No. 7. Seattle:
Department of Urban Planning, Washington State University, 1972.
"Zoning Fight Spreads in Western New York State," AREA Bulletin, 2, 1
(January, 1976), 2-3.
-233-
